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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis investigates the cross-sectional stock returns in connection with two 
corporate characteristics: distress risk and profitability.  These are two fundamental 
factors that determine expected stock returns. 
 
The research seeks to explain stock return premiums which are driven by these 
factors. The first chapter, Limit of Arbitrage and the Distress Puzzle, investigates 
what lies behind the long-term, persistent distress risk premiums. This chapter finds 
the distress risk premium is clustered in firms with high bid-ask spread, dollar 
volume, idiosyncratic volatility and short-selling constraints such as low 
institutional ownership and low short interest ratio. Upon dissecting the distress risk 
indicator as measured by failure probability based on Campbell et al. (2008, 2011), 
it appears that high distress risk firms with extremely small market capitalisation 
primarily contribute to this equity premium. After the double-sorting method is 
applied to firms based on these factors and distress risk, the average value-weighted 
distress premium increases from 0.62% per month for market-wide level to 1.35%- 
2.17% per month for the top 20% limit-of-arbitrage effect firms. Furthermore, the 
interaction of distress risk with stock’s bid-ask spread, illiquidity ratio, short-selling 
constraints and idiosyncratic volatility further distinguishes the predicting power of 
distress risk, in which the difference of predicting power of firm’s failure 
probability can be as large as five standard errors from zero.    
 
The second chapter, Profitability, Insider Ownership and Cross-sectional Stock 
  
II 
 
Returns, examines how profitability anomalies are related to firm’s insider 
ownership regarding determining cross-sectional stock returns in the U.S. market. 
Gompers et al (2003) find low agency cost firms tend to outperform others and 
attribute the effect to improved profitability and value-creating decision from 
corporate governance channel. Portfolio-level analyses confirm that firms with 
lower agency costs, as proxied by various forms of insider ownership, are positively 
associated with stock returns. Besides firm’s insider ownership is positively related 
to the profitability premium in the U.S. stock market for the period 1980-2015. 
However, in cross-sectional analyses the interactive relationship between firm’s 
profitability and institutional ownership is sensitive to additional risk factors and 
sample volume. 
 
The third chapter, Profitability Premium, Firm’s Distress Risk and Stock Returns 
documents a robust relationship between the two pricing factors, linking the two 
empirical findings together. This chapter finds a significant interaction effect of 
firm’s profitability, as well as distress risk, in co-determining stock returns cross-
sectionally. In line with the findings of Altman (1968), as well as Fama and French 
(2006), that firm’s past information of profitability predicts future distress event 
and vice versa. This chapter finds that the profitability premium is partially 
clustered with firms having high distress risk, and the predicting power of firm’s 
profitability ratio is different over three standard errors from zero between low and 
high distress risk firms. Theses findings shed light on exploring the two 
fundamental pricing factors under a unified framework of asset pricing. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Motivations 
The research on asset pricing aims to explain how asset prices are determined, 
under which the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) theory plays a central role. As 
described by Fama (1970), an efficient market is a market where the information 
set is fully reflected in the current asset price, depending on the trichotomy of 
information. The EMH theory proposed three levels of market efficiency and each 
level contains a set of information that could influence asset prices:  historical prices 
or returns; fundamental information that is publicly-known; private information.  
Under such a state, stocks always trade at their fair value on the market. It inferes 
that it is impossible to outperform the overall market performance through 
exploiting trading strategies based on past price (meaning “weak form” efficient 
market), or on public information (meaning “semi-strong form” efficient market), 
or even on private information (meaning “strong-form” efficient market). The only 
way an investor can obtain higher returns is by purchasing riskier investments. 
EMH provides a consensus framework for understanding asset prices and 
explaining why returns of assets are not predictable. However, empirical research 
such as Basu (1977) and Banz (1981) challenges the predictability of asset return 
by showing asset prices are predictable with various fundamental firm 
characteristics, and investors can, therefore, make profits without taking extra risk. 
In a recent survey, Harvey et al. (2016) find academia has identified 316 pricing 
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factors from papers that have been published in leading journals since 1967, 
revealing how empirical findings are challenging the EMH.   
To explain cross-sectional stock returns and why asset returns are predictable 
conditioning on specific fundamental information, two schools of explanations 
have been proposed, based on the belief as to whether bearing systematic risk leads 
to the expected return, or returns are mispriced due to complex investor behaviour 
patterns.  Research based on rational expectation, for example, Fama and French 
(1993, 2015), Kapadia (2011) and Novy-Marx (2013) have boosted the research 
findings in terms of proposing new asset pricing models, identifying risk factors, 
and seeking economic reasons to fulfil the gap of empirical findings and theories. 
Research based on behavioural finance, like Daniel et al. (1998) Baker and Wurgler 
(2006) and Stambaugh et al. (2012), have made several interpretations in explaining 
anomalies on investor’s overreaction, learning process and other investor 
psychology. The debate on which theory describes asset pricing more efficient is 
still ongoing, due to some long-lasting, seemingly unexplainable anomalies like the 
distress puzzle (Campbell et al. 2008), and profitability premium (Novy-Marx, 
2013) which have been identified in the recent literature.  
In the last few decades, scholars of asset pricing have observed a persistent 
abnormal return from portfolios where small size and high book-to-market equity 
firms (in the literature, those are named as size and value premiums) are grouped. 
These patterns of return, together with other factors that generate excess returns by 
not bearing extra systematic risk, are known as anomalies. The risk of financial 
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distress was introduced by Chan and Chen (1991) to explain market anomalies 
related to the failure of Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). Along with Fama 
and French (1993), they attribute size and book-to-market anomalies to the effect 
of distress risk which is not captured by CAPM. They argue that distress risk is 
liable on a firm’s size and value premium as small firms and high book-to-market 
equity firms are likely to be financially distressed, and hence, those firms under 
exposure of distress risk are expected to be more rewarded. After controlling the 
variation of firm’s distress risk, asset pricing models can explain a sizable 
proportion of CAPM-related anomalies.  However, distress risk has become a new 
type of anomaly that requires investigation: Dichev (1998) finds high distress risk 
firms earn substantially lower returns than low distress risk firms. Also, firm’s 
distress risk can capture cross-sectional stock return variation beyond firm’s size 
and book-to-market ratio. Dichev’s (1998) work raised two questions related to 
firm’s distress risk: (1) whether firm’s size and book-to-market ratio are proxying 
distress risk, and (2) why is high distress risk not rewarded with a higher stock 
return than low distress risk stock. 
Campbell et al. (2008, 2011), Fama and French (1996, 2008), Dichev (1998), 
George and Hwang (2010), Griffin and Lemmon (2002), Kapadia (2011), Opler 
and Titman (1994), in common with Vassalou and Xing (2004), investigate the 
distress puzzle. Using various proxy variables for firm’s distress risk, these scholars 
have verified the predicting power of distress risk through different asset pricing 
models in the cross-sectional level. However, whether the distress puzzle is from 
the perspective of the rational school is still ongoing. Furthermore, Campbell et al. 
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(2008) point out that distress risk may not be a rational asset pricing effect. They 
find that the pricing power of distress risk and returns from distress risk-driven 
portfolios are tied into a different form of behaviour finance theory. Therefore, 
Campbell et al. concluded that distress puzzle is a new type of anomaly.  
The distress puzzle derives three main topics. The first is interpreting why distress 
risk negatively influences stock returns. While Fama and French (1992) 
successfully interpret the U.S. stock market based on their prestigious model in 
cross-sectional regression, they also find that two leverage measurements proxying 
for firm’s relative-distress have different signs on coefficients in determining 
stock’s expected return. In section III.B.2 of Fama and French (1992), the ratio of 
a firm’s total assets over the market value of its equity is positively related to 
portfolio returns, whereas the relationship is negative when leverage is measured 
in terms of total assets over the book value of equity. The negative sign of the 
relative distress risk to equity return is crucial, as it violates the core of asset pricing 
theory wherein a higher expected return is the result of bearing greater risk. The 
second topic is to understand the predicting power of financial distress in terms of 
equity price cross-sectional.  Fama and French (1992) claim that the firm’s book-
to-market ratio proxies firm’s distress risk, but their finding is challenged by Dichev 
(1998) who finds distress risk measures have additional pricing power explaining 
variations among stocks’ average returns, even when firm’s book-to-market ratio 
and firm’s size are considered. Furthermore, Campbell et al. (2008) find a 
significant return premium generated from low-minus-high distress risk stocks and 
the premium cannot be explained by common risk factors. If distress risk is a 
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systematic risk, why is it not captured by market risk factors as predicted by CAPM 
or other common risk factors such as size and book-to-market ratio? If distress risk 
is not a systematic risk, is there a resolution to explain the premium from distress 
risk? The third topic is an extension of the two topics testing whether firm’s distress 
risk as one of the firm’s characteristics can explain other anomalies. Conrad et al. 
(2014), Fama and French (1998), Franzen et al. (2007), Griffin and Lemmon 
(2002), Stambaugh et al. (2012), Tykvová and Borell (2012), and Tang et al. (2013) 
produce research designs to explain anomalies by using numerous distress risk 
measures. However, the existing literature remains unclear as to the reasons why 
investors do not gain positive rewards by bearing high distress risk.  
Recent works have identified a new anomaly related to firm’s profitability ratio 
within the research of Novy-Marx (2013) and Ball et al. (2015).  Their findings 
reveal the predicting power of profitability ratios in the cross-sectional stock 
returns, which are firm’s gross profitability over total assets and operating 
profitability over total assets respectively. By showing the variation of firm’s 
profitability independent of the market risk, firm’s size, and book-to-market equity 
in determining stock returns, Novy-Marx (2013) and Ball et al. (2015) also 
investigate how profitability is related to stock return anomalies. Firms with high 
profitability have earned high expected stock returns with robust statistical 
significance in the post-1960 period, depicting the independence to firm’s 
fundamental risks (Fama and French, 2006). Thus, Fama and French (2015) admit 
the pricing power of profitability ratios alongside firm investment intensity as two 
additional common risk factors.  
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The profitability premium is resulting from bearing a high expectation of future 
earning, in which high future dividends implies a higher discount rate or expected 
returns controlling for potential influences from firm’s size and book-to-market 
ratio, as argued by Novy-Marx (2013) and Ball et al. (2015). To prove this Novy-
Marx (2013) shows that firm’s gross profitability as a measure of economic 
profitability is better than other measures such as net income to total assets. Further, 
Ball et al. (2015) show the estimation of firm’s profitability ratio also captures the 
pricing power from the ratio of market equity to book assets value, which is another 
factor that has predicting power in the stock returns. However, the question of 
whether other theories could explain the profitability premium is still open, as it is 
identified recently and, therefore, has been investigated by researchers to a limited 
extent.  
Existing literature has identified several potential explanations in addition to the 
rational expectation theory that has been proposed by Novy-Marx (2013) as well as 
Ball et al. (2015). One explanation that has strong economic links to firm’s 
profitability is the theory of agency cost, where, for example, research on corporate 
governance, Gompers and Metrick (2001) and Gompers et al. (2003) find consistent 
evidence that low agency cost firms continuously outperform high agency cost 
firms, in terms of firm’s profitability and long-term stock returns. Therefore, it is 
arguable that the profitability premium, driven by firm’s profitability, is associated 
with firm’s agency cost, where good corporate governance status drives firm's high 
profitability. Furthermore, the relation of the profitability to firm’s distress risk has 
not been examined as well. In the existing literature of accounting, multiple 
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researchers including Altman (1968), Ohlson (1980) and Campbell et al. (2008) 
have discovered and repeatedly verified that there is a stable relationship between 
firms’ profitability and distress risk. Therefore, a detailed analysis linking these two 
fundamental risk factors is desirable in terms of asset pricing research.  
Investigating the distress puzzle and profitability anomalies has significant 
meaning for financial practice and, possibly more importantly, for theory building. 
Investors can make profits by adopting trading strategies based on similar 
anomalies. Fama and French (1998) show that by using anomaly-driven trading 
strategies in the U.S. equity market, investors earned 7.68% annualised returns from 
1975 to 1995, almost three times the market average return in the same period. In 
terms of the distress puzzle, Campbell et al. (2008) find that the annualised return 
is 9.80%, or 23.85% for risk-adjusted returns, with both figures significantly 
outperforming most well-documented anomalies. Additionally, in terms of the 
profitability premium, Ball et al. (2015) find the corresponding annualised return is 
approximately 4% or 9% adjusted for risks, and that both figures are robust in 1963-
2013 U.S. stock market with high t-statistics values.  According to the definition of 
the semi-strong efficient market from the EMH, return from fundamental 
information-driving trading strategy cannot exceed market return unless additional 
risk is taken. However, some anomalies, in particular, the distress premium and 
profitability premium, have realised significant excess returns whilst carrying fewer 
risks. Understanding how these two anomalies are related to a firm’s fundamental 
risk would be helpful in terms of testing whether investors can beat the market when 
composing new portfolio investment strategies. 
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From the perspective of financial theory, the distress puzzle and profitability 
premium question the EMH and the completeness of asset pricing models. If the 
market is efficient, why do low distress risk firms outperform high distress risk 
companies, and why do high profitability firms outperform low profitability firms 
for decades? If the asset pricing model is correct, then why have asset pricing 
models like CAPM and Fama-French 3-factor models have failed to explain the 
puzzle of distress risk and profitability? One of the features of the distress puzzle 
and profitability anomaly is their risk-adjusted return is even higher than raw return, 
indicating that these two anomalies have negative factor loadings to identified risk 
factors. Therefore, the explanation for the distress puzzle and profitability anomaly 
may present new evidence of EMH and develop new asset pricing models, where 
true risk factors more precisely determine asset prices.  
 
1.2 Research Questions 
Deriving from controversial empirical findings and reviewing the existing 
literature, this research aims to answer research questions around the distress puzzle 
and the profitability anomaly.  
• Does limit of arbitrage account for the distress puzzle?  
Campbell et al. (2008, 2011) and Conrad et al. (2014) document that high 
distress risk firms tend to have extremely small firm size, low institutional 
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ownership and high return volatility. Those are typical evidence that 
arbitrage limit exists among those stocks, and the returns of these stocks are 
not exploitable, because the cost incurred as a result of holding, trading, and 
short-selling restricts trading activities related to high distress risk stocks. 
Explaining anomaly by arbitrage limit theory has achieved fruitful results, 
where several well-documented anomalies like value premium (see Ali et 
al. 2003), idiosyncratic volatility puzzle (see Han and Lesmond, 2011; 
Stambaugh et al. 2016) and cash holding anomaly (see Li and Luo, 2016). 
Do investors trade high distress risk stocks frictionlessly, or does costly 
trading limit the exploitability of the distress premium? Is there any 
interaction between firm’s distress risk and common arbitrage limit factors 
and can the relationship between the two variables help explain the pricing 
power of distress risk? Those research gaps are filled in this thesis. 
• Does corporate governance explain profitability premiums? 
Gompers et al. (2003) note that corporate governance drives firm 
profitability and causes excess returns that the CAPM and Fama-French 
three-factor model cannot explain. They also find supporting evidence that 
the abnormal returns are associated with high agency cost firms, which are 
mostly having lower stock returns than low agency cost firms.  Lilienfeld-
Toal and Ruenzi (2014) document that CEO ownership, a proxy for internal 
governance surveillance, is also associated with stock returns. This is in line 
with the argument of Gompers et al. (2003) that high CEO ownership has a 
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positive incentive effect based on the fact that they are insiders who have 
access to the firm’s decision-making processes. This offers a potential 
explanation of why agency cost theory helps to explain profitability 
premiums, as documented by Novy-Marx (2013) and Ball et al. (2015), by 
testing whether agency costs also account for the variation in stock returns 
between low and high profitability firms. This research seeks to find 
suitable agency cost proxies and test if they are associated with the 
profitability anomaly. 
• What is the relationship between profitability premium and firm’s 
distress risk? 
The existing literature in the accounting area, such as Altman (1968), 
Ohlson (1980), and Shumway (2001), has revealed a consistent relationship 
between firm’s profitability and firm’s likelihood of bankruptcy. This work 
tests whether the distress risk is better at distinguishing the variation of stock 
returns from low and high profitability firms, seeking evidence of whether 
firm’s distress risk attributes to the profitability premium documented by 
Novy-Marx (2013) as well as Ball et al. (2015). 
Furthermore, the question of whether the pricing power of a firms’ 
profitability is distinctive with high/low distress risk firms is also 
investigated. An examination of the interaction effect of firm’s profitability 
and distress risk provides additional pricing power in terms of cross-
 11 
 
sectional stock returns when added to commonly recognised pricing factors. 
This is accompanied by a robust examination that recognises whether these 
results are affected by the selection bias of distress risk/profitability proxies. 
 
1.3 Findings and Contributions 
In Chapter 4, the limit of arbitrage effect underlying the distress risk puzzle is laid 
out. In brief, distress risk creates a persistent risk-adjusted return anomaly that is 
negatively related to expected returns and subjects to a strong arbitrage limit effect 
in 1981-2014 U.S. market. Novel empirical findings are presented, arguing that the 
distress risk premium documented by Campbell et al. (2008) are heavily affected 
by its transaction costs and holding costs implied, which is measured by bid-ask 
spread, dollar volume, illiquidity ratio and idiosyncratic volatility. By 
demonstrating the strong interaction effect of distress risk with several proxies of 
the arbitrage limit effect at both portfolio and individual stock level, one of the most 
prominent anomalies pointed out by Harvey et al. (2016) can potentially be 
resolved. 
Chapter 4 is constructed as follows. First and foremost, to verify the consistency of 
the research methodology with earlier research, the major conclusion of Campbell 
et al. (2008) that on average, stock return negatively associated with distress risk is 
replicated. With annually updated parameters to avoid look-ahead bias that most 
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relevant research has not covered, the distress risk premium in the 1981-2003 U.S. 
equity market is replicated, and using the extended sample of 1981-2014 US equity 
market data, the negative distress risk-return pattern continues to persist and is 
unaffected by different sampling criteria. Second, returns from the distress risk-
sorted portfolios are positively related with firm’s bid-ask spread, illiquidity 
measure, idiosyncratic volatility and negatively related with firm’s dollar volume. 
Third, in the independent double sort portfolio analyses, the value-weighted distress 
premium is positively associated with average arbitrage limit and is no longer 
significant in firms with low arbitrage limits. The Fama-MacBeth regression 
analyses confirm the significant divergence of distress risk’s pricing power in low 
and high arbitrage limit firms. 
Chapter 5 attempts to explain the profitability anomaly in terms of a firm’s 
characteristic of insider ownership. Supported by the theory of agency cost, an 
examination of whether agency cost measured as firm’s corporate governance is 
related to the profitability premium that Novy-Marx (2013) and Ball et al. (2015) 
have proposed. The results from portfolio level analyses show that a list of insider 
ownership variables, including CEO ownership, top managers’ ownership, 
institutional ownership and institutional ownership concentration is higher at 
portfolios constructed with high profitability. However, using firm-level analysis 
with Fama-MacBeth regressions, the hypothesised interaction effect of firm’s 
profitability and insider ownership appears to be mostly related to certain well-
documented risk factors such as firm size, book-to-market ratio, and momentum. 
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Controlling those factors helps to explain the difference of return from high and 
low profitability firms, but this finding requires further investigation. 
Chapter 5 is constructed as follows. First, to suit the data availability of several 
insider ownership variables, the dataset is trimmed to the 1980-2015 period, where 
the major conclusion that high profitability firms outperform low profitability firms 
with significant value-weighted premium is still observed. Second, in the portfolio 
analyses, the gross profitability premium and operating profitability premium are 
all lower in the high agency cost firms but higher in the low agency cost firms. 
Third, results from Fama-MacBeth regressions show that the interaction of firm’s 
profitability and insider ownerships are driven by other firm’s fundamental factors, 
as the interaction effect is less significant when those factors enter into regressions 
as control variables. One of the reasons for this phenomenon is the sample size of 
insider ownership, which covers only a small fraction of the stocks traded on the 
market.  
Chapter 6 examines the relationship between distress risk and firm profitability in 
the context of determining cross-sectional stock returns and explaining the 
profitability premium. The interaction between a company’s profitability and its 
distress risk adds additional predictive power in terms of understanding stock 
returns, and this effect is robust across various distress risk measures, including 
failure probability, O-score, Distance-to-Default and profitability measures. The 
interaction effect partially come from existing firm characteristics as documented 
by Fama and French (1993). However, when the variables of the above-mentioned 
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characteristics are controlled for, the interaction effect between profitability and 
distress risk remains significant at the 1%-5% level. In addition, profitability 
premiums are clustered in high distress risk firms, which account for 20% to 45% 
of total excess returns driven by firm’s profitability in the Fama-MacBeth 
regression analysis.   
Chapter 6 is constructed as follows. First, in the 1980-2015 period, two distress risk 
measures, Ohlson’s O-score and Bharath and Shumway (2008)’s Distance-to-
Default are measured with constituent methodology as target paper. Together with 
Campbell et al. (2008) failure probability, the average distress risk has a variation 
across low and high gross profitability/operating profitability sorted stocks. 
Second, the change of distress risk contributes to the profitability premium by 
showing that the premium is positively associated with average distress risk in the 
portfolio analyses. However, this relation is not significant where distress risk is 
proxied by Distance-to-Default. Third, Fama-MacBeth regressions present the 
comparable results as portfolio analysis, showing that the predicting power of 
firm’s gross profitability and operating profitability is significantly different in low 
and high distress risk firms. 
Therefore, the findings of the current research illuminate asset pricing studies by 
re-thinking the roles of several fundamental pricing factors. The pricing power of 
firm distress risk and firm profitability are investigated and related to other 
characteristics of firms to show how they interact. These results help rational asset 
pricing credibility by refining the multi-factor models in terms of the relationship 
 15 
 
between distress risk and firm profitability. From the perspective of behaviour asset 
pricing, the current research supports the view that arbitrage limit theory can 
explain a significant fraction of the distress risk premium. Moreover, market 
participants can exploit profitable passive trading strategies by constructing 
portfolios with higher risk-adjusted returns that offer compelling profits with a 
factor mimicking portfolio.   
 
1.4 Thesis Structure 
Chapter 2 summarises the relevant literature, reviews the concept of EMH and the 
core theories of asset pricing research with its relation to anomalies including 
distress puzzle and profitability anomaly. Particular attention is paid to related work 
that aims to explain anomalies from the perspectives of the rational school and the 
behaviourist school, and the paradigm of analysing market anomalies is discussed. 
Research on the impact of distress risk and firm profitability on stock’s expected 
returns is also reviewed. Specifically, the numerous contradictory findings of 
distress risk and expected returns are listed. Furthermore, the link between firm 
profitability and distress risk is explored, and the relationship of the two pricing 
factors within the literature delineated. 
Chapter 3 introduces research methodology. The procedure and analytical steps for 
investigating anomalies are explained in detail, and their advantages and 
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disadvantages are noted in order to clarify any inconsistent results. In addition, the 
methodology of estimating and simulation of Campbell et al. (2008) failure 
probability is introduced. 
Chapters 4 to 6 provide the empirical findings based on portfolio analysis and cross-
sectional regression. Before presenting the empirical findings, the relevant 
literature is referenced, and appropriate hypotheses presented. This is followed by 
an introduction to the data and analysis techniques used. Where necessary, target 
research is replicated to verify that the initial results are in line with prior research.  
In addition to the standard research paradigm, which includes portfolio sorts and 
cross-sectional regressions, robustness tests are conducted as necessary. 
A summary of the finding that highlights the limitations of the current project and 
suggests potential future research perspectives is given in Chapter 7. 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Efficient Market Hypothesis and Anomalies 
2.1.1 The concept of market efficiency and anomaly 
The concept of Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) has been proposed to describe 
the condition of capital market equilibrium and to explain why some assets offer 
higher returns than others. The EMH is widely interpreted as follows: Efficiency is 
defined by whether the market can adjust the price of an asset-in-the-market fully 
and instantly, and an efficient market means that the price for an asset in the market 
is fully reflective of all existing information (Nobel Prize Committee, 2013). EMH 
has become widely accepted, and many economic and financial theories rely on this 
assumption about markets and asset prices. Fama (1970), identifies three 
dimensions of market efficiency that helps to understand the level of information 
efficiency embed in EMH: a weak-form efficient market means that historical 
prices contain all available information for pricing future returns; a semi-strong 
form efficient market occurs where the speed of price adjustments to information-
generating events is timely, and a strong-form efficient market occurs where all 
private and public information is fully expressed in historical prices. There are 
several other interpretations of EMH like Jensen (1978). However, the core notion 
of EMH is consistent with Fama (1970). The concept of EMH has been extended 
and revised by Fama (1991) to fit the recent findings on asset pricing. The definition 
of the weak-form efficient market has revised to a test of “return predictability”, 
where time-series and cross-sectional analyses are used to forecast asset returns 
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using historical information; in the semi-strong form, efficient market tests are 
revised as “event studies”; and in the strong-form, efficient market tests are revised 
as “private information impacts”.  Of the three EMH tests, the return predictability, 
formerly the weak-form market efficiency, is the most discussed subject of 
research, and it is here that return anomalies are discovered that represent a 
challenge to the concept of the efficient market. 
Anomaly refers to evidence from empirical analysis when researchers try to explain 
stock returns using asset pricing models; per Fama (1991) “many of the front-line 
empirical anomalies in finance (like the size effect) come out of tests directed at 
asset-pricing models” (p.1589). Fama and French (1996) describe an anomaly as a 
type of public information that an investor can employ in order to generate excess 
returns persistently. Despite the variety of asset pricing theories with their different 
beliefs in market efficiency, there is one fundamental concept that rules them all, 
the risk-return trade-off relationship. The risk-return trade-off is an approachable 
expression of mean-variance optimisation as used by Markowitz (1952), and it is 
accepted by Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), and Black (1972) as the theoretical 
foundation of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). In non-mathematical 
terms, risk-return trade-off describes the profits people will make by bearing an 
equivalent amount of uncertainty. The concept that the benefits arise from the 
expectation of risk is the key essence of all tests verifying market efficiency; an 
anomaly is a violation of this rule, where asset returns do not fully reflect the risk. 
Fama and French (1998) admit that anomalies challenge the EMH. However, they 
argue that any empirical test of anomalies should consider the methodology issues 
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given the fact that most anomalies disappear when research is carried out over a 
long enough time span. Besides, existing theory from rational asset pricing has 
solved many apparent anomalies. However, other researchers such as Gruber and 
Ross (1978) argue that certain anomalies arise from investor behaviour. The 
behaviour and emotions of investors, subject to the influence of market information, 
become complicated and sensitive, and they may not make rational decisions. 
Mispricing thus widely exists in the market. 
Why is return anomaly a challenge of market efficiency? A central argument of the 
two surveys on EMH is the joint-hypothesis test, which is, according to Fama 
(1970) composed of two parts: proof of market efficiency in weak-form (otherwise 
known as return predictability) and a test of the suitability of asset pricing model in 
the cross-sectional analysis. Fama (1970) argues that market efficiency can only be 
tested where pricing factors are captured by an asset pricing model. Postulating a 
specific model of asset prices allows further study testing the hypothesis whether 
the deviation of asset returns from the model prediction is random or systematic. 
That is, whether the forecast errors embedded in the model are predictable. This 
joint hypothesis is further discussed by Jarrow and Larsson (2012), who provide 
mathematical proof of the joint-hypothesis test. They argue that one of the criteria 
for evaluating asset pricing model is to test whether a new asset pricing model can 
explain existing anomalies. This is consistent with the argument of Fama (1991), 
in which he points out that in order to conduct testing as to whether a market is 
efficient, a “good” asset pricing model is needed. An asset pricing model can only 
measure the speed and accuracy of price adjustments that occur through new 
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information. Cross-sectional regression can examine how well public information 
can explain the realised return by measuring the R-square value, and testing if the 
variation of specific variables can systematically affect returns of assets in the 
market. Thus, if the market is efficient, then the expected return should be 
positively associated with measurable risks, which can be captured by an asset 
pricing model where the factor loading of risks is the coefficient of the pricing 
model variables. The existence of anomalies is, therefore, suggesting that either the 
market is inefficient, or the asset pricing model is imprecise. 
2.1.2 Explanations of anomalies 
Among studies explaining anomalies, there are two different schools of thought, 
both of which claim a resolution for how anomalies exist. The rational school 
continues to argue that the risk-return relationship in the modern portfolio theory is 
valid, and the market is efficient. They insist that the return anomaly be aroused by 
taking risks that are not well known or not measured precisely, and insist that a 
better proxy of market risk-beta, provides a resolution. To the point of finding 
market risk proxies, Ross (1976) argues that arbitrage pricing theory extends 
CAPM with more systematic factors that have linear relationships with the expected 
return, creating a multi-factor asset pricing model. A Significant contributions 
made in this area are Fama and French (1992, 1993), whose three-factor model (FF-
3 Model) adds two premiums of two zero-cost portfolio sorted by book-to-market 
ratio and market value of equity as an addition to the market beta, which is the sole 
systematic risk factor considered in the CAPM, and successfully explains stock 
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returns and many CAPM-related anomalies. Carhart (1997) contributes to the 
model by adding the momentum factor, another return anomaly that is past stock 
returns, composing the “four-factor model” that is seen in much of the literature 
(FFC-4 Model hereafter). Those models, alongside CAPM, are the ones that have 
been predominantly used in both practice and research in recent decades. Recently, 
Hou et al. (2015), as well as Fama and French (2015), contributed to the FF-3 Model 
by adding a firm’s investments and profitability as new factors pricing asset prices.  
Allowing the addition of factors that are subtracted from a strongly identified return 
anomaly into the asset pricing model contributes to the revolutionary power of 
multi-factor models. Meanwhile, this leaves suspicions of data snooping to the 
sceptical. As Fama (1990) comments, the multi-factor model theory makes it 
feasible to reach the mean-variance efficiency; however, the importance and 
economic implications of systematic factors remain vague. Nevertheless, such 
factor models have successfully explained sizeable anomalies, thus upholding the 
EMH. As anomalies which are explainable by multi-factor models, particularly the 
FF-3 model, are no longer viewed as anomalies in contemporary literature. 
Other rational explanations of anomalies include intertemporal CAPM, an asset 
pricing model based on CAPM but allowing change of investor’s investment set. 
Developing from the economic theory of CAPM, the aim of these approaches is to 
estimate market risk betas more effectively by considering how consumption 
affects portfolio choices. Fama (1990) summarises the main contributions of 
ICAPM-inspired models by allowing a joint test of the random walk return and 
linear risk-expected return relationship. In addition, some literature presents factor 
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models that include market risk factors, and one variable based on economic theory 
that infers a relationship with impact asset prices, like firm’s investments to assets 
ratio (Hou et al. 2015), Distance-to-Default ratio (Vassalou and Xing, 2004), 
bankruptcy risk (Kapadia, 2011), and liquidity ratio (Acharya and Pedersen, 2005). 
Unlike multi-factor asset pricing models that are frequently questioned by data 
snooping, those factor models are developed based on the theoretical relation of 
stock return with a macroeconomic phenomenon that systematically impacts all 
assets, giving the necessary economic theory to support the rationality of factor 
models. However, as the explanatory power of intertemporal CAPM-based factor 
models is often less than multifactor models in terms of determining equity returns. 
Thus, their usefulness in practice is less recognised by investors. 
The behaviour finance school claims that anomalies are mispricing phenomena 
caused by the sophisticated behaviours of investors, or by trading frictions that 
violate EMH. McLean and Pontiff (2016) find evidence that the market is learning 
to identify and utilise anomalies by showing the average excess returns from 97 
anomaly-based trading strategies that significantly reduced after they were first 
published. Conrad et al. (2014) find that investors have a preference for stocks that 
have positively skewed past returns, which can be used to explain distress risk 
anomalies. Baker and Wurgler (2006) identify a macroeconomic factor - sentiment 
index can explain sizeable long-short excess returns from anomalies, especially 
those caused by returns of short-side portfolios. These findings are categorised as 
“Behavioural Finance” as they violate some key assumptions made by rational 
investors, as well as rejecting the axiom of a frictionless market.  
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Arbitrage limit is one of the most fruitful theories explaining anomalies in the 
behavioural finance school. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that the EMH 
assumes that most investors, along with the economists, see available arbitrage 
opportunities and take them.  However, certain types of trading are costly. In 
extreme situations, arbitrageurs trying to eliminate glamour/value mispricing might 
lose sufficient money and force them to liquidate their positions. In light of this, 
Ali et al. (2003) develop the concept of arbitrage risk. They find that the book-to-
market anomaly is associated with high arbitrage limit conditions such as high bid-
ask spreads, low institutional ownership, lower analyst coverage, and particularly, 
high idiosyncratic volatility. Later work also notes that arbitrage limit theory can 
explain some of the most predominant anomalies that are otherwise unsolvable 
using rational asset pricing models. Stambaugh et al. (2015) find that the 
idiosyncratic volatility puzzle, along with an additional 11 anomalies, is 
explainable using limit of arbitrage theory with multifactor models like FF-3 model. 
Similarly, Li and Luo (2016) find that the cash-holding anomaly is mostly driven 
by proxies of the arbitrage limit, and they provide a behaviour prospect resolution 
by showing the return spread of high and low is sensitive to investor sentiment.  
Other behavioural finance theories related to anomalies include learning theory, 
which emphasises the importance of the time gap between investors’ awareness of 
an anomaly and their ability to exploit the anomaly’s arbitrary opportunities. The 
theory is supported by Bebchuk et al. (2013), who find evidence that the abnormal 
returns related to firm’s corporate governance, do not exist in out-of-sample data 
and are negatively associated with media coverage and investor analyst coverage. 
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Furthermore, McLean and Pontiff (2016) observe that most anomalies lose their 
significance after they are first published in leading academic journals and that 
arbitrage costs increase within the post-publishing period for anomaly returns. 
These finding shed a light on examining anomalous returns in the out-of-sample 
analysis. 
Investor’s over/under reaction to the variation of return constitutes another type of 
behaviour explanation. Fama and French (1998) argue that firms with poor 
historical earnings and negative cumulative returns tend to be undervalued by the 
rational prospect investors. Da and Gao (2010) find that the first month after 
forming portfolios accounts for most of the cumulative returns in a year, and further 
provide evidence that investors’ overreactions to distress risk account for the 
distress puzzle. Controlling for the return from the previous month diluted the 
pricing power of distress risk measured by Distance-to-Default, with no significant 
monthly return for high default risk portfolios from the second month after portfolio 
formation. 
Debates between these two schools constitute the main disputes around EMH 
research. Finding supportive evidence to relevant explanations contributes to most 
relevant literature, according to the survey of Schwert (2003). The ground remains 
primarily occupied by the rational school, with behaviour finance school theories 
acting as a supplement. The behaviourist school has an advantage in terms of 
explaining anomalies as mispricing arising from investors’ behaviour, but 
insufficient research is conducted to propose a theory or asset pricing models like 
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CAPM or FF-3 model, leaving scholars only able to explain something that people 
are already aware of. The rational school thus outperforms the behaviourist school 
in terms of consensus theory and empirical paradigms to test anomaly phenomenon 
and market efficiency, with theoretical and research paradigms backed up by well-
documented economic theory. This allows for better understanding of results and 
interpretations that are relatively well unified.  New anomalies are observed every 
year, but attempts for finding a resolution to the occurrence of the anomalies still 
continue. 
Several gaps exist in the research as a result of the complexity of the distress puzzle. 
Although attempts have been made to identify whether financial distress is a new 
type of anomaly, it remains unclear whether the pricing power of distress risk is a 
measuring error or driven by an unknown risk factor. While attempting to address 
the anomalies, one might be interested if distress risk can explain some strong 
anomalies like the profitability effect. Those are the questions that this research 
endeavours to address. 
2.2 Distress Risk and Equity Returns 
2.2.1 The mixed evidence of the distress risk-return relationship 
The "relative distress" that HML represents in the Fama-French model leaves 
several theoretical and empirical questions to be answered. Fama and French (1992, 
1993, 1996) have continuously claimed that relative distress risk is a way to 
understand the power of anomalies in their three-factor model. Yet empirical 
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studies find divergent signs for market value of leverage and book value of leverage 
which undermines their use as a pricing factor in cross-sectional stock returns. 
Specifically, leverage measured by the market value of a firm is positively linked 
with stock returns, but leverage measured by book value is negatively related to 
returns. 
The difference between the two leverage measurements has not been given 
sufficient attention in earlier work. Fama and French (1992) argue that, even if two 
measurements capture different information, they should be included in the market-
to-book ratio, as the ratio is calculated as the difference of two leverage proxies. 
Following this logic, Fama and French (1993), Opler and Titman (1994), and 
Griffin and Lemmnon (2002) focus on explaining the difference between the two 
leverage variables’ coefficient, but their responses to the emergent negative sign 
are similar to those of Fama and French (1993), as HML captured different 
information than book leverage. Griffin and Lemmon attribute the divergence of 
coefficients to the noisy measurement of the two leverage factors. They argue that 
the two financial ratios are also influenced by corporate financial decisions 
designed to optimise the firm’s capital structure. Their works, combining with Chan 
and Chen (1991) attribute to the research by identifying satisfied proxy of distress 
risk. 
The anomalous negative sign has prompted additional investigations since 
Dichev’s work (1998) which finds that the negative relationship remains significant 
even when the proxy for distress risk is replaced by a Z-score. This finding is in 
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line with other research (Griffin & Lemmon, 2002; Franzen et al. 2007) that adopts 
different proxies for financial distress risk to explain stock returns but find distress 
risk is negatively priced in the stock return.  These findings suggest that measuring 
errors of distress risk may not be the reason for the negative distress risk-returns 
relationship. Garlappi et al. (2008) revisit the form of the distress risk-return 
relationship, and they find that negative sign is sensitive to the power of the 
shareholders facing the distress risk. Campbell et al. (2008) find firm’s failure 
probability is associated with an abnormal excess return that cannot be explained 
by CAPM, FF-3 or FFC-4 model. They also note that the distress premium is 
concentrated in portfolios that focus on going short on firms with high distress risk. 
These findings challenge Fama and French’s (1993) story, as distress risk should 
follow the basic concept that a high expected return results from investments 
bearing a high level of risk. 
In contrast to the above studies, some research notes a positive slope of distress risk 
variables using complex modelling. Vassalou and Xing (2004) use default 
likelihood derived from Merton’s Option pricing model to represent distress risk, 
and they find that a company’s default risk is positively related to its stock returns. 
The positive sign not only exists in terms of the market-based distress factor but 
also within accounting-based measurements. Chava and Purnanandam (2010) find 
distress risk rewards positive expected equity returns from analysts’ forecasting. 
The problem of the negative sign, they argue, exists because realised returns contain 
“noise” and are therefore not a good proxy of expected returns. 
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The negative relation between distress risk and equity returns is the primary 
research object, instead of the positive relation (Vassalou and Xing, 2004) for three 
reasons. First, the negative relation is what most literature has found and 
investigated, like Chan and Chen (1991), Dichev (1998), Griffin and Lemmon 
(2002), Campbell et al. (2008), Campbell et al. (2011), Avramov et al. (2013). 
Throughout literature, the significant negative return premium is robust in both 
portfolio-level and firm-level analysis and passes numerous robustness checks. 
Besides, the negative relation is not only supported with the above empirical 
findings but also documented by various theoretical models, especially the model 
in Gomes and Schmid (2010) that illustrates the relation of distress risk and 
anomalies e.g. momentum and value effect under the proposition of negative 
distress risk-return relationship. As for the positive relation, there has been no 
literature stating the mechanism except for the intuition that additional risk should 
bearing with high expected returns. Thus, the research primarily studies the 
negative distress risk-return relation in order to utilise existing literatures. 
The second issue is the compatibility of research methodology in estimating distress 
risk. In a very insightful discussion, Friewald et al. (2014) argues that the fraction 
of random drift implied in Merton’s (1974) model can drive the deviation of 
physical probability (according to historical information from the market, which 
most accounting-based distress risk measures are relying on) and risk-neutral 
probability (purely relying on the model assumption that the trigger of default is 
depending on the implied asset value and volatility) are affected. This paper 
highlights the compatibility issue of measuring distress risk, warning that the 
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implied information in the measured distress risk may not be consistent between 
the two methods. In light of this, this research pays additional consideration in 
interpreting empirical results of the distress premium. Given that the failure 
probability of Campbell et al. (2008) is the main research object, this research 
scrutinizes the negative relation and only sets robustness tests for the distance-to-
default measure, the distress risk measure with positive relation to stock returns. 
A number of researches, including Chava and Purnanandum (2008), Da and Gao 
(2010), and Hackbarth et al. (2015), have proposed to explain the positive return, 
and made successes, which constitutes the third reason of downgrading the 
importance of the positive distress risk-return relation. For instance, Chava and 
Purnandum (2008) use analyst’s forecasting return as “expected return”. 
Specifically, neither Da and Gao (2010) nor Hackbarth et al. (2015) find the distress 
premium is significant when the database was extended in 2004. Their findings 
have presented that the distress risk and return relation were directly proportional 
in the pre-1980 period, whereas this research mainly focuses on post-1980 period. 
These successful explanations are relying on various crucial restrictions that may 
not be in line with Campbell et al. (2008). Therefore, the research pays 
concentrations primarily to the negative relation between firm’s distress risk and 
equity return. 
2.2.2 Interpreting the negative sign 
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There are three main types of resolution to the question of the existence of the 
distress anomaly. The first viewpoint is that the asset pricing model is not complete 
enough for describing return from real assets in the market. A new risk factor should 
be added to the model to explain the negative distress risk-return relationship. This 
assumes that the market is still efficient (Chan and Chen, 1991; Vassalou and Xing, 
2004; Kapadia, 2011). The second opinion notes that efficient market theory does 
not reflect real market behaviour. Investors with different appetites for risk make 
different choices, and idiosyncratic firm characteristics can draw investors’ 
attention to certain distressed firms more than others (Griffin and Lemmon, 2002; 
Garlappi et al. 2008; Campbell et al. 2008; Avramov et al. 2009; Avramov et al. 
2013). The third viewpoint argues that errors in research design are the cause of the 
distress puzzle. Controlling research biases would, therefore, lead to the distress 
puzzle being resolved (Chava and Purnanandam, 2010; Tang et al. 2013). 
The rational explanation asserts the effectiveness of existing equilibrium asset 
pricing models. Naturally, anomalies are then defined as missing risk exposures 
that correlate to either firm characteristics or systematic risk (Tang et al. 2013). As 
asset pricing theory is mathematically derived from CAPM, and the single-factor 
model asserts returns are calculated as bearing both systematic risk and the firm’s 
characteristic risk, it is reasonable to assume under this paradigm that financial 
distress is a missing part of systematic risk or is correlated with a firm’s 
characteristics such as size and leverage. This is also the conclusion of Chan and 
Chen (1991). Vassalou and Xing (2004) and Kapadia (2011) find that distress risk 
is associated with macroeconomic conditions and firm characteristics. Their asset 
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pricing models, by constructing a distress risk factor using the same methodology 
as FF-3 model (Fama and French, 2003), explain anomalies and excess returns from 
CAPM, supporting the concepts put forward by the rational school. 
Another angle based on corporate finance theory also explains distress risk based 
on the rational school. They argue that a firm’s capital structure and its dynamic 
change results in complex effects on stock returns. George and Hwang (2010) find 
a threshold effect whereby a distress anomaly is connected with the firm’s debt 
structure: the distress anomaly only appears when firms have particularly poor 
credit ratings. Gomes and Schmid (2010) find that high leverage firms with high 
total assets are able to place them at lower risk of depreciation when firms go into 
bankruptcy, while low leverage firms have more growth opportunities in the future. 
Hence, a premium is charged for low leverage firms resulting in a negative risk-
return relationship when firm’s leverage measures distress risk. This point of view 
is supported by some interesting findings in their cross-sectional regression 
analyse. But the main drawback, according to Gomes and Schmid (2010), is that 
their theoretical explanation is “more complex than static textbook examples 
suggest” (p.467), and their proposed explanation has not presented a good reason 
why common risk factor models are not capturing the predicting power of distress 
risk. Given the amount of research based on this viewpoint, the rational explanation 
provides the main body of empirical testing and dominates most of the debate in 
this area, but why some most-used asset pricing models cannot explain the pricing 
power of firm’s distress risk is open for further research 
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Behaviour finance interpretations can be found in the work of researchers such as 
Schwert (2003), Campbell et al. (2008), and Tang et al. (2013) who also put forward 
some comments on their efforts to interpret the distress puzzle through the 
behavioural finance theory. Schwert (2003) argues that most anomalies are due to 
temporary investor behaviour, and notes that their impact on asset pricing declines 
over time. Campbell et al. (2008) start from an assumption based on the experience 
of institutional investors who favour distress stocks: they argue that institutional 
holders with high levels of risk-aversion drive down the prices of distress risk 
stocks, as active investors could participate in firms’ operational running and 
reduce high-risk investments and sell poison assets, releasing positive signals to 
market participants. However, these are merely assertions and lack empirical 
examination or proof. Updated research by Campbell et al. (2011) argues that short-
selling constraints may be contributing to the mispricing phenomena seen in short-
side portfolio returns. A more common explanation is that investor sentiment leads 
to mispricing during the announcement of performance. Stambaugh et al. (2012) 
find that anomalies, especially those excess returns generated from the short-side 
portfolio, are due to investors’ sentiment.  Such sentiment damages the accuracy of 
pricing in the market, and, hence, unexpected events such as financial distress 
create considerable opportunities for obtaining excess returns. 
Other explanations focus on the bias implied in the research methodology. 
Zmijewski (1984) questions the empirical tests around anomalies as frequently 
overlooking the requirement for data completeness. In the case of measuring 
distress risk, there are also several other biases identified within the existing 
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literature. Shumway (1997), for example, notes a delisting bias. The selection of 
healthy firms and the rejection of distressed firms manually increases the returns 
from a portfolio. Chava and Purnanandam (2010) investigate several different 
biases when estimating cross-section of equity returns, and claim that ex-post 
returns cannot precisely reflect a breaking event such as a bankruptcy. They test 
this claim by calculating the expected return based on financial data and stock 
analysis and find that the ex-ante return is positively correlated to distress risk, 
results that are consistent with the equilibrium asset pricing model. A similar 
criticism of ex-ante bias is also put forward and tested by Tang et al. (2013), who 
put all known anomalies into their empirical model to test whether the true expected 
return emerges. On the contrary, their findings show that nearly all anomalies 
disappeared from the ex-ante adjustment return.  
2.2.3 What drives the distress puzzle? 
The distress puzzle is intriguing as it is not only controversial in terms of whether 
distress risk can be positively priced or negatively priced in the expected stock 
returns but is also difficult to explain why distress risk has pricing power to the 
expected stock returns. Contrary to Fama and French (1992, 1993, 1996) who claim 
the pricing power of distress risk is why firm’s size and book-to-market equity has 
pricing power to asset returns, Griffin and Lemmon (2002) find that distress risk 
has pricing power even after controlling for size and value premium. The significant 
distress premium, interpreted from the significant intercept of CAPM and FF-3 
model, provides straightforward evidence that distress risk is another return 
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anomaly, and Griffin and Lemmon (2002), therefore, argue that the role of distress 
risk is divergent from the judgement of Fama and French (1992). Vassalou and 
Xing (2004) provide a similar but more robust result as Griffin and Lemmon 
(2002). They find that the distress risk indicator, inspired by Moody’s bankruptcy 
risk model, has the power to predict expected returns, and using the probability of 
default as a distress risk indicator, they find default risk is positively priced stock 
returns.  Novy-Marx (2013) also suggests that profitability factors explain stock 
returns driven by distress risk. In these results, a high-minus-low distress risk firm 
portfolio earns 0.40% monthly risk-adjusted return, a notable reduction compared 
with the return of 0.76% per month seen without risk adjusting. The finding of 
Novy-Marx (2013) presents a rational school explanation to the pricing power of 
distress risk. His conclusion is coming from portfolio-level analysis with no cross-
sectional analysis to support his findings. 
However, the story of financial distress as a result of rational theory is challenged 
by evidence relating to behavioural finance theory. Anomalies are easily discovered 
by data mining (Harvey et al. 2016). For example. Schwert (2003) investigates 
several of the most prestigious market anomalies and finds that most of them are 
not stable over a longer time span.  One example is the decline of the size effect in 
the U.S. market. van Dijk (2011) reviews the debate around the size effect from the 
last 30 years and confirms that size effect has lost its power recently, compared to 
its former impact. Previous studies indicate the possibility that a distress anomaly 
is far removed from a documented anomaly such as momentum, return-reversal, or 
value effects. A direct research linking the behaviourist perspective to the distress 
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puzzle is done by Campbell et al. (2008), who firstly define the distress risk as a 
new anomaly. Their research finds that the significance of distress premium cannot 
be diluted by either CAPM or the Fama-French three-factor model. They also find 
that the premium is more pronounced in low institutional ownership firms, which 
implies that the constraint for trading such stocks creates difficulties. Despite the 
debate as to whether the distress variable should have a positive or negative sign, 
most literature confirms the existence of the pricing power of distress risk. 
Another view explaining the distress puzzle is that they are “created” by research 
design misspecification. This means that anomalies arise due to the quality of 
dataset in early years, inaccurate measuring of specific variables or database 
backfilling. Shumway (1997) finds that the record of stock return after it is delisted 
from the current exchange is omitted in the CRSP database, one of the most used 
asset pricing research databases, and he further notes that controlling the delisting 
return causes the size effect in NASDAQ stocks to vanish (Shumway, 1999).  Tang 
et al. (2013) assert that most anomalies disappear when the expected return is 
defined as the average expected value from stock analysis, rather than the historical 
return, which is provided by CRSP and is predominately used in asset pricing 
research. These findings suggest potential biases in research design which could 
explain many anomalies and may work to explain distress risk, because identifying 
firm’s financial distress and measuring the return is relying heavily on the CRSP 
database and delisting return. Harvey et al. (2016) have completed a study on 
setting a new threshold of asset pricing determinants, and suggest that scholars 
endeavouring to identify pricing factors should make the results pass stricter 
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hurdles such as a t-ratio significantly over 3.0. Within most research methods, 
testing how durable distress risk is when implementing different pricing factors is 
a key issue to preserving distress anomalies for investigation.   
What explains the pricing power of distress risk? Can any of the existing theories 
based on methodology bias, behaviour finance, or the rational explanation given 
from the risk-return perspective solve this puzzle? Some behaviourist work 
provides potential answers, including investor’s overreactions, where the power of 
institutional investors constitutes the main explanatory variable for the distress 
puzzle. Several rational explanations have been proposed, but few of them have 
supporting empirical results, and only a very few papers support the view that 
research bias is the origin of the distress puzzle. This is because of studies such as 
the most recent paper presented by Da and Gao (2010) prove that they cannot 
eliminate the pricing power of distress risk even after controlling for all known 
research biases. The lack of a coherent theory between the possible explanations 
and the huge shortage of empirical testing leaves a tempting blank to fill. 
2.3 Predicting Financial Distress 
2.3.1 Definition of financial distress 
Financial distress at its most simple refers to any situation wherein a firm fails to 
meet its debt obligations. However, depending on the research design of a given 
piece of research, the definition of financial distress can vary. Most existing 
research has relied heavily on U.S. market data, and thus the definition of financial 
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distress used within this work was also influenced by the U.S. legal system and 
accounting standards. Altman (1968, 1993), Dichev (1998), Hillegeist et al. (2004), 
Ohlson (1980), and Zmijewski (1984) defined financial distress simply as a firm’s 
bankruptcy.  Bankruptcy is a typical example of financial distress, as it is the 
ultimate legal destination of a distressed firm. However, this definition overlooks 
the fact that bankruptcy is not the only phenomenon of financial distress, and that 
even bankruptcy itself has two categories - under the U.S. bankruptcy code, 
Liquidation and Reorganization.  
A clarification of the importance of identifying financial distress risk can be found 
in Gertner and Scharfstein (1991), who raise awareness of the Bankruptcy Reform 
Act of 1978 (The 1978 Act) that diversified bankruptcy into two types. Chapter 7 
covers liquidation and Chapter 11 covers reorganisation. They further prove that 
investors under different types of financial distress exhibit distinctive preferences 
and behaviours as their expected returns change by the firm’s bankruptcy 
procedures. In addition to bankruptcy, other scholars such as Campbell et al. (2008, 
2011) and Vassalou and Xing (2004) propose a broader definition of financial 
distress by including bankruptcy and default, performance-related delisting events, 
and become a commonly used definition of financial failure in the literature. It is 
notable that scholars who create their definitions of financial distress tend to 
emphasise that their definition is coherent when examined in light of the core 
concept of bankruptcy. Each new definition of financial distress aims to capture the 
fundamental of financial distress and provides or information. Figure 2 depicts the 
way in which both bankruptcy and financial failure are affected by macroeconomic 
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conditions and shows their co-movement. The peak time for bankruptcy is also the 
peak time for firm delisting, default, and other distress events. Distress risk 
prediction models also provide good results in terms of predicting bankruptcy and 
failure. 
The expansion of the definition of financial distress still provides robust results that 
can coexist with other findings when using only bankruptcy data. Campbell et al. 
(2008) conjectured that a broader definition of financial distress creates an enlarged 
sample size that allows scope for new econometric methods and credit default 
models to be used. Such attempts provide robust results that conclude solely using 
bankruptcy data, and are used in subsequent research.  
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Figure 1 Bankrupt and failed firms in the United States of America (1980-2014) 
This figure plots the rate of U.S. bankruptcy firms over total firms in the market and the rate of failure firms over total firms. A bankruptcy firm is defined as having 
filed a Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 form with the court, and a failure firm is defined as a) filing a bankruptcy form; b) being rated as a “D” by rating agencies, or c) 
suffering from performance-related delisting from the current exchange. Bankruptcy and failure firms are obtained from Moody’s Default Research Database, 
UCLA-LoPucki bankruptcy database, Compustat, and SDC Platinum corporate bankruptcy database. U.S. recession (grey area) data is obtained from NBER. 
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2.3.2 Predicting a firm’s failure 
Whether pricing the distress risk or predicting a financial distress event, a proxy 
for financial distress risk is required. The substantial research of Altman (1968), 
predicting financial distress using accounting data from firm’s financial reports 
and market data related to firm’s stock, has become a fruitful area of research. 
As a result, according to Hillegeist et al. (2004) and Charitou et al. (2013), more 
than ten types of distress risk measures have already been identified. To clarify 
these current measurements, Hillegeist et al. (2004) introduced a 
categorification that identifies the two main types of measurements used in their 
research. Measurements relying on information from a firm’s financial 
statements are named accounting-based methods. Meanwhile, distress risks that 
are estimated from market information, e.g. price, returns, and volatility, are 
called market-based measurements. 
Almost all accounting-based measurements are the result of calculations based 
on one or more financial statement variables. Altman (1968) proposes the first 
index that can be used to measure a firm’s possibility of distress. The Altman 
Z-score is the sum of six accounting variables. Each variable has a fixed 
coefficient that can be calculated by discriminant analysis, a statistical 
technique that extracts information from the known sample to estimate the data 
for an unknown sample with similar characteristics. It requires a complete data 
set that includes all bankrupted firms and firms’ other financial statements 
including firm’s net income, cash flows, return on asset and liquidity ratio, even 
though it can also be performed solely on a book-to-market ratio. Ohlson (1980) 
has developed another distress indicator, Ohlson’s O-Score. The O-Score is also 
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the result of calculations based on several financial statements with several 
consensus variables that have been adopted in other research. Those methods, 
though they display different statistical calculation procedures, are inspired by 
the same basic premise: that a firm’s leverage, profitability, size and past 
earnings and level of solvency directly affects its default risk and the cost of 
default to investors. Shumway (2001) further presents a mathematic solution 
integrating the discriminate analysis and logit regression under a broader 
category of “hazard model”, which presents a mathematic resolution of all 
accounting-based measures in the framework of hazard model analysis as 
physical probability of financial distress. 
 Market-based indicators are derived from Merton’s option pricing formula. 
This is the finite sum of an integration formula, and it relies on asset price and 
price volatility to calculate a firm’s value. By calculating the difference between 
a company’s current value and its value when it is in financial distress, the 
likelihood of default can be derived from the transformed Merton formula, in 
which Vassalou and Xing (2004) and Hillegeist et al. (2004) present empirical 
calibration of the so called “default likelihood indicator”. The default likelihood 
indicator is calculated relying on interative process of estimating firm’s asset 
value volatility from the option pricing model. To relieve the complexity of the 
calculation, some reduced-forms have been invented for distress forecasting 
models, such as that invented by Campbell et al. (2008) as well as Bharath and 
Shumway (2008). Charitou et al. (2013) report that one main feature of the 
reduced-form predicting model is that it relies on less market information to 
make an estimation. The estimation of 𝐷𝐿𝐼  requires assumption of asset’s 
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volatility and market value. Both are not directly observable from market data, 
and the estimation of the two parameters are often referring to a risk-neutral 
assumption in the distribution of probability. 
In short, the benchmark in this field is a mainly accounting-based measurement. 
Option pricing methods are based on a different theory, but they represent a 
similar outcome, although some scholars, including Bharath and Shumway 
(2008), Campbell et al. (2011), Chava and Jarrow (2004), and Vassalou and 
Xing (2004), argue that their model outperforms other measurements. Empirical 
tests implementing those methods do not generally produce distinct results 
whether using purely accounting-based measurements or by mixing 
measurements. Blöchlinger (2012) and Charitou et al. (2013) compare several 
distress risk measurements using both accounting and market-based methods, 
and by using updated parameters. Their findings suggest that either accounting-
based models or market-based models can predict an event of financial distress. 
Blöchlinger (2012) notes that more than 90% of firms that were identified as 
having the highest financial distress risk did indeed go into financial distress in 
the following year. Empirical research therefore usually chooses more than one 
measurement from Table 1 to pass a robustness test. Such studies have shown 
that expanding the definition of financial distress does not impair the accuracy 
of the predicting model. 
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Table 1 List of main financial distress risk measurements 
This table lists seven distress risk measures that are commonly cited in the literature.  The 
categorisation follows Hillegeist et al. (2004).  
Accounting-based measurement Market-based measurement 
Name Main Papers Name Main Papers 
Z-score 
Dichev (1998) 
Agarwal and Taffler 
(2008) 
Distance-to-Default  
Campbell et al. 
(2008) 
Chava and 
Purnanandum 
(2010) 
Charitou et al. 
(2013) 
O-score 
Griffin and Lemmon 
(2002) 
George and Hwang 
(2010) 
Hillegeist et al. 
(2004) 
Avramov et al. 
(2013) 
Default likelihood 
Indicator (DLI) 
Vassalou and 
Xing (2004) 
Da and Gao 
(2010) 
Book-to-Market 
Ratio 
Chan and Chen 
(1991) 
Fama and French 
(1996) 
Gomes and Schmid 
(2010) 
Other Merton Option 
Model 
Hillegeist et al. 
(2004) 
Bharath and 
Shumway (2008) 
 Charitou et al. 
(2013) 
 
Hazard Model (FP) 
Zmijewski (1984) 
Shumway (2001) 
Chava and Jarrow 
(2004) 
Campbell et al. 
(2008) 
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2.4 Corporate Governance and Equity Returns 
Corporate governance is the mechanism protecting firm’s owners by “getting a 
return on their investment” (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, p.737). Jensen (1986) 
uses plain language in his influential paper describing the conflict of interests 
between shareholders and managers, and he enumerates how managers could 
erode shareholder's interests via persuading large firm size, increasing bonuses 
and funding risky projects. Highlighting those costs will damage the firm’s 
performance eventually. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) further summarise those as 
agency problems under scenarios of a) inadequate residual control rights; b) the 
discretion of managers; c) failure of incentive contracts. Corporate governance 
mechanisms like enforcing legal protections, introducing large shareholders, 
takeovers, and large creditors can reduce agency costs. Those early scholars 
have built the framework of studying corporate governance, but as Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) point out, governance mechanism is designed with costs, and the 
benefit of governance, as well as cost-benefit analysis, has not been fully 
investigated. 
This point is empirically studied by Gompers et al. (2003) using 1990-1999 U.S. 
market data, and they present striking empirical evidence that the variation of 
firm’s governance index predicts firm’s future performance and is negatively 
related to stock returns. The governance index is defined as a discrete number 
from 1 to 19. A higher governance index implies that shareholder rights are 
restricted to a greater extent, and stocks with an index lower than 5 are defined 
as “democracy” firms, while stocks with an index higher than 14 are defined as 
“dictator” firms. The difference between dictator and democratic stocks has a 
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gap at 9% annualised return performance, which is not explained by FFC-4 
model. Gompers et al. (2003) attribute this return anomaly to the implied agency 
costs that investors are underestimated to high governance index firms. This 
assertion is supported by their empirical findings that low governance firms tend 
to have more acquisition and capital expenditures than high governance index 
companies. This finding combines with Gompers and Metrick (2001) who find 
institutional ownership is positively priced in the expected returns, linking 
corporate governance positively to firm’s performance. This conclusion is 
further supported by Bebchuk et al. (2008) as well as Harford et al. (2008) who 
also find firm’s corporate governance status positively drives firm’s 
performance measured by Tobin’s Q. 
Cremers and Nair (2005) expand Gompers et al. (2003) findings with internal 
shareholder’s ownership. They find the difference of stock market performance 
between low and high corporate governance firms are better characterised by 
blockholder ownership, where the governance premiums are clustered in high 
insider ownership firms. An explanation for such findings is raised as follows: 
the well-governance firms potentially accrue long-term premiums from firm’s 
profitability. Thus, investors are expecting higher returns from such firms. 
Cremers and Nair (2005) find supportive evidence that industry-adjusted 
profitability, measured as return on assets, return on equity and net profit 
margin, are all positively related to firm’s governance mechanism. Lilienfeld-
Toal and Ruenzi (2014), from the different perspective, again confirm the 
positive relation of firm’s governance and performance by showing firm’s CEO 
ownership is also positively related to firm’s profitability, and the variation of 
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ownership explains cross-sectional stock returns. They argue that CEO’s effort 
is not fully priced and link the corporate governance premium to the prestigious 
Fama and French (1996) human resource explanation of market anomalies. It is 
noteworthy that the above studies of corporate governance and stock returns are 
under the broader categorisation investigating the relation between corporate 
governance and firm’s performance, in which stock market performance is 
viewed as a measure of firm’s performance. Those research findings, where 
Giroud and Mueller (2011) also summarised, suggest a stable relation of firm’s 
profitability and corporate governance. 
Possible explanations for the governance premium, are proposed by Gompers 
et al. (2003), and are extensively discussed by Giround and Mueller (2011) as 
well as Bebchuk et al. (2013). The Gompers et al. explanation where agency 
costs are liable to the weak firm performance pervasively existed in low 
governance firms are supported by Cremers and Nair (2005) as well as Harford 
et al. (2008) and Bebchuk et al. (2008). However, in an anatomy of governance 
index, Grioud and Mueller (2011) find the abnormal stock return related to the 
“democracy”- “dictator” portfolio is sensitive to the definition of portfolio 
breakpoints and does not exist in the post-1999 period. They argue the variation 
of competition across industries enforces different governance mechanism, 
wherein non-competitive industries, firms’ performance are more positively 
benefited from good governance systems. The commonality of those findings 
insists that the return anomaly is as consequence of high expected firm 
performance, particularly a positive expectation of firm’s profitability. 
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On the other side, Bebchuk et al. (2013) argue the disappearing of abnormal 
return associated with corporate governance is because investors are learning 
and adopting corresponding trading strategies to exploit such investing 
opportunities. They find the disappearing of positive governance-return 
relationship, observed by Grioud and Mueller (2011) is significantly related to 
the increasing research papers, more media attention and analyst’s forecasting. 
They also present empirical evidence that the positive governance-expected 
firm performance maintains stability in the 1990-2008 period, suggesting the 
disappearing of return anomaly does not affect the well-documented 
governance-return relationship. However, this explanation does not apply to 
other governance related anomalies: Lilienfeld-Toal and Ruenzi (2014) find the 
monthly return anomaly from long-short CEO ownership firms does not weaken 
in the post-1999 period. Their findings also reject other behaviour finance-
related explanations such as surprise and limits of arbitrage theory. 
In addition, some researchers such as Abdioglu et al. (2013) argue that the 
legislation of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) composes an exogenous shock to 
corporate governance, making institutional investors more willing to hold 
stocks as the requirement of Sarbanes-Oxley Act generally increases the 
transparency of firm’s information and reduces the agency cost. To prove this 
point, they present evidence that firm’s investments, as well as R&D 
expenditure, attracts more active/passive institutions, and thus increases the 
institutional ownership after the legislation. Their findings suggest a plausible 
robustness check on whether agency cost is the firm characteristics explaining 
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the variation of firm’s profitability by considering an exogenous shock to the 
market. 
In summary, the existing literature presents one of the foremost findings relating 
to firm’s corporate governance: good corporate governance induces higher 
expected firm’s performance, which could also be a potential explanation for 
another return anomaly that is driven by firm’s profitability found by Novy-
Marx (2013) as well as Ball et al. (2015). If the abnormal return is truly driven 
by firm’s profitability, controlling for other firm’s characteristics that are related 
to systematic risk, then the relation of firm’s profitability and corporate 
governance may explain the profitability premium. The detailed research design 
is disclosed in Chapter 5. 
 
2.5 Firm Profitability and Cross-sectional Stock Returns 
2.5.1 The Back-to-the-stage factor 
In asset pricing studies, firm’s profitability is another type of fundamental 
information that public can gain to achieve excess returns that seemingly violate 
the EMH. Inspired by the dividend-discount model, the stock return is 
determined by the discount of its expected cumulative dividends in each period 
and, thus, the dividend payment is one of the predictors understanding asset 
prices, stated by Beaver (1968). Early research like Basu (1977) also tests 
market efficiency related to firm’s profitability by examining if post-
announcement stock return changes are due to market inefficient, which is 
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categorised as event study in Fama (1991) research.  As for the return 
predictability tests, Haugen and Baker (1996) find that a firm’s earning-to-price 
( E/P ) ratio, commonly used in accounting research to represent a firm’s 
profitability, earned positive returns over the S&P 500 index return of about 
0.27% per month in the 1979.1 to 1986.6 period, and 0.26% per month in the 
subsequent 1986.7 to 1993.12 period.  
High profitability firms tend to be those that are large or who have a low book-
to-market ratio; thus, the researchers argue that a profitability anomaly is 
unlikely due to the high distress risk, one of the potential explanations to the 
entire universe of anomalies proposed by Fama and French (1993). However, 
Fama and French (1996) argue that the pricing power of E/P is driven by a 
firm’s size and book-to-market ratio, with no statistically significant αFF3 
among E/P sorted decile portfolios. The insignificant FF-3 alpha suggests that 
profitability has no ongoing pricing power on expected stock returns. Malkiel 
(2003) further confirms this finding by showing the pricing power of 𝐸/𝑃  is no 
longer significant to post-1985 U.S. stocks, and presents several plausible 
explanations based on rational school of thoughts. 
Fama and French (2006) bring the profitability factor back to centre stage in 
terms of asset pricing research. They argue that a firm’s profitability is 
predictable and, to show this, provide a predictive model where the O-score, a 
bankruptcy risk factor proposed by Ohlson (1980), is included with statistics 
significant predicting power. In addition, they also present empirical evidence 
that a firm’s profitability, measured as positive earnings divided by book value 
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of equity, has additional pricing power above and beyond the common risk 
factors in Fama and French (1996). In light of this, Novy-Marx (2013) dissects 
the relationship between a firm’s profitability and cross-sectional stock returns 
and finds that most earning-related anomalies are explainable with the FF-3 
model and a zero-cost factor portfolio formed by firm’s gross profitability. Ball 
et al. (2015) further find that, depending on the deflator of profitability ratio, 
operating profitability gives higher pricing power than gross profitability and 
earning to book equity ratio. These two profitability ratios were both significant 
in the 1963 to 2010 period, an extended time offering a return pattern that is 
relatively unaffected by extreme events where stock returns are at an anomalous 
high. 
2.5.2 Related theories explaining the pricing power of profitability 
The expected cash flow theory suggests that most anomalies exist due to 
correlation with a firm’s expected earnings, and firm’s profitability is, as argued 
by Novy-Marx (2013), a “clean” proxy of such. Using a revised dividend 
discount model, Fama and French (2006) link firm’s expected earnings to book-
to-market ratio and expected stock return. They argue that expected earnings 
are positively related to stock dividends, and this revises their earlier assertation 
that distress risk is the reason of causing value and size anomaly. The Fama-
French 5-factor model has some success with this, according to Fama and 
French (2015), offering better predictive power than 𝐹𝐹 − 3 or CAPM in terms 
of cross-sectional stock returns in U.S. domestic and international markets. 
These research findings incorporate the pricing power of firm’s profitability and 
recognise it as a pricing factor rather than an anomaly. 
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Research on corporate governance has presented robust findings documenting 
that good corporate governance is related to firms’ profitability and subsequent 
stock returns. Core et al. (1999) argue that the higher agency problem drives 
low firm performance, and this is due to failures on the part of the CEO and top 
managers in creating value-maximising decisions. Gompers et al. (2003) find 
anti-takeover intensity to be negatively priced in subsequent cross-sectional 
stock returns, while Giroud and Mueller (2011) further expand the findings of 
Gompers et al. (2003) by showing that pricing power is industry-related and 
can, therefore, be better identified by industry-adjusted profitability. This 
suggests that investors are sophisticated at exploiting corporate governance 
premium to support equity investing. 
The logic that distress risk is liable to anomalies such as firm’s profitability has 
several rational expressions. Fama and French (1996) propose a plausible theory 
that investors charge a surplus to hold stocks with high exposure to financial 
distress. The missing value of human capital, captured by measures of financial 
distress, therefore represents market anomalies. The correct way to measure 
human capital is, however, still an unsolved question. Recent studies expand the 
scale of such research by utilising financial distress to express other emerging 
anomalies. Agarwal and Taffler (2008) find that in the UK stock market, 
momentum anomaly represents for distress risk. George and Hwang (2010) and 
Avramov et al. (2013) use multiple proxies of distress likelihood to examine the 
predicting power of distress risk among several common anomalies and find a 
threshold effect driven by distress risk. Most anomalies do not repeatedly 
emerge in the portfolio of high distress risk businesses. To explain the size 
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effect, Kapadia (2011) has created a “tracking” portfolio on underlying 
aggregate distress risk that can explain average realised gains as well as the 
Fama-French three-factor model. The highlight of this research is that under the 
new asset pricing model, the excess return is insignificant, and this suggests that 
the new model outranks existing accomplishments by being able to explain 
returns from a rational school perspective. 
As proposed by Novy-Marx (2013) and Ball et al. (2015), there is no prior 
literature examining whether firm’s profitability is explainable by firm 
characteristics, which leads to a research gap. This is partly because these 
effects have only been recently identified. Future research could be based on 
existing accounting literature by considering the other determinants of firm’s 
profitability, then testing whether firms’ characteristics explain their 
profitability premiums in terms of cross-sectional stock returns. 
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3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Portfolio Analysis 
3.1.1 Properties of stock portfolio 
A portfolio is a collection of investments, and in this research, a stock portfolio 
is defined as being composed of stocks that are available for trading at a given 
time. Portfolio analysis allows for techniques that exploiting trading strategies 
based on fundamental information gained from grouping stocks with similar 
characteristics, as highlighted by Fama and French (1992). Grouping stocks into 
portfolios based on a single variable is also known as a one-way portfolio sort. 
One-way sort analysis is commonly used to identify anomalies by constructing 
a long-short portfolio holding one side of the whole spectrum of variable-sorted 
portfolios, and short-selling the portfolio at the other side of the spectrum. 
Researchers that have used this technique include Banz (1981), for size effect, 
Campbell et al. (2008), for distress risk puzzle, and Novy-Marx (2013) and Ball 
et al. (2015), for the profitability anomaly.  Two-way portfolio sorting is similar 
except that it refers to the methodology of evaluating two candidate variables 
that affect stock returns. Depending on the interaction of the two variables, the 
process can be analysed independently or dependently. This method is widely 
used to explain the pricing power of an anomaly by identifying whether the 
return of anomaly is more pronounced when another factor is present.  
3.1.2 Evaluating portfolio performance 
• Equal-weighted portfolio return 
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Portfolio returns are measured as the average rate of return in excess of the risk-
free rate from all stocks in the portfolio within a specific holding period. 
Depending on whether stocks are allocated with the same weight, or weighted 
by firm size representing the marginal change in investor wealth, portfolio 
returns can be measured as either equal-weighted or value-weighted. If a 
portfolio contains 𝑁 stocks, the return on stock 𝑖 is denoted as 𝑟𝑖, and the equal-
weighted portfolio excess return 𝑟𝑒𝑤
𝑝
is the sum of the weighted stock return: 
𝑟𝑒𝑤
𝑝 =
∑ 𝑟𝑖
𝑁
𝑖 −𝑟𝑓
𝑁
 (3.1) 
• Value-weighted portfolio return 
The value-weighted portfolio return is the sum of all stock return weighted by 
each stock’s size relative to the portfolio size, instead of the proportion of a total 
number of stocks in an equal-weighted portfolio. Denoting the size of stock 𝑖 as 
𝑉𝑖, the value-weighted portfolio excess return is then determined by the sum of 
the weighted stocks measured as: 
𝑤𝑖 = 𝑉𝑖/ ∑ 𝑉𝑖  (3.2) 
𝑟𝑣𝑤
𝑝 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑟𝑖
𝑁
𝑖 − 𝑟𝑓 (3.3) 
Each measure has advantages and disadvantages. The equal-weighted return is 
a straightforward and direct indicator of portfolio performance, but Fama and 
French (1998) argue that equal-weighted portfolio returns could be biased since 
portfolio performances are mostly driven by small stocks, which represent 60% 
of total U.S. stocks but less than 3% of total market value. Value-weighted 
portfolio returns are less influenced by this, as the variation in firm size is noted 
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in the weightings, but this, in turn, means that the value-weighted portfolio 
returns are likely to be driven by giant stocks. 
• Risk-adjusted portfolio return 
Another measure of portfolio performance is to use risk-adjusted returns rather 
than raw return. The most commonly used risk-adjusted returns are the CAPM 
alpha, Fama-French 3-factor alpha (FF-3 Alpha), and Fama-French-Carhart 
alpha (FFC-4 alpha), developed by Lintner (1965), Fama and French (1993), 
Carhart (1997) respectively. Risk-adjusted returns are measured as the average 
of time-series regressions to portfolio returns by premiums from bearing risk 
factor/factors that are/are specified in the model. The alpha, which can be used 
as an indicator of excess returns related to multifactor risks, is then calculated 
as the intercept of the linear regression. Inspired by the success of the FF-3 
model as reviewed in the earlier section, a bunch of multi-factor models have 
been developed, and, hence, investors can choose which model is preferable. 
This research uses the CAPM alpha and FF-3 alpha together to test whether 
anomalies are explained by rational asset pricing models, and FFC-4 alpha is 
being used if literature finds momentum accounts for a certain anomaly: 
𝑟𝑝 − 𝑟𝑓 = 𝛼𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑀 + 𝛽𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡(𝑅𝑚 − 𝑟𝑓) + 𝜖 (3.4) 
𝑟𝑝 − 𝑟𝑓 = 𝛼𝐹𝐹−3 + 𝛽𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡(𝑅𝑚 − 𝑟𝑓) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑆𝑀𝐵 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿 + 𝜖 (3.5) 
𝑟𝑝 − 𝑟𝑓 = 𝛼𝐹𝐹𝐶−4 + 𝛽𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡(𝑅𝑚 − 𝑟𝑓) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑆𝑀𝐵 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿 + 𝛽𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑈𝑀𝐷 + 𝜖 
(3.6) 
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The risk-adjusted alphas (𝛼𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑀 , 𝛼𝐹𝐹−3, 𝛼𝐹𝐹𝐶−4 ) are estimated by regressing 
portfolio’s excess return, 𝑟𝑝 − 𝑟𝑓, by risk factor/factors specified in asset pricing 
model and the intercept of regression is the risk-adjusted alpha. The CAPM 
model is regressed by value-weighted market excess return averaging all NYSE, 
AMEX and Nasdaq stocks, 𝑅𝑚 − 𝑟𝑓 , and the coefficient (𝛽𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡) represent 
stock’s relative loading to the market risk. According to Fama and French 
(1993), the FF-3 model is regressed by market excess return, the size premium 
(𝑆𝑀𝐵) calculated from the difference of average small stock portfolios and 
average big stock portfolios and the value premium (𝐻𝑀𝐿) calculated from the 
difference of average high book-to-market ratio portfolios and average low 
book-to-market ratio portfolios.  The FFC-4 model, according to Carhart 
(1997), adds momentum factor ( 𝑈𝑀𝐷 ), the difference of high and low 
cumulative returns from 𝑡 − 11  to 𝑡 − 1 before the month 𝑡  evaluating 
portfolio performance) in addition to FF-3 model. If risk factor/factors can fully 
explain portfolio’s excess return, the alpha is statistically indifferent from zero. 
As with raw returns, risk-adjusted returns can be either equal- or value weighted 
in order to address potential abnormal returns driven by tiny and/or giant stocks. 
Compared with raw returns, risk-adjusted returns reflect the ways in which 
portfolio performance is related to existing risk factors, and reflects how 
anomalies can be explained by risk factors. In such cases, each anomaly is 
viewed as a significant risk-adjusted portfolio alpha. This chapter does not 
attempt to use the Fama-French 5-factor model as main risk-adjusted technique, 
as Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 is investigating firm’s profitability anomaly that is 
closely related with one of the factors implied in the Fama-French 5-factor 
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model. However, portfolio analyses in Chapter 4 is also examined under such 
model as a robustness test, and the results are consistent with main findings.  
3.2 Individual Stock Analysis 
3.2.1 Correlation of firm characteristics 
A correlation of firm characteristics provides an intuitive conclusion about 
relationships between anomalies and other firm characteristics. The sign and 
significance of correlations between returns and anomalies give initial evidence 
about whether there is a connection between the two. The correlation may be 
measured in terms of Pearson’s correlation or Spearman’s rank correlation. 
However, given the existence of nonlinear relationships, coefficients of 
Spearman’s rank correlation may deviate from the Pearson’s correlation, and in 
such cases, the coefficient of regression analysis may be biased. This is thus 
commonly used as a cross-check with a portfolio’s characteristics distribution 
as to whether there is a clear trend between two variables. The averaged 
correlation of two variables, 𝐴  and 𝐵,  is created from 𝑡 -times rebalanced 
sample and then measured as follows: 
𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝐴, 𝐵) =
∑ 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑡(𝐴,𝐵)𝑡
𝑡
 (3.7) 
The frequency of such rebalancing should be in line with the portfolio 
rebalance frequency. 
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3.2.2 Fama-MacBeth (1973) regression 
The Fama-MacBeth regression is widely used in the cross-sectional analysis and 
was developed by Fama and MacBeth (1973) as a two-pass cross-sectional 
regression method to examine whether there is a linear relationship between 
expected returns and factor betas. Betas are estimated using time series 
regression in the first pass, and the relationships between returns and betas are 
estimated using a second pass cross-sectional regression. The use of estimated 
betas in the second pass introduces the classical errors-in-variables problem. As 
described by Cocharane (2005), in the first step, for each month t the excess 
returns of firm 𝑖  (denoted as 𝑅𝑖,𝑡+1 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡+1  are regressed by factors 𝜆𝑛(𝑁 =
1,2,3 …)) which are observed at 𝑡 and are assumed to determine stock returns: 
 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡+1 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡   = 𝛼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜆1,𝑡𝛽1 + 𝜆2,𝑡𝛽2 + ⋯ + 𝜆𝑛,𝑡𝛽𝑛 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (3.8) 
𝑖 = 1, 2, … , 𝐼 for each t 
𝑛 = 1, 2, … , 𝑁 
 
𝑖 − 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 
𝑡 − 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 
𝛽𝑛   − 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡 
𝜆𝑛 − 𝑐𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝛽𝑛 
In the second step, the average value of ?̂?𝑖  and  ?̂?𝑛  of the cross-sectional 
regressions is measured as: 
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?̂?𝑖 =
∑ ?̂?𝑖,𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑇
 (3.9) 
?̂?𝑛 =
∑ ?̂?𝑛,𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑇
 (3.10) 
The corresponding variance of the averaged value, ?̂?𝑖 and ?̂?𝑛, is then measured 
as: 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̂?𝑖) =
∑ (?̂?𝑖,𝑡−?̂?𝑖)
2𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑇2
 (3.11) 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̂?𝑛) =
∑ (?̂?𝑛,𝑡−?̂?𝑛)
2𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑇2
 (3.12) 
The Fama-MacBeth regression usually reports the second step as final output 
for analysis. It allows tests to be designed to examine the power of pricing 
factors at the firm level. However, the researcher must be careful to ensure that 
the regression method does not highlight or mask any characteristics in the data 
that offer valuable information about the validity of the asset pricing model that 
is not included in the explanatory variable sets, 𝛽𝑛. Specifically, data snooping 
biases as discussed in Lo and MacKinlay (1990) must be avoided, as otherwise 
researchers could input only the desired factors and claim that these are what 
determines 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡. 
3.2.3 Discussion of portfolio analysis and individual stock analysis 
Many scholars have confirmed that the two mainstream research methods are 
compatible.  Bali et al. (2016) particularly highlight that the coefficient of the 
Fama-MacBeth (1973) regression is comparable with returns from the long-
short portfolio. The average coefficient estimates in Fama and MacBeth (1973) 
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regression can, therefore, be interpreted as monthly returns on long-short 
trading strategies that trade on that part of the variation in each regressor that is 
orthogonal to every other regressor. A matrix algebra illustration of the 
commonality of the two methods is available in Footnote 3 of Ball et al. (2015), 
and in this thesis, their conclusion is the main theory supporting the validity of 
the use of two methodologies.   
There are, however, certain advantages in using one method over some others. 
Bali et al. (2016) attribute the predominant metric of portfolio analysis to its 
nonparametric nature, which requires fewer sampling specifications than cross-
sectional regression methods. Forming characteristic-based portfolios does not 
need a presumed distribution of a firm’s characteristics, and allows observations 
with extreme values to be included alongside other companies; thus, any 
idiosyncratic risk that a single firm holds could also diversified in the portfolio. 
The drawbacks of portfolio analysis, according to Bali et al. (2016), include the 
limitation to the number of factors by which stocks may be sorted. If stocks are 
sorted by two factors and portfolios constructed at the intersection of the two 
factors’ quintile breakpoints, a total number of 25 (5 times 5) portfolios are 
constructed. If the breakpoints are built on a decile basis, rather than a quintile 
basis, the corresponding number is 100 (10 times 10). If portfolio sorts are built 
based on three factors, and portfolios are formed at the intersection of decile 
breakpoints, the number of portfolios is 1,000 (10 times 10 times 10).  This leads 
to concerns around whether some portfolios may not have a sufficient number 
of stocks to dilute distinctive characteristics, especially when the number of 
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firms with specific information, e.g. firm’s insider ownership (which will be 
discussed in Chapter 5), is small. 
Cross-sectional regression analysis, meanwhile, allows a large set of 
explanatory variables to coexist. This enables research design to minimise the 
possibility of missing key variables, and to explore the pricing power of each 
variable, controlling for other firm characteristics. However, Bali et al. (2016) 
highlight three drawbacks that researchers should address when using cross-
sectional analysis. The first is that cross-sectional regressions reflect the 
pervasive impact of the large number of small firms in the market. As the 
ordinary least square regression weights each observation equally, the weight 
on the micro-cap stocks, which make up roughly two-thirds of the market, but 
which represent less than 6% of the market by capitalisation, dominate the 
average coefficient results. The second drawback is that Fama-MacBeth 
regressions are also sensitive to outliers and impose a potentially unspecified 
parametric relation between the variables, making the economic significance of 
the results difficult to judge.  The third drawback is that, given the skewed 
distributions and extreme observations for some firm characteristics, Fama-
MacBeth regressions may not present unbiased results compared to portfolio 
tests, which provide potentially more robust results in terms of evaluating 
predictive ability. 
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4 LIMIT OF ARBITRAGE AND THE DISTRESS PUZZLE 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter documents what lies behind the distress puzzle, a long, persistent 
negative return premium, is a set of significant limit of arbitrage effects. By 
using a comprehensive dataset that includes details of financially distressed 
firms based on U.S.-wide stocks in the main exchanges. The distress premium 
is captured and is found to be more concentrated in cases of high transaction 
cost stock portfolios, and concentrated in portfolios where arbitrage 
opportunities are restricted and those with high historical idiosyncratic 
volatility. Dissecting the distress puzzle shows that high distress risk firms with 
small market capitalization are the primary contributors to the premium, while 
small firms also tend to have high transaction costs, high idiosyncratic volatility, 
and high short-selling costs. In line with Fama and French (2008), the results 
were cross-checked using double-sort portfolio returns and the Fama-MacBeth 
regression.  Consistent evidence of limit-of-arbitrage effects in the distress 
premium is demonstrated, as distress risk is positively related to expected return 
when the interaction effects of distress risk on high transaction costs and 
idiosyncratic volatility are controlled. 
Firms with high financial distress risks generate abnormally low returns. 
Existing empirical evidence from Dichev (1998), Campbell et al. (2008), and 
Avramov et al. (2013) find a strong premium from a zero-cost portfolio that 
holding top 20% lowest distress risk stocks while short selling top 20% highest 
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distress risk stocks cannot be explained by asset pricing models such as CAPM 
and the Fama-French 3-factor (FF-3) model. In addition, returns of those 
portfolios that are sorted by distress risk present a negative risk-return 
relationship: Low distress risk stocks earn high returns, while high distress risk 
stocks record low returns. These empirical findings compound the so-called 
“distress puzzle”, as current theories are not able to provide satisfactory 
explanations for these results. 
Firms that are at high risk of financial distress have several characteristics 
related to the limit of arbitrage effects, which leads to the main research 
hypothesis whether the distress puzzle exists due to arbitrage limits. Limit of 
arbitrage theory refers to the way in which transaction costs restrict the ability 
of traders to make profits from market mispricing, thus creating constant 
mispricing anomalies. This theory highlights that the assumption of a 
frictionless market, which is commonly used in risk-based asset pricing 
theories, is not in line with reality. Vassalou and Xing (2004) find that most 
distressed stocks are penny stocks. From a sample of 1,614 firms which 
eventually filed bankruptcy protection, defaulted, or were delisted for 
performance reasons, Campbell et al. (2008) note that the mean value of stock 
price was slightly over one dollar, and the average 3-month return volatility was 
almost twice the market level. Avramov et al. (2013) find the mean market 
capitalization of high financial distress risk firms to be 9 times smaller than that 
of solvent companies. From another perspective, Campbell et al. (2008) confirm 
the importance of market capitalization. They find that in their failure risk 
predictive model, the variable proxy for firm market capitalization is the most 
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persistent variable with the power to predict the probability of financial distress 
over short and long forecasting horizons. Conrad et al. (2014) show that 
institutional ownership is negatively related to distress risk, and the top decile 
high distress risk firms have a mean value of institutional ownership of 12.5%, 
while the average value across the safest six deciles is over 30%. The spreads 
of firm’s stock price, size and institutional ownership across high and low 
distressed firms suggest the existence of the distress puzzle is possibly due to 
high arbitrage limits in high distress risk firms, where anomaly exists but costs 
of correcting prices block potential arbitrage activities. This leads to our main 
research hypothesis if the distress puzzle is due to arbitrage limits. 
Limit of arbitrage theory refers to the way in which transaction costs restrict the 
ability of traders to make profits from market mispricing, thus creating constant 
mispricing anomalies. This theory highlights that the assumption of a 
frictionless market, which is commonly adopted in risk-based asset pricing 
theories, is not in line with reality. Amihud (2002), Asquith et al. (2005), and 
Nagel (2005) contribute to the understanding of this topic by identifying stock 
illiquidity, short interest ratio, and institutional shareholders that represent the 
condition of arbitrage limits. They find that most asset pricing anomalies are 
more pronounced in stocks that have a significant limit of arbitrage properties. 
These findings argue that trading stocks using anomaly-driven strategies, 
contradictory to the implied hypothesis of EMH that transaction is frictionless 
and no transaction costs, are heavily influenced by those arbitrage limit effect 
than trading other stocks.   Successful results in terms of explaining anomalies 
by limit of arbitrage theory can be found in Ali et al. (2003), where the value 
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effect is strongly related to several limit-of-arbitrage effects, and Duan et al. 
(2010) who argue that the short interest ratio anomaly has no pricing power in 
low idiosyncratic volatility stocks. The research is thus designed by using 
proxies of transaction cost (bid-ask spread, dollar volume, Amihud (2002) 
illiquidity measure) and holding costs (idiosyncratic volatility) to explain the 
distress puzzle. 
Indeed, a number of scholars claim to have resolved the distress puzzle. George 
and Hwang (2010) argue that there is an interactive effect between a firm’s 
leverage and distress risk where distress risk is positively priced, as interaction 
variables are included in the Fama-MacBeth regression analyses.  Garlappi et 
al. (2008) argue that the power of shareholder bargaining under high probability 
of financial distress implies a higher portion of the firm’s value can be claimed. 
In their double-sort portfolio results, firm’s distress risk at month 𝑡 − 1  is 
positively priced in the 𝑡 + 1 month returns controlling for firm’s total assets, 
R&D expenditures and industry concentrations. Novy-Marx (2013) argues that 
the distress premium diminishes when gross profitability is used as a pricing 
factor, while Conrad et al. (2014) find that high distress risk firms are lottery-
like, such that distressed firms record a subsequent extreme high return. They 
propose that the way to distinguish distressed firms and “Jackpot firms” is based 
on the return’s idiosyncratic skewness, where firms with high idiosyncratic 
return skewness are likely to be Jackpots, while distressed firms do not 
demonstrate such patterns. A more interesting conclusion comes from Chava 
and Purnanandam (2010), which is that the distress premium was driven by 
extreme outliers of returns in the period 1980 to 1990. This implies that the 
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distress puzzle is a time-specific mispricing phenomenon rather than a market-
wide anomaly based on size and value premiums. Nevertheless, none of which 
presents a sound resolution to the negative distress risk-return relationship in 
the post-1980 period in both portfolio analysis and individual stock analysis.  
This chapter contributes to solving the distress puzzle from the perspective of 
arbitrage. Starting with the computation of a firm’s risk of financial distress, the 
failure probability introduced by Campbell et al. (2008) is estimated from a 
hazard model that contains predicting variables selected from financial reports 
and the capital market. The estimation, common to most papers citing CHS 
failure probability, is based on a comprehensive list of 2,610 financially 
distressed firms in the U.S. from 1963 to 2014. An independently run logit 
regression is used to obtain parameters for calculating the failure probability. 
This provides an up-to-date estimation of distress risks that the previous 
literature has not yet covered, and helps to avoid look-ahead bias by using 
information that investors should not have known on the date of observation. 
This leads to the discovery that the distress premium is not generated from 
outliers in 1980 to 1990 and that the premium is stronger than that observed by 
Campbell et al. (2008) when post-2003 stock returns are included. 
The second contribution of this chapter is the elaboration of the concept of 
distress premium and its covariance with arbitrage opportunities. Following 
Asquith et al. (2005) as well as Li and Luo (2016), the distress risk premium 
measured as the monthly-rebalanced long-short portfolio return from holding 
the lowest 20% distress risk firms and short-selling the highest 20% distress risk 
firms, is positively related to firms’ average monthly bid-ask spread, dollar 
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volume, illiquidity ratio, and idiosyncratic volatility. This variation of distress 
risk premium in low and high arbitrage limit firms is even higher if portfolio 
return is risk-adjusted, in which the portfolio’s Fama-French 3-factor alpha is 
0.45%−1.03% per month in low arbitrage limit companies and is 1.51%-2.27% 
per month in high distress risk firms in the 1980-2014 sample period. The cross-
sectional regression further supports the arbitrage limit theory hypothesis by 
showing a distinctive pricing power of failure probability between low and high 
arbitrage limit firms. 
There are several complimentary aspects between this chapter and Da and Gao 
(2010), who find that the effect of clientele changes and short-term reversal 
drives the distress premium from monthly rebalanced portfolios where the 
illiquidity of stock is also considered to be a proxy for transaction costs. The 
same approach is used in this chapter to evaluate the relationship between two 
market phenomena. However, regressions show that the fundamental difference 
between this study and Da and Gao (2010) is that in their literature a positive 
distress risk-return pattern is observed; such a pattern does not exist in this 
research. Comparing a rough proxy using 1971 to 1999 U.S .equity market data, 
seven different limit-of-arbitrage characteristics were considered based on more 
comprehensive databases and the relationship over a longer time period, from 
1981 to 2014. 
 
4.2 Hypothesis Development 
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It is known from the earlier literature that arbitrage limit affects differences in 
expected returns across stocks. In the Shleifer and Vishny (1997) survey, they 
proposed the mechanism how costs of arbitrage in exploiting anomaly-related 
return premium can influence investor’s decision, and thus leaving mispricing 
phenomenon to remain. By arguing how implausible a frictionless market 
assumption in the asset pricing model could fit the reality, they present two 
sources that drive stock price deviating from fundamentals.  The first is the 
source of noise, which may initially generate mispricing due to investor 
sentiments or impediments of trading to intuitions. The second source is the cost 
of arbitrage. If arbitrage trading is limited by some restrictions, then excess 
returns that cannot be explained by rational asset pricing models may exist and 
restrict arbitrage activities. Pontiff (1996) supplements the concept of arbitrage 
cost by identifying how transaction costs and holding costs affect arbitrage 
profits: Transaction costs like bid-ask spread occurs with each transaction, 
reducing the willingness of investors exploiting anomalies with high costs. 
Holding costs like portfolio’s idiosyncratic volatility constitute a risk exposure 
as they are the consequence of forming diversified portfolios with different 
stocks. Therefore, investors are less willing to hold assets for long-term.  Thus, 
return anomalies are more pronounced with a high limit of arbitrage effect. 
Although the relation of the distress puzzle and limit of arbitrage theory has not 
yet been empirically investigated, various research findings confirm that high 
distress risk firms have potential barriers in trading activities: Campbell et al. 
(2008) find distressed stocks, on average, have market value of equity which is 
over 10 times smaller than the average firm market value of equity in the market. 
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Novy-Marx and Velikov (2015) estimate the trading cost based on anomalies, 
and they find the trading cost based on long-short distress risk portfolio could, 
on average, explain 70.5% of the buy-and-hold distress premium. For firms with 
such a small size and high trading costs, whether its stocks can be traded and 
held frictionlessly is in doubt, as equity investments in distressed firms are not 
favoured by Absolute Priority Rule implied in the U.S. bankruptcy law. In the 
extreme case, the value of holding distressed stocks could be zero as it cannot 
be reclaimed until senior debtholders are satisfied. Therefore, even professional 
investors like institutional owners may lack interest in holding high distress risk 
stocks, or hold stocks to lending.  
This research, inspired by the existing literature, forms the following 
hypotheses: 
H1: The abnormal return from long-short distress risk portfolios is positively 
associated with transaction costs/ holding costs. 
H1 is tested as follow: For every month 𝑡, all stocks are independently sorted 
by the measure of distress risk and the proxy of arbitrage limit effect, known at 
𝑡 − 1 before the month of forming. Then the distress premium is characterised 
by the arbitrage limit effect. According to the literature, the distress premium in 
high arbitrage limit groups should outperform low arbitrage limit groups. 
H2: The predictive power of financial distress risk to the expected stock returns 
is more pronounced in firms with higher transaction costs/holding costs than 
others. 
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H2 is tested by adopting Fama-MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions: For 
each month 𝑡, all stock’s monthly excess return is regressed by stock’s distress 
risk proxy and the proxy of limit of arbitrage effect, known at 𝑡 − 1, and one 
interaction variable computed as the product of the two proxy variables, and 
then computed as the time-series averaged coefficients and time-series t-
statistics throughout all month’s cross-sectional regressions covered by the 
dataset. Existing literature implies that the coefficient of the interaction variable 
should be significantly different from zero, representing how distinctive the 
distress puzzle is presented in low and high arbitrage limit stocks.  
 
4.3 Data and the Measures 
The dataset is constructed as follows: All common shares (CRSP share 
code=10/11) that are listed in the NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ from January 1980 
to December 2014 are included. Financial firms (SIC code 6000-6999) are 
dropped. Distress returns are addressed by using the CRSP delisting return 
(CRSP code dlret) where available. In the event that the final return for the 
delisting return is unavailable, the last full month return information and date 
are used as the delisting return. In some cases, CRSP still reports a firm’s stock 
return even after financial distress events have been observed. This can be due 
to 1) a re-emergence of a distressed firm; 2) the date of bankruptcy or default 
announcement being prior to the delisting events; or 3) a firm declaring 
bankruptcy or defaults, but continuing to trade stock in the market. For cases 
that match the above descriptions, the return from the month of the first financial 
distress event is used as the firm’s delisting return, and all observations 
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afterwards are dropped. In line with Campbell et al. (2008), all these delisting 
return adjustments represent a conservative estimation of returns from 
distressed firms and do not sharpen distress premium. The final dataset contains 
2,271,552 firm-month observations for 408 months. 
4.3.1 Campbell et al. (2008): Failure Probability 
4.3.1.1 Model specification and data 
The failure probability (𝐹𝑃) proposed by Campbell et al. (2008) is a predicting 
model that is heavily reliant on accounting information, though some market 
information is also utilised, to measure the risk of a firm being financially 
distressed. The probability is estimated as Shumway (2001) hazard model 
methodology, but 𝐹𝑃 has higher predicting power in long-term estimation by 
allowing the explanatory variables changes with time. This research subtracts 
the method of calculating 𝐹𝑃 because this creates the most accurate model for 
predicting distress risk using accounting-based information, according to 
Campbell et al. (2008) and Charitou et al. (2013). 
The 𝐹𝑃 is estimated as follows: all explanatory variables (see Table 2 for detail) 
are constructed using accounting data from Compustat and market data from 
CRSP. These variables are inspired by early research such as Shumway (2001) 
as well as Hillegeist et al. (2004) and Campbell et al. (2008) and modify some 
variables with new calculation.  The estimation also utilises a list of financially 
distressed firms from January 1963 to December 2014. The list of financially 
distressed firms includes U.S. bankruptcy initial filings from Thomson SDC 
Platinum, The UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database, Compustat, 
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Moody’s Default Research Database, and CRSP Event files from January 1963 
to December 2014. All filings with common corporate identifiers and dates of 
declared bankruptcy, default, or performance-related delisting events are 
included. Duplicates are dropped, and the record with the earliest event date is 
stored. Given that this research will use accounting and market information to 
estimate the probability of failure and portfolio returns, only firms with 
traceable PEERMNO and GVKEY are retained. This final combined dataset 
contains 2,610 failure events. In the sample period in line with Campbell et al. 
(2008), the failure firm case is 2,077, a higher number than Campbell et al. 
reported due the backfilling of the original database.  
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Table 2 Predicting variables definition 
Variable Definition Notes  
PRICE 
The log value of CRSP monthly 
closing price 
 
Note that CRSP reports negative stock 
price sometimes and the absolute 
value of price for calculation is taken. 
 
CRSP code 𝑃𝑅𝐶 
Note all prices over $15 are replaced as 
$15 but its original value is used to 
calculate 𝑀𝐸. 
 
Bid-ask average value is used when no 
closing price is available. 
ME 
Market capitalization is a number of 
shares outstanding times the closing 
price at the end of the month. For the 
market value of equity calculating 
MB, closing price and outstanding 
share is December-end information. 
 
𝑀𝐸𝑖,   𝑡 = 𝑆𝐻𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑖,   𝑡 × 𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑖,   𝑡 
 
BE 
The definition of book equity (BE) as 
total shareholders' equity plus deferred 
taxes and investment tax credit 
(Compustat item TXDITC) minus the 
book value of preferred stock 
(Compustat item PSTK). I prefer the 
shareholders' equity numbers as 
reported by Compustat (Compustat 
item SEQ). In case this data is not 
available, I calculate shareholders' 
equity as the sum of common and 
preferred equity (Compustat items 
CEQ and PSTK). If neither of the two 
is available, I define shareholders' 
equity as the differences between total 
assets and total liabilities (Compustat 
items ATand LT). 
𝐵𝐸 =  𝑆𝐸𝑄 + 𝑇𝑋𝐷𝐼𝑇𝐶 − 𝑃𝑆𝑇𝐾 
𝑜𝑟 𝐵𝐸 = 𝐶𝐸𝑄 + 𝑃𝑆𝑇𝐾 + 𝑇𝑋𝐷𝐼𝐶𝑇
− 𝑃𝑆𝑇𝐾 
𝑜𝑟 𝐵𝐸 = 𝐴𝑇 − 𝐿𝑇 + 𝑇𝑋𝐷𝐼𝑇𝐶 − 𝑃𝑆𝑇𝐾 
 
Note that the BE is calculated based on the 
above sequence. 
 
 
BEadj 
Adding 10% of the difference between 
ME and BE. 
𝐵𝐸 (𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑)𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐵𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 0.1(𝑀𝐸𝑖,𝑡
− 𝐵𝐸𝑖,𝑡) 
Note that if 𝐵𝐸 (𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑)𝑖,𝑡 is still 
negative after adjustment, I replace that 
native value as $1. 
TAadj 
Total assets plus 10% of the difference 
between market equity value and book 
equity value. 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 (𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑)𝑖,𝑡
= 𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 0.1(𝑀𝐸𝑖,𝑡
− 𝐵𝐸𝑖,𝑡) 
 
RSIZE 
Firm’s market equity over the total 
S&P 500 market value 
𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡
= ln (
𝑀𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆&𝑃 500 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑡
) 
NITA Net income over total assets 
𝑁𝐼𝑇𝐴 =
𝑁𝐼𝑄
𝑇𝐴𝑎𝑑𝑗
 
 
NIMTA 
Net income over market value of total 
assets 
𝑁𝐼𝑀𝑇𝐴 =
𝑁𝐼𝑄
(𝑀𝐸 + 𝑇𝐿)
 
TLTA Total Liability over total assets 
𝑇𝐿𝑇𝐴 =
𝑇𝐿
𝑇𝐴𝑎𝑑𝑗
 
 
TLMTA 
Total Liability over market value of 
total assets 
𝑇𝐿𝑀𝑇𝐴 =
𝑇𝐿
𝑀𝐸 + 𝑇𝐿
 
 
CASHMTA 
Cash and short income over total 
market value of assets 
𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑀𝑇𝐴 =
𝐶𝐻𝐸𝑄
𝑀𝐸 + 𝑇𝐿
 
 
(Continue) 
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EXRET 
Gross excess return, S&P 500 return is 
value-weighted 
𝐸𝑋𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 = ln(1 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑡) − 𝐿𝑛(1
+ 𝑅𝑆&𝑃 500,𝑡) 
 
MB 
The market value of equity (ME) over 
adjusted book value of equity (BEadj) 
𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑀𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝐵𝐸 (𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑)𝑖,𝑡
 
 
 
SIGMA 
Annualised 3-month rolling sample 
standard deviation. I assume the 
standard deviation is centered on zero, 
instead of centered around mean value 
given a time period. Return is 
calculated based on CRSP Daily Stock 
Files 
 
𝑆𝐼𝐺𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1.𝑡−3
= √252 ×
1
𝑁 − 1
× ∑ 𝑟𝑖,𝑘
2
𝑘∈{𝑡−1,𝑡−2,𝑡−3}
 
 
NIMTAAVG Time-weighted NIMTA 
𝑁𝐼𝑀𝑇𝐴𝑉𝐺𝑖,𝑡−1,𝑡−12 =
1−𝜑3
1−𝜑12
(𝑁𝐼𝑀𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1,𝑡−3 + 𝜑 ×
𝑁𝐼𝑀𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−4,𝑡−6 + ⋯ + 𝜑
9 ×
𝑁𝐼𝑀𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−10,𝑡−12) 
Where 𝜑 = 2−
1
3 
EXRETAVG Time-weighted EXRET 
𝐸𝑋𝑅𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑉𝐺𝑖,𝑡 =
1 − 𝜑
1 − 𝜑12
(𝐸𝑋𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝜑 × 𝐸𝑋𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡−2
+ ⋯
+ 𝜑11 × 𝐸𝑋𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡−12 
Where 𝜑 = 2−
1
3 
 
All variables are winsorized at the 5/95 percentiles before regression. Outliers 
that are not in this range are therefore replaced by 5/95 percentile threshold 
values. To further examine whether 𝑀𝐵, 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸 and 𝑆𝐼𝐺𝑀𝐴 are not required 
for winsorize process, their original values are used within the regression and 
the outcome is significantly inconsistent with Campbell et al. (2008). The 
hazard model is then estimated by using winsorized explanatory variables. 
At the beginning of a month 𝑡, the marginal probability of a firm 𝑖 falling into 
financial distress, denoted by 𝑃 , is estimated using a logit regression. This is 
known as the one-month model: 
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𝑃(𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 1|𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 = 0) =
1
1+𝑒−𝛼−𝛽𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1
 (4.1) 
 
In line with Campbell et al. (2008, 2011), 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 is the logit regression dependent 
variable, which equals to 1 if firm 𝑖 falls into financial distress in month 𝑡, or 0 
otherwise. Thus, the regression reflects the marginal probability if a firm file for 
financial distress in month t is 𝑃(𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 1|𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 = 0). Here, 𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1 is the vector 
of all explanatory variables measured at the end of the previous month. These 
predicting variables includes: 𝑁𝐼𝑀𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑉𝐺 , 𝑇𝐿𝑀𝑇𝐴 , 𝐸𝑋𝑅𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑉𝐺 , 𝑆𝐼𝐺𝑀𝐴 , 
𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸, 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑀𝑇𝐴, 𝑀𝐵, and 𝑃𝐼𝑅𝐶𝐸. In addition, the conditional probability 
that a firm will file for bankruptcy 12 months later (𝑡 + 12) is estimated using 
historical information from 𝑡 − 1 , given its assumed to be survival until 
month 𝑡 + 11. 
𝑃(𝑌𝑖,𝑡+12 = 1|𝑌𝑖,𝑡+11 = 0) =
1
1+𝑒−𝛼−𝛽𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1
 (4.2)
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This figure illustrates how Campbell et al. (2008) failure probability is estimated in the panel dataset. The one-month model is estimated by using all available 
information set till one-month ahead of estimation 𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1 as explanatory variables explain if firm 𝑖 on month 𝑡 is financially distressed (Yi,t = 1|Yi,t−1 = 0) or 
not (Yi,t = 0|Yi,t−1 = 0). For the 12-month model, the condition of the firm is estimated by 1-month lagged information set 𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1 to estimate the conditional 
probability causing distressed  (Yi,t+12 = 1|Yi,t+11 = 0) or not  (Yi,t+12 = 0|Yi,t+11 = 0). All other firm-month observations after the first financial distress 
event occurring are dropped.
Date of IPO 
Date of first distress event 
⚫ Re-emerge 
⚫ Continue Trading 
⚫ Other distress events 
One-Month model 
Last month before distress event 
12-month model 
Date of IPO 
Date of first distress event 
Last month before distress event 
⚫ Re-emerge 
⚫ Continue Trading 
⚫ Other distress events 
12 months before distress event 
Data Included  Data of financial distress Data dropped  
Time Line 
Time Line 
Figure 2 The one-month and 12-month failure probability predicting model 
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It is crucial to handle observations that enter into regression, and observations 
that are dropped from the database due to model setting requirements, which are 
the key difference between one-month model and 12-month model. Figure 2 
plots the procedures and differences of estimating two models. For one firm at 
month 𝑡  enters into regression, one-month model must observe all lagged 
independent variables 𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1, in that month. For firms that eventually fall into 
financial distress, the model identifies the first date of distress event as the sole 
date of financial distress in the database, assigning 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 1 in that month and 
zero otherwise. Most distressed firms stop reporting their financial statement 
and their stocks are delisted when a distress event occurs. But there are some 
exceptions wherein the estimation model drops them from the database and 
assume firms have not survived when a distress event occurs. In the estimation 
of the 12-month model, we also drop observations within 12 months of financial 
distress event. That is, for instance, Firm Alpha defaulted in September 1998, 
and eventually delisted in March 1999. The estimation of 12-month model drops 
observations from September 1997 and afterwards in the 12-month model even 
though the stock was still trading in the market for subsequent months, and 
using data that is updated to September 1997 to predict whether Firm Alpha 
would fall into financial distress in September 1998. 
4.3.1.2 𝐹𝑃 simulation outcomes 
The replicating results are presented in Table 3. For each of the panel groups, 
the first row reports summary statistics of original values of predicting 
variables, taken from Campbell et al. (2008) and our replicating results in the 
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same period are listed in the second row. The third row reports the summary 
statistics across the whole sample period.  
Panel A of Table 3 reports the Entire Data Set, including all U.S. firm-monthly 
observations of healthy firms (active firms in the observing month), bankrupted 
firms (firms filed for Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 in the observing month) and 
failure firms (firms are delisted from current exchange due to performance-
related reason; firms are rated as defaulted by S&P or by Moody’s; firms are 
bankrupted in the observing month). Our replica in the same period (1963-2003) 
generally gives identical results as Campbell et al. (2008), and statistic 
characteristics of all variables are constant in the whole sample period (1963-
2014).  One might be interested in the inconsistency of variable’s minimum and 
maximum statistics, where the full sample period gives a smaller value than the 
replica dataset. This is because the dataset in the different sample period is 
winsorized independently, thus with different volume of observations, summary 
statistics may vary due to the difference value of 5/95 percentile threshold in 
two sample periods. 
Panel B of Table 3 reports summary statistics for Bankruptcy Group which only 
includes the firm-month observations which represent those firms that have 
filed for bankruptcy. Consistent with Shumway (2001) as well as Campbell et 
al. (2008, 2011), bankrupted firms have lower net incomes than the market 
average level. The mean/median value of profitability measure, 𝑁𝐼𝑇𝐴  and 
𝑁𝐼𝑀𝑇𝐴 is -0.001/0.007 in 1963-2003 and is 0.000/0.006 in 1963-2014 for the 
Entire Data Set. For the bankrupted firms, the mean/median value of 𝑁𝐼𝑇𝐴 and 
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𝑁𝐼𝑀𝑇𝐴 is -0.036/-0.029 and -0.024/-0.026 respectively, a drastic difference to 
the market level.  Bankrupted firms are distinct from the market with other 
characteristics: they have high leverage (measured as 𝑇𝐿𝑇𝐴  and 𝑇𝐿𝑀𝑇𝐴 ), 
negative stock returns (𝐸𝑋𝑅𝐸𝑇), small size (𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸), high return volatility 
(𝑆𝐼𝐺𝑀𝐴), high Market-to-Book ratio and low stock price. For statistics in  Panel 
C, those conclusions hold due to the large similarity in terms of accounting and 
marketing performance among distressed firms, regardless of which type of 
financial distress they are. The replica sample gives qualitative comparable 
results with Campbell et al. (2008) and maintains stable in the whole sample 
period, suggesting the backfill of bankrupted firms does not change the pattern 
of what the literature has identified. 
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Table 3 A comparison of failure probability predicting variable with Campbell et al. (2008) 
This table lists summary statistics of the key variables for predicting firm’s failure probability (𝐹𝑃). NITA is the ratio of firm’s net income to total assets. NIMTA is the ratio 
of firm’s net income to market-adjusted total assets. TLTA is the ratio of firm’s total debt to total assets. TLMTA is the ratio of firm’s total assets over market-adjusted total 
assets. EXRET is the firm’s monthly stock return in excess of S&P 500 index return. RSIZE is the natural logarithm value of firm’s market value of equity over S&P 500 listed 
firm size. SIGMA is the firm’s annualised 3-month return volatility. CASHMTA is the ratio of firm’s cash and short-term investments to market-adjusted total assets. MB is 
firm’s market-to-book-ratio, following the adjustment suggested by Campbell et al. (2008). PRICE is the natural logarithm value of firm’s stock price. The composition of 
variables is listed in Table 2. Each panel contains a group of summary statistics from Table II of Campbell et al. 2008 (p.2907), a replica using the same sample period, and a 
complete dataset covering all 1963-2014 firm-month observations. For each panel, all variables are independently winsorized at 5/95 percentiles. 
 
Variable NITA NIMTA TLTA TLMTA EXRET RSIZE SIGMA CASHMTA MB PRICE 
Panel A. Entire Data Set (Campbell et al. 2008), 1963-2003 
Mean -0.001 0.000 0.506 0.445 -0.011 -10.456 0.562 0.084 2.041 2.019 
Median 0.007 0.006 0.511 0.427 -0.009 -10.570 0.471 0.045 1.557 2.474 
Std. Dev. 0.034 0.023 0.252 0.280 0.117 1.922 0.332 0.097 1.579 0.883 
Min -0.102 -0.069 0.083 0.036 -0.243 -13.568 0.153 0.002 0.358 -0.065 
Max 0.039 0.028 0.931 0.923 0.218 -6.773 1.353 0.358 6.471 2.708 
Observations 1,695,036          
Panel A2. Entire Data Set (Replica), 1963-2003 
Mean -0.001 0.000 0.509 0.437 -0.010 -10.440 0.545 0.081 2.020 2.022 
Median 0.007 0.006 0.514 0.420 -0.009 -10.564 0.476 0.045 1.479 2.464 
Std. Dev. 0.033 0.021 0.249 0.274 0.115 1.913 0.322 0.092 1.585 0.869 
Min -0.101 -0.062 0.092 0.036 -0.238 -13.537 0.170 0.002 0.475 0.000 
Max 0.039 0.028 0.931 0.911 0.213 -6.700 1.377 0.334 6.597 2.708 
Observations 1,751,162          
Panel A3. Entire Data Set, 1963-2014 
Mean -0.001 0.000 0.508 0.429 -0.009 -10.371 0.527 0.087 2.065 2.070 
Median 0.007 0.005 0.510 0.401 -0.008 -10.472 0.443 0.049 1.540 2.546 
(Continue) 
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(Continued) 
Std. Dev. 0.033 0.021 0.252 0.276 0.110 1.896 0.307 0.095 1.578 0.839 
Min -0.100 -0.060 0.092 0.036 -0.230 -13.480 0.144 0.002 0.490 0.086 
Max 0.040 0.027 0.930 0.911 0.204 -6.730 1.259 0.347 6.622 2.708 
Observations 2,271,552          
Panel B1. Bankruptcy Group (Campbell et al. 2008), 1963-1998 
Mean -0.054 -0.040 0.796 0.763 -0.115 -12.416 1.061 0.044 2.430 0.432 
Median -0.054 -0.047 0.872 0.861 -0.171 -12.876 1.255 0.021 1.018 -0.065 
Std. Dev. 0.043 0.030 0.174 0.210 0.148 1.345 0.352 0.062 2.509 0.760 
Observations 797          
Panel B2. Bankruptcy Group (Replica), 1963-1998 
Mean -0.036 -0.024 0.703 0.631 -0.086 -11.956 0.930 0.056 3.297 0.788 
Median -0.029 -0.026 0.775 0.723 -0.105 -12.333 1.053 0.024 2.435 0.446 
Std. Dev. 0.042 0.027 0.238 0.276 0.135 1.456 0.359 0.078 2.404 0.951 
Observations 1,145          
Panel B3. Bankruptcy Group, 1963-2014 
Mean -0.040 -0.027 0.682 0.620 -0.086 -12.145 1.020 0.072 3.199 0.870 
Median -0.030 -0.026 0.754 0.712 -0.108 -12.554 1.308 0.032 1.984 0.486 
Std. Dev. 0.045 0.029 0.254 0.287 0.144 1.448 0.384 0.094 2.563 0.904 
Observations 2,586          
Panel C1. Failure Group (Campbell et al. 2008), 1963-2003 
Mean -0.059 -0.040 0.738 0.731 -0.105 -12.832 1.167 0.072 2.104 0.277 
Median -0.066 -0.047 0.821 0.842 -0.179 -13.568 1.353 0.029 0.751 -0.065 
Std. Dev. 0.043 0.030 0.228 0.239 0.162 1.168 0.303 0.099 0.389 0.760 
Observations 1,614          
Panel C2. Failure Group (Replica), 1963-2003 
Mean -0.042 -0.029 0.707 0.646 -0.090 -12.068 0.954 0.061 3.300 0.832 
(Continue) 
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(Continued) 
Median -0.032 -0.028 0.771 0.745 -0.119 -12.521 1.077 0.028 2.230 0.542 
Std. Dev. 0.045 0.029 0.229 0.270 0.150 1.557 0.337 0.080 2.573 0.916 
Observations 2,077          
Panel C3. Failure Group, 1963-2014 
Mean -0.041 -0.027 0.711 0.653 -0.087 -11.995 1.057 0.066 3.235 0.891 
Median -0.030 -0.026 0.779 0.759 -0.116 -12.449 1.308 0.032 2.042 0.560 
Std. Dev. 0.045 0.028 0.231 0.270 0.146 1.585 0.350 0.085 2.584 0.910 
Observations 2,610          
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4.3.2 Limit of arbitrage effect proxies 
Inspired by Ali et al. (2003), Stambaugh et al. (2015) as well as Li and Luo 
(2016), this chapter adopts proxies of arbitrage limits below. Depending on the 
role that certain variables have played in the literature, these arbitrage limit 
proxies are categorised as transaction cost (stock’s monthly average bid-ask 
spread, dollar volume, Amihud (2002)’s illiquidity measure) and holding cost 
(stock’s monthly idiosyncratic volatility related with Fama-French three-factor 
model), as suggested by Asquith et al. (2005). 
Bid-ask spread (𝑩𝑨): The difference between the quoted closing ask price 
(CRSP code 𝑎𝑠𝑘) and closing bid price (CRSP code 𝑏𝑖𝑑) over the bid-ask 
average value is calculated as (ask-bid)/(0.5*(ask+bid)). For missing prices of 
ask or bid, highest or lowest trading prices are used as an alternative. The 
variable is estimated on a daily basis, and reported as the average value in a 
given calendar month; this requires at least 15 effective observations in each 
month. According to the literature, 𝐵𝐴  should be positively priced in the 
expected stock returns and should be positively associated with the distress 
premium.   
 
Dollar trading volume (𝑫𝑽): The number of shares traded (CRSP code 𝑣𝑜𝑙) 
in a day times the closing price (CRSP code 𝑝𝑟𝑐). If the closing price is missing, 
the bid-ask average is used. The variable is estimated on a daily basis, and 
reported as the average value in a given calendar month; this requires at least 15 
effective observations each month. According to Amihud (2002), 𝐷𝑉 reflects 
stocks’ trading volume with an interaction of stock price: stocks with low 𝐷𝑉 
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are more sensitive by arbitrage activities, as large and frequent trading on these 
stocks can drive huge price drift comparing their limited stocks available for 
trading. Firms with low 𝐷𝑉 is a sign of high transaction costs. Therefore, based 
on our hypotheses the distress premium should be negatively related to 𝐷𝑉.    
 
Stock illiquidity (𝑰𝑳𝑳𝑰𝑸): Defined as the average ratio of the daily absolute 
return (CRSP code 𝑟𝑒𝑡) to the dollar trading volume (𝐷𝑉) on that day. Note that 
most research with cross-section of returns follows Amihud (2002), and states 
that 𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄 should be the average within a specific time period (denoted 𝐷): 
  
𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑎𝑑𝑗 =
1
𝐷
∑
|𝑟𝑒𝑡|
𝐷𝑉
𝐷
𝑑=1  (4.3) 
 
𝐷 − 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑎 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 − 𝐷𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 
𝐷𝑉 − 𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 
 
In this research, the portfolios are rebalanced at the beginning of every month, 
so the number of trading days in one month is calculated, and at least 15 valid 
observations are required each month. The higher a firm’s 𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄 is, the higher 
the stock transaction costs.  Thus, the distress premium should be positively 
related to 𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄. 
 
Idiosyncratic volatility (𝑰𝑽𝑶𝑳): Idiosyncratic volatility is measured as the 
standard deviation of residual return from an asset pricing model.  Given the 
failure of the CAPM to explain cross-sectional returns, and the ubiquity of the 
 85 
 
FF-3 model in empirical financial applications, the focus is on idiosyncratic 
volatility measured relative to the Fama-French 3-factor model: 
 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑚𝑘𝑡𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (4.4) 
 
Every month 𝑡 the daily stock returns (CRSP Daily code 𝑟𝑒𝑡) in excess of U.S. 
one-month t-bill rate 𝑟𝑓,𝑡 , is then regressed by 𝑀𝐾𝑇 , 𝑆𝑀𝐵 , and 𝐻𝑀𝐿 , all 
available on a daily basis from Professor Kenneth French’s website. 
Idiosyncratic risk is thus defined as the standard deviation of the model-
explained residual return 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , then multiplied by the square root of the total 
number of trading days (𝐷) in the given month.  
 
𝐼𝑉𝑂𝐿 = 𝑆𝑡𝑑. 𝐷𝑒𝑣(𝜀𝑖,𝑡) × √𝐷 (4.5) 
Similar to the 𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄, the distress premium is assumed to be positively related 
with 𝐼𝑉𝑂𝐿. 
4.3.3 Other variables  
The proxy of distress risk is Campbell et al.’s (2008) failure probability (𝐹𝑃), 
and its estimation procedures are numerated in Section 3.4. Following the 
paradigm of asset pricing studies, this chapter also considers control variables 
below. 
Stock Price: The closing price of a stock on the last trading day of a month 
(CRSP code 𝑝𝑟𝑐); bid-ask average is used if no closing price is available. 
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Firm’s size (𝑴𝑬): Measured by the value of a firm’s market value of equity 
(CRSP code 𝑝𝑟𝑐 times 𝑠ℎ𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑡) in million dollars. 
Firm’s book-to-market ratio (𝑩𝑬𝑴𝑬): Measured by the value of firm’s Book-
to-Market ratio. 𝑀𝐸 is the market capitalization, defined as the December-end 
closing price times shares outstanding in million U.S. dollars.  𝐵𝐸  is the 
shareholder’s equity plus deferred taxes and investment credit using Davis, 
Fama, and French’s (2000) estimating method. The definition of book equity 
(BE) as total shareholders' equity plus deferred taxes and investment tax credit 
(Compustat item 𝑇𝑋𝐷𝐼𝑇𝐶) minus the book value of preferred stock (Compustat 
item 𝑃𝑆𝑇𝐾). I prefer the shareholders' equity numbers as reported by Compustat 
(Compustat item 𝑆𝐸𝑄 ). In case this data is not available, I calculate 
shareholders' equity as sum of common and preferred equity (Compustat items 
𝐶𝐸𝑄 and 𝑃𝑆𝑇𝐾). If neither of the two is available, I define shareholders' equity 
as the differences of total assets and total liabilities (Compustat items 𝐴𝑇 and 
𝐿𝑇). 
12-month Momentum (𝑴𝑶𝑴𝟏𝟐): The sum of stock returns (CRSP code 𝑟𝑒𝑡) 
from the past 12 months to 1 month prior to the formation of a portfolio. 
 
 
4.3.4 Summary statistics 
Table 4 shows the summary statistics and correlations between all tested 
variables. The correlation is measured as time-series averaged cross-sectional 
correlation in terms of Spearman’s ranking correlation. This is to describe better 
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the relation of firm’s distress risk and arbitrage limit in the cross-section 
dimension since these variables are skewed. The results show that distress risk 
strongly correlates with past 12-month returns (correlation=-0.324). This is in 
line with Campbell et al. (2008) and Garlappi et al. (2011), who note that high 
distress risk firms are associated with a negative momentum phenomenon. 
Distress risk is weakly related to book-to-market (correlation=0.039) equity but 
more strongly related to the firm’s size (correlation=-0.161). The signs of 
correlation between all arbitrage limit factors to failure probability are 
consistent with the hypotheses by showing a positive correlation of 𝐹𝑃 and 𝐵𝐴, 
𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄  and 𝐼𝑉𝑂𝐿  and negative correlation of 𝐹𝑃  and 𝐷𝑉 . All these signs 
support the hypothesis that arbitrage limit effect is positively related to the 
distress puzzle.  
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Table 4 Summary statistic of distress risk, firm characteristics and arbitrage limit factors 
This table lists the time-series average Spearman’s rank correlations across the main variables being investigated in this chapter. The data time period is from January 1981 
to December 2014, a total number of 408 months. Data is from U.S.-incorporated firms with valid information for the test variables without SIC codes within 6000-6999. 
FP is measured as the month-end failure probability at t-1 measured as Campbell et al. (2008).  BM is the firm’s book-to-market ratio. ME is the log value of firm’s market 
value of equity in million US dollars. MOM12 is the cumulative return of (t-12, t-2). BA is firm’s monthly average bid-ask spread. DV is firm’s monthly average dollar 
volume divided by 10^4. ILLIQ is firm’s monthly illiquidity measure multiplied by 10^4. IVOL is firm’s idiosyncratic volatility related to Fama-French 3-factor adjusted 
return. The detailed estimation of each variable is introduced in section 4.3. 
 
 FP BEME ME MOM12 BA DV ILLIQ IVOL 
Mean 0.061 0.669 1836.368 0.184 3.157 1277.628 2.814 0.029 
P1 0.006 -0.363 4.774 -0.685 0.386 2.469 0.379 0.004 
Median 0.031 0.559 199.859 0.070 2.288 330.556 2.186 0.024 
P99 0.522 2.893 30584.94 2.622 14.130 18619.490 439.234 0.100 
SD 0.115 1.446 8949.346 0.685 2.864 286.401 220.653 0.020 
SKEW 9.492 12.229 15.235 4.975 287.598 28759.780 13.823 3.413 
  FP BEME ME MOM12 BA DV ILLIQ IVOL 
FP         
BEME 0.039        
ME -0.161 -0.249       
MOM12 -0.324 -0.117 0.138      
BA 0.101 0.219 -0.573 -0.139     
DV -0.094 -0.288 0.916 0.143 -0.676    
ILLIQ 0.135 0.264 -0.938 -0.15 0.697 -0.979   
IVOL 0.289 -0.025 -0.519 -0.106 0.413 -0.347 0.483   
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4.4 Empirical Findings 
4.4.1 Consistency with earlier literature 
From January 1981 to December 2014, at the beginning of every year, all stocks 
in the full sample are sorted into ten decile groups according to their CHS failure 
probability (𝐹𝑃) that is estimated using historical information, which acts as a 
proxy for financial distress risk. This one-way sort generates t portfolios. The 
long-short portfolios, denoted as 𝐿𝑜𝑤 − 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ , represent a trading strategy 
whereby holding stocks in the 1st decile of distress risk (low distress risk firms) 
and shorting stocks in the 10th decile of distress risk (high distress risk firms) 
controlling for the effects of limit of arbitrage. In line with Fama and French 
(2008) and Hou et al. (2015), NYSE sample breakpoints are applied to the 
NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ samples to further eliminate size effects. 
The information used for sorting stocks is based on the price and market equity 
value of the last trading day in December, and the weight of each stock in the 
portfolio is therefore calculated by its previous December-end market value of 
equity. The sum of the stocks’ market value of equity (𝑀𝐸) within a portfolio 
constitutes the market value of the portfolio. Thus the weight of each stock is 
the ratio of the stock’s market value over the portfolio’s value, as explained in 
the Chapter 3 Research Methodology. Every month, CRSP reports the stock’s 
monthly holding period return, where stock’s value-weighted return is 
calculated as its monthly holding period return times the stock’s weight. The 
portfolio’s value-weighted return is the sum of all stocks’ value-weighted 
returns within the same portfolio. 
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Observations with negative book-to-market ratio are not removed from the 
sample because most financially distressed firms present negative book value 
of equity in their final life stages prior to delisting.  About 2% of all firm-month 
observations have a negative book value of equity. Thus, removing those 
observations would mean removing firms that have high distress risks, which is 
counterintuitive when looking to explain this phenomenon. In accordance with 
Campbell et al. (2008) methodology, the negative book value of equity is 
replaced with the value of one dollar before the book-to-market value is 
calculated. For the same reason, only observations with the price per stock less 
than one dollar are excluded, rather than those of five dollars, to minimise 
market microstructure issues: the median stock price for distressed firms is just 
above one dollar. 
Fama and French (2008), point out several methodological issues in terms of 
sorting portfolio returns on anomaly variables. When returns are estimated to 
be equal-weighted, a significant long-short portfolio return may reflect the 
pervasive nature of small firms. To address this issue, Table 5 reports value-
weighted raw excess returns (portfolio’s average monthly return minus 1-month 
U.S. T-bill rate), FF-3 alphas and FFC-4 alphas as risk-adjusted returns. The 
equal-weight returns are, however, still used as robustness checks but 
suppressed from the thesis in order to keep the main findings clear. 
The results of this comparison are presented in Table 5. Three findings emerge 
from this presentation. First, the distress premium is more pronounced in terms 
of risk-adjusted returns, as the 𝐿𝑜𝑤 − 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ portfolio’s average FF-3 alpha is 
higher than its raw excess returns (1.45% per month against 0.62% per month). 
 91 
 
Second, adjusting portfolio return by FFC-4 model reduces the hedge 
portfolio’s performance. The average monthly FFC-4 alpha=0.51%, which is 83 
bps lower than raw excess return and 94 bps lower than FF-3 alpha. This 
suggests that the momentum effect plays an important role in the distress puzzle, 
while FFC-4 the model cannot fully explain the distress puzzle since the FFC-4 
alpha is still statistically significant (t=1.75). Finally, the results in Panel are 
generally consistent with Campbell et al. (2008), who present the average return 
from a low-high portfolio as 0.71% (Excess return), 1.65% (FF-3 alpha) and 
1.06% (FFC-4 alpha) per month. 
The latest research on asset pricing draws attention to the question of whether 
extremely low price stock, also known as “penny stocks”, plays a critical role 
in understanding several anomalies relating to the theory of arbitrage limit. This 
view can be found from McLean and Pontiff (2016) as well as Li and Luo 
(2016). As the work of Campbell et al. (2008) drops stocks with a price below 
$1.00, the effect of penny stocks has, therefore, not been examined. There is 
little evidence to confirm whether the distress puzzle is simply another aspect 
of the penny stock effect. To further investigate whether the overlooked penny 
stock effect in previous research impact on the distress puzzle, stocks are re-
sorted using the sample, including stocks below $1.00, but keeping all other 
procedures constant. The returns of portfolio that are sorted by all stocks 
including penny stocks are disclosed in the Panel B of Table 5.  
 
The comparison of two sampling methods shows the following findings: Low 
distress risk portfolio yields higher average return than the reported return in 
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Panel A by 6 bps (value-weighted excess return), 5 bps (FF-3 alpha) and 25 bps 
(FFC-4 alpha) respectively. For the highest distress risk portfolio, the change of 
average return varies across three portfolio performance measures: the excess 
return maintains constant at -0.39% per month, while the FF-3 alpha increases 
by 4 bps and the FFC-4 alpha increases 20 bps than the corresponding Panel A 
results. The dramatic change of FFC-4 alpha is likely due to the high bid-ask 
bonus among penny stocks, an effect among small firms as Pontiff (1996) 
documented. For the long-short portfolio performance, the excess return is 
increased by 4 bps, the FFC-3 alpha increased by 1 bps and the FFC-4 alpha is 
reduced by 10 bps. Those findings confirm the fact that the distress puzzle is 
mostly due to the pricing failure of the Fama-French 3-factor model. 
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Table 5 Return of distress risk-sort decile portfolios (1981.1-2014.12) 
At the beginning of every January from 1981 to 2014, all qualified stocks (nonfinancial firms, with valid FP, ME, BM, MOM12 and are traded on NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq as 
common shares at the forming date) are independently grouped by failure probability (𝐹𝑃) from low to high. This generates 10 portfolios divided at every 10% of the 
spectrum of FP. Portfolios are rebalanced every year. Value-weighted monthly average returns in excess of 1-month T-bill rate (Excess Return) and alphas from Fama-
French 3-factor model (FF-3 Alpha) as well as alphas from Fama-French-Carhart model (FFC-4 Alpha) for all 10 decile portfolios and long-short portfolios holding the low 
distress risk portfolio and short selling the high distress risk portfolio are shown. The t-statistics as adjusted by Newey-West standard error are reported below each row of 
return in parentheses. 
 
Portfolios 
1 
 Low  
Distress Risk 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
High 
 Distress Risk 
1-10 
 Low-High 
Panel A. Drop $1 stocks, as Campbell et al. (2008)               
Excess Return 0.23 0.27 -0.06 -0.06 -0.02 -0.02 0.15 0.08 0.33 -0.39 0.62 
 (1.30) (2.59) (-0.74) (-0.73) (-0.23) (-0.15) (0.91) (0.47) (1.24) (-1.10) (1.51) 
FF-3 Alpha 0.30 0.39 0.04 0.01 -0.08 -0.12 -0.12 -0.29 -0.25 -1.15 1.45 
 (1.96) (4.18) (0.52) (0.06) (-0.88) (-1.04) (-0.73) (-1.73) (-0.99) (-3.62) (3.78) 
FFC-4 Alpha 0.14 0.27 0.09 0.12 0.06 0.15 0.22 0.09 0.33 -0.37 0.51 
 (0.95) (3.01) (1.26) (1.38) (0.72) (1.57) (1.60) (0.67) (1.69) (-1.53) (1.74) 
Panel B. Keep $1 stocks                   
Excess Return 0.29 0.22 0.04 -0.06 0.01 -0.02 0.07 0.18 0.42 -0.39 0.68 
 (1.72) (1.83) (0.50) (-0.68) (0.11) (-0.19) (0.42) (0.99) (1.29) (-0.91) (1.49) 
FF-3 Alpha 0.35 0.36 0.17 0.04 0.02 -0.09 -0.12 -0.09 -0.10 -1.11 1.46 
 (2.55) (3.83) (2.46) (0.47) (0.27) (-0.75) (-1.18) (-0.54) (-0.42) (-3.26) (3.38) 
FFC-4 Alpha 0.25 0.26 0.21 0.18 0.21 0.16 0.27 0.34 0.67 -0.17 0.41 
  (1.87) (2.40) (3.31) (1.66) (2.88) (1.69) (1.73) (2.22) (3.23) (-0.47) (0.91) 
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4.4.2 Portfolio characteristics of distress risk sorted stocks 
 
In Panel A of Table 6, the average value of firm’s distress risk, as well as three 
firm characteristics that are commonly viewed as key determinants of cross-
sectional stock returns, are reported for each 𝐹𝑃 sorted decile portfolio.  The 
average size of stocks in ten distress risk portfolios differs greatly, indicating 
that the effect of size causes dispersion. Firms in the highest distress risk 
portfolios have the smallest average size (509.0 million U.S. dollars) than other 
portfolios, suggesting those firms are more likely to be influenced by arbitrage 
limit. In line with Gomes and Schmid (2010), the spread of 𝐵𝐸/𝑀𝐸 is hump-
shaped where the difference of lowest and highest distress risk portfolio is little. 
Consistent with the judgement of Campbell et al. (2008), high distress risk firms 
are associated with significant negative momentum effect, which can be seen as 
a monotonic downward value of 𝑀𝑂𝑀12 from 0.333 to -0.300 through ten 
distress risk-sorted portfolios. 
Panel B of Table 6 reports the average value of firm’s bid-ask spread (𝐵𝐴) in 
percentage, dollar-volume (𝐷𝑉) for every 10,000 units, Amihud’s illiquidity 
ratio (𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄) and idiosyncratic volatility related to FF-3 model. Amihud and 
Mendelson (1986) adopt the bid-ask spread as a measure of stock illiquidity, as 
price spread between demand and supply reflects the concession required for 
immediate sale. In their later research, dollar volume and illiquidity ratio are 
also used as proxies of market liquidity, and those measures are also adopted by 
Asquith et al. (2005), Fu (2009), and Li and Luo (2016). The average distress 
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risk is positively related with bid-ask spread in all distress risk deciles, where 
the averaged 𝐵𝐴  is 1.606% in the first portfolio, and the value is slightly 
decreased in the subsequent 2 portfolios to 1.164%, then increased 
monotonically to 5.085% in the highest distress risk portfolio. The spectrum of 
averaged 𝐷𝑉 across failure probability sorted portfolio, like the reversed pattern 
of 𝐵𝐴, is stated from 590.02 in the lowest distress risk portfolio and decreased 
to 308.05 in the highest distress risk portfolio. The spread of high and low 
illiquidity also positively relates to distress risk. In the lowest distress risk 
portfolio, the average 𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄 is 2.071, while the value is increased to 30.581 in 
the highest distress risk portfolio. The average 𝐼𝑉𝑂𝐿 across distress risk 
portfolios also indicate that high distress risk firms have substantial holding cost 
(0.055 in the highest distress risk portfolio and 0.025 in the lowest distress risk 
portfolio). Pontiff (2006) demonstrates that idiosyncratic risk is the single 
largest cost faced by arbitrageurs. However, the idiosyncratic volatility-return 
pattern is contradictory: Ang et al. (2006) argue that the pattern is negatively 
related, yet Fu (2009) finds the pattern to be positive. The findings of this 
research confirm that rational investors hold fewer positions in stocks that have 
high idiosyncratic volatility. Consequently, there is less pressure for these 
stocks to be sold. Thus, firms with high idiosyncratic volatility have high 
holding costs. Overall, the spread of arbitrage limit variables across high and 
low distress risk firms indicate the potential cost from exploiting distress puzzle 
is enormous.  
Panel C displays other firm characteristics of ten distress risk portfolios. 
Consistent with prior research, distress risk is negatively associated with the 
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dividend-to-earnings ratio (Chava and Jarrow, 2004), networking capitals and 
size (Ohlson, 1980), positively associated with leverage (Avramov et al. 2013). 
In terms of arbitrage-related factors, distress risk is negatively related with 
institutional ownership (Campbell et al. 2008; Campbell et al. 2011, Conrad et 
al. 2014). Inspired by Asquith et al. (2005) who investigate the role of 
institutional ownership and short interest ratio as a pair of arbitrage effect 
variables, the average short interest ratio across decile distress risk portfolios 
are presented. The average distress risk is negatively associated with 
institutional ownership as well as short interest ratio, suggesting that any trading 
activities regardless of whether holding or shorting high distress risk stocks, are 
facing less supply of selling and demand of buying those stocks. 
These results confirm the size-arbitrage limit relationship: small firms are 
mostly firms with the highest distress risk. In addition, a strong relationship 
between firm size and distress risk emerges: even when stocks are sorted only 
by distress risk and arbitrage factors, a clear pattern of high distress risk-small 
size is observable. However, Dichev (1998), as well as Campbell et al. (2998), 
find that firm’s size does not explain the distress premium. Therefore, this 
research does not use size as an arbitrage limit proxy; rather sets it as one of the 
common risk factors that are determining the stock returns. To further minimise 
the potential effect of firm’s size to the portfolio analyses, the return of portfolio 
is weighted by size (see Chapter 3 for the detailed estimation and discussion of 
value-weighted return), and further adjusted by Fama-French 3-factor models.
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Table 6 Characteristics of ten portfolios sorted by failure probability 
At the beginning of every month from January 1981 to December 2014, all stocks that are qualified for grouping portfolios stocks (nonfinancial firms with valid FP, lnME, 
lnBM, MOM12 and are traded on NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq as common shares at the forming date) are sorted by failure probability (𝐹𝑃) from low to high. This generates 10 
portfolios divided at every 10% of the spectrum of failure probability. Portfolios are rebalanced every month. SIZE is firm’s market value of equity in million U.S. dollars 
at month 𝑡 − 1. Book-to-Makret Ratio is firm’s book value of equity at fiscal year-end over market value of equity in December of 𝑡 − 1.  FP is measured as the month-end 
failure probability at 𝑡 − 1 measured as Campbell et al. (2008).  MOM12 is the cumulative return of (t-12, t-2). BA is firm’s monthly average bid-ask spread. DV is firm’s 
monthly average dollar volume divided by 10^4. ILLIQ is firm’s monthly illiquidity measure multiplied by 10^4. IVOL is firm’s idiosyncratic volatility related to Fama-
French 3-factor adjusted return.  The detailed estimation of each variable is introduced in section 4.3. 
 
Portfolios 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Panel A. Average Firm’s Size, Book-to-Market Ratio, Momentum and FP        
Size (Million US Dollars) 1028.0 2486.9 3019.2 2877.0 2509.0 2006.1 1790.3 2378.7 1770.5 509.0 
Book-to-Market Ratio 0.697 0.565 0.577 0.632 0.701 0.782 0.862 0.916 0.951 0.690 
FP (%) 0.009 0.015 0.020 0.027 0.035 0.046 0.061 0.085 0.132 0.469 
MOM12 0.333 0.321 0.279 0.230 0.193 0.156 0.123 0.076 -0.022 -0.300 
Panel B. Transaction Cost and Idiosyncratic Volatility Measurements  
BA (%) 1.606 1.237 1.164 1.288 1.592 1.675 2.504 2.725 3.875 5.085 
DV (10^4) 590.02 459.05 385.70 334.42 297.20 274.74 260.33 247.46 250.76 308.05 
ILLIQ 2.701 1.869 2.137 2.216 2.429 3.025 4.404 5.370 9.259 30.581 
IVOL 0.025 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.025 0.027 0.030 0.034 0.040 0.055 
Panel C. Other Characteristics         
Dividends/Net Income 0.16 0.13 0.18 0.22 0.30 0.23 0.36 0.20 0.35 0.08 
(Continued) 
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(Continued) 
Debt/Assets 0.05 0.10 0.14 0.18 0.22 0.25 0.28 0.31 0.35 0.45 
NWC/Assets 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.01 
Log(Assets) 4.35 4.91 5.18 5.34 5.43 5.46 5.45 5.30 5.12 4.86 
Institutional Ownership 0.377 0.425 0.429 0.416 0.398 0.376 0.355 0.323 0.296 0.260 
Short Interest Ratio 0.058 0.049 0.049 0.055 0.036 0.033 0.034 0.030 0.031 0.029 
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4.4.3 Double-Sorts portfolio analyses 
Using the same sample period and sampling criteria, at the beginning of each 
month, all stocks in the full sample dataset are sorted into five quintile groups 
according to their 𝐹𝑃 , which acts as a proxy for financial distress risk. 
Independently, the stocks are sorted into five quintiles according to one of the 
limits of arbitrage effect variables mentioned earlier in this work. The 
intersection of breakpoints from two independent sorts generates 25 double-
sorted portfolios. The Long-short portfolios denoted as 𝐿𝑜𝑤 − 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ, represent 
a trading strategy whereby holding stocks in the 1st quintile of distress risk and 
shorting stocks in the 5th   quintile controlling for the effects of limit of arbitrage. 
Using the same methods, another five long-short portfolios are constructed to 
examine the arbitrage premium after controlling for distress risk. According to 
the suggestion made by Li and Luo (2016), because penny stocks are those with 
the highest sensitivity to arbitrage limit effect, penny stocks (price per share < 
one dollar) on the date of forming the portfolio remain in the database. 
4.4.3.1 Trading costs and financial distress 
The results in Table 7 show the monthly averaged returns of portfolio that are 
independently sorted by firm’s failure probability and trading cost proxies. To 
correct the potential bias relating to firm’s size, value-weighted FF-3 alpha is 
reported as the measure of portfolio performance. Given the fact in Table 6 that 
portfolio’s average transaction costs are increased with portfolio’s average 
distress risk in most cases. Stocks with a high bid-ask spread imply that a high 
cost to markets in terms of conducting transaction deals. Therefore, a bonus 
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return is expected in these high bid-ask spread/low dollar volume/high 
illiquidity stocks and the bonus may result in the distress premium.   
Panel A of Table 7 reports the double sort portfolio average returns by failure 
probability and bid-ask spread (𝐵𝐴). The distress premium, measured as the 
average monthly return from 𝐿𝑜𝑤 − 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ distress portfolio, is higher and more 
significant when average 𝐵𝐴 is high. The highest performance of long-short 
distress risk portfolio is the one with highest average 𝐵𝐴, yielding a monthly 
return at 1.85% (t=6.14) FF-3 alpha or 1.43% (t=4.69) without risk-adjust the 
procedure. Both performed better than the univariate portfolio results and defeat 
other four long-short distress risk portfolios.  The phenomenon that FF-3 alpha 
is even higher than average excess return reflects the fact that the distress 
premium earns higher FF-3 risk-adjusted returns than excess returns. This 
finding is in line with the long-short decile portfolio performance reported in 
Table 5. When the average 𝐵𝐴 declines, the corresponding distress premium is 
reduced. In the lowest 𝐵𝐴  quintile, the value-weighted FF-3 Alpha reaches 
0.84% (t=2.54), or is 0.38% (t=1.06) without risk-adjusting. Both are the worst 
performance among all the five long-short distress risk portfolios. In fact, the 
value-weighted distress premium in the first three 𝐵𝐴 quintiles is no longer 
significant, suggesting that the distress premium only exists in illiquid stocks. 
This finding is in line with the analysis using bid-ask spread in explaining cash 
holding anomaly, momentum effect, and idiosyncratic volatility puzzle (Li and 
Luo, 2016; Lesmond et al. 2004; Han and Lesmond, 2011) that the portfolio’s 
performance from those anomalies are positively associated with high bid-ask 
spread and the premium is not significant among low bid-ask spread firms. 
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Breaking the composition of the distress premium into long position and short 
position, the portfolio sort further shows that the disappearance of the 
significant distress premium is mostly due to the sensitivity of firms with high 
𝐹𝑃, the short-side of premium. From the one side, the negative distress risk-
return relationship is observed from all five 𝐵𝐴-sorted rows. The performance 
of high distress risk firms is negatively affected with the average 𝐵𝐴. From the 
low to high average 𝐵𝐴  quintile, the average portfolio performance worsen 
drastically, yielding from -0.31% per month in the lowest 𝐵𝐴 quintile to -0.79% 
per month in the second lowest 𝐵𝐴 quintile, and -1.14%, -1.49% and -1.10% 
per month respective to the subsequent three 𝐵𝐴 quintiles.  On the other side, in 
the each quintile of 𝐵𝐴 spectrum, the low distress risk firms perform constantly 
well with a monthly excess return varying from 0.24%-0.75% and are relatively 
less affected by the variation of 𝐵𝐴. This provides evidences that the premium 
of distress puzzle is mostly contributed by the short-side stocks in high 𝐵𝐴 
stocks, which are high distress risk firms and associated with high transaction 
cost. 
The effect of bid-ask spread does give a positive premium to high 𝐵𝐴 firms, but 
not as significant as those in high distress risk firms.  In the 1st 𝐹𝑃 quintile, the 
𝐿𝑜𝑤 − 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ firms have a premium at -0.22% FF-3 alpha per month. This is in 
line with Amihud and Mendelson (1986) who find transaction cost like bid-ask 
spread is positively priced in the expected stock returns. When the average 
distress risk increases, the 𝐿𝑜𝑤 − 𝐻𝑖𝑔𝑒𝑟 return from other four 𝐵𝐴 quintiles 
are reversed to positive at 0.02%, 0.37%, 0.17% and 0.79% per month. The 𝐵𝐴 
return premium is roughly increased from low to high distress risk quintile, but 
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only premium in the 5th 𝐹𝑃 quintile is statistically different from zero (t=2.11). 
This further contradicts with arguments that liquidity risk is responsible to the 
distress puzzle (Da and Gao, 2010) as the underlying theory of liquidity risk 
requires a negative premium in such scenario. 
Where the stock’s Dollar Volume (𝐷𝑉) is used as the proxy variable for trading 
cost, a similar conclusion can be drawn as in the 𝐹𝑃 − 𝐵𝐴 sorted analysis. Panel 
B of Table 7 presents the analysis results. A stock with low dollar volume 
implies low coverage in terms of market attention and low trading liquidity. 
Therefore, the distress premium exists since relatively few transactions are 
made that exploit arbitrage. The pattern of value-weighted 𝐿𝑜𝑤 − 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ returns 
indicates that one of the distress puzzles, high distress risk-low equity return, is 
related to the stock’s 𝐷𝑉. The distress premium  monotonically declines across 
the 𝐷𝑉  spectrum, as the excess return drops from 1.51% (t=4.28) to 1.03% 
(t=3.39) FF-3 alpha per month, or drops from 1.19% (t=3.22) per month to 
0.43% (t=1.22) per month in terms of portfolio’s average raw value-weighted 
return. In line with FP-𝐵𝐴 sorted stocks, the disappearance of distress premium 
in terms of excess return is due to the relatively better performance of high 
distress risk firms with high 𝐷𝑉. Although high distress risk firms generally 
underperform low distress risk counterparties, those with lower transaction 
costs (high 𝐷𝑉) are more rewarding to investors.  
These results are also in line with the general idea of Amihud and Mendelson 
(1986), who document a negative link between liquidity and average return, as 
in the short portfolio holding period 𝐵𝐴  and 𝐷𝑉  represent a market 
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microstructure issue. Harris (1994) find returns on low-priced stocks are greatly 
affected by the minimum tick of $1/8, which adds noise to the estimations of 
𝐵𝐴 . Gervais et al. (2001) find past month trading volume contains future 
evolution of stock price. Those findings suggest that spread difference as a result 
of bid-ask quotes and dollar volume affects trading decisions and stock 
valuations from a completely different angle to liquidity risk in short holding 
periods. However, these findings do not support the view that liquidity risk is 
responsible to the distress puzzle, due to 1) the pricing power of dollar volume 
seems explained by FF-3 model, as none of five 𝐷𝑉 𝐿𝑜𝑤 − 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ premium is 
significantly different from zero, and 2) controlling the variation of 𝐵𝐴, firms 
with high distress risk still underperform low distress risk firms with significant 
premium. The variation of distress premium across 𝐵𝐴/𝐷𝑉 quintiles should be, 
therefore, viewed as a result from costly arbitrage to high distress risk firms 
instead of bearing “liquidity risk”. 
Panel C of Table 7 reports the average returns from distress risk and illiquidity 
ratio (𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄) double sorted portfolios. Given the potential size effect in such 
portfolios, the focus remains on value-weighted portfolio returns. As predicted 
in an earlier chapter, when stock liquidity is relatively high, the distress risk 
premium is not significantly different from the baseline. Also, the first and 
second illiquidity quintile show corresponding 𝐿𝑜𝑤 − 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ portfolio records 
of 1.03% and 1.08% average returns per month. When the illiquidity ratio 
increases, however, the distress premium increases drastically almost 50% to 
1.95% (t=8.52) per month. The pattern of a positive relation between 𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄 and  
 104 
 
𝐿𝑜𝑤 − 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ  𝐹𝑃  premium is, consistent with 𝐹𝑃 − 𝐵𝐴  and 𝐹𝑃 − 𝐷𝑉  sorts, 
showing that transaction cost has heavily influenced the distress puzzle. 
Breaking down the source of distress premium from the long- and short-side 
further indicates that 𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄 affects distress premium radically symmetry. In the 
long-side (low distress risk) the average stock performance is positively related 
to stock illiquidity condition: low 𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄  stocks earn average monthly FF-3 
alpha at 0.51% while high 𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄 firms earns 0.99%. In the short-side (high 
distress risk) the average stock performance is negatively related to 𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄, as 
most liquid stocks record monthly FF-3 alpha at -0.52% per month in average, 
and least liquid stocks earn -0.96% per month in average. In sum, consistent 
with the findings from previous analysis using different transaction cost proxies, 
two phenomena are observed: first, stock’s illiquidity is positively priced in the 
return from low distress risk stocks. Second, in the high distress risk stocks, 
stock’s illiquidity is negatively priced in the stock return. 
Moreover, in three out of five distress risk quintiles, the average portfolios 
return increases with a portfolio’s average illiquidity. This in line with the 
judgement of Amihud (2002) that illiquidity is compensated with high expected 
stock returns. However, this pattern is reversed in the highest distress risk 
quintile such that higher illiquidity portfolios record lower portfolio returns: the 
average zero-cost portfolio return from 0.48% per month drops to -0.44% per 
month (t=1.40), showing that liquidity risk is not the proper explanation to the 
distress puzzle. But since the magnitude of return, measured as the absolute 
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value of portfolio return, is still associated with 𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄 positively, this return 
pattern could be viewed as after-cost expected return from investors. 
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Table 7 Portfolio returns from 𝐹𝑃 and transaction cost variable independent double-sorting 
From January 1980 to December 2014, all qualified stocks (non-financial firms with valid FP, lnME, lnBM, MOM12 and are traded in NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq as common 
shares at the forming date) are independently sorted by firm’s distress risk measured by monthly failure probability (FP) and the proxy of transaction cost (measured as 
monthly bid-ask spread (BA) in Panel A; monthly dollar volume (DV) in Panel B and monthly Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio (ILLIQ) in Panel C) then held for one month. 
The estimation of FP, BA, DV and ILLIQ is in section 4.3. This generates 25 portfolios, divided at every 20% of the distress risk spectrum from low to high and every 20% 
of the transaction cost spectrum in a similar manner. Low-High refers to a portfolio holding the top 20% most safe stocks (low FP) and shorting the riskiest 20% (High FP) 
within the same transaction cost variable quintile or refers to holding high transaction cost stocks and shorting low transaction cost stocks within the same FP quintile.  The 
performance of the portfolio is measured as value-weighted Fama-French 3-factor alpha at percentage, and Newey-West (1987) adjusted standard error.  
 
Panel A.  FP-BA Group 
Monthly Value Weighted Returns (%) 
BA Low FP 2 3 4 High FP FP Low-High 
Low BA 0.53 0.17 -0.00 -0.10 -0.31 0.84 
 (3.62) (2.19) (-0.05) (-0.66) (-0.96) (2.54) 
2 0.41 0.15 -0.00 -0.27 -0.79 1.20 
 (2.22) (1.06) (-0.01) (-1.95) (-3.05) (3.76) 
3 0.24 -0.33 -0.40 -0.33 -1.14 1.38 
 (1.72) (-2.16) (-2.50) (-1.91) (-2.96) (3.55) 
4 0.46 -0.22 -0.55 -0.59 -1.49 1.95 
 (2.57) (-1.53) (-2.72) (-2.63) (-6.02) (6.45) 
High BA 0.75 0.15 -0.37 -0.27 -1.10 1.85 
 (3.33) (0.75) (-1.7) (-0.77) (-4.07) (6.14) 
BA Low-High -0.22 0.02 0.37 0.17 0.79 
 
 (-0.84) (0.08) (1.44) (0.43) (2.11)  
(Continued) 
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(Continued) 
 
Panel B. FP-DV Group 
Monthly Value Weighted Returns (%) 
DV Low FP 2 3 4 High FP FP Low-High 
Low DV 0.95 0.44 0.34 0.54 -0.56 1.51 
 (3.50) (2.36) (1.91) (1.52) (-2.15) (4.28) 
2 0.59 0.07 -0.01 -0.16 -0.89 1.48 
 (5.57) (0.64) (-0.05) (-1.11) (-4.29) (6.26) 
3 0.32 0.06 -0.10 -0.18 -1.01 1.33 
 (3.16) (0.73) (-1.23) (-1.5) (-4.92) (5.34) 
4 0.24 0.01 -0.05 -0.09 -0.69 0.93 
 (2.24) (0.06) (-0.41) (-0.91) (-3.15) (3.41) 
High DV 0.48 0.11 -0.05 -0.15 -0.55 1.03 
 (3.20) (1.70) (-0.69) (-1.48) (-1.94) (3.39) 
DV Low-High 0.47 0.33 0.39 0.68 -0.01 
 
 (1.39) (1.58) (1.92) (1.90) (-0.05)  
(Continued) 
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(Continued) 
 
 
Panel C. FP-ILLIQ Group 
Monthly Value Weighted Returns (%) 
ILLIQ Low FP 2 3 4 High FP FP Low-High 
Low ILLIQ 0.51 0.09 -0.00 -0.15 -0.52 1.03 
 (3.49) (1.44) (-0.06) (-1.56) (-1.82) (3.29) 
2 0.28 -0.08 -0.15 -0.19 -0.80 1.08 
 (2.30) (-0.86) (-1.24) (-1.58) (-3.15) (3.52) 
3 0.46 0.17 -0.19 -0.28 -0.97 1.43 
 (3.27) (1.38) (-2.13) (-2.75) (-4.7) (5.18) 
4 0.53 0.26 0.03 -0.11 -0.98 1.51 
 (4.61) (1.80) (0.21) (-0.65) (-4.72) (6.01) 
High ILLIQ 0.99 0.45 0.19 -0.15 -0.96 1.95 
 (5.98) (2.32) (0.97) (-0.78) (-3.85) (8.52) 
ILLIQ Low-High -0.48 -0.36 -0.19 0.00 0.44 
 
  (-2.32) (-1.59) (-0.91) (0.01) (1.40)   
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Table 8 Portfolio returns from 𝐹𝑃 and transaction cost variable independent double-sorting 
From January 1980 to December 2014, all qualified stocks (non-financial firms with valid FP, lnME, lnBM, MOM12 and are traded on NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq as common 
shares at the forming date) are independently sorted by firm’s distress risk measured by monthly failure probability (FP) and the proxy of holding cost, monthly idiosyncratic 
volatility (IVOL),  then held for one month. The estimation of FP and IVOL is in section 4.3. This generates 25 portfolios, divided at every 20% of the distress risk spectrum 
from low to high and every 20% of the transaction cost spectrum in a similar manner. Low-High refers to a portfolio holding the top 20% most safe stocks (low FP) and 
shorting the riskiest 20% (High FP) within the same transaction cost variable quintile or refers to holding high transaction cost stocks and shorting low transaction cost 
stocks  within the same FP quintile.  The performance of the portfolio is measured as value-weighted Fama-French 3-factor alpha at percentage, and Newey-West (1987) 
adjusted standard error.  
 
Monthly Value Weighted Returns (%) 
IVOL Low FP 2 3 4 High FP FP Low-High 
Low IVOL 0.42 0.26 0.11 0.13 -0.04 0.46 
 (2.92) (3.03) (1.34) (1.10) (-0.17) (1.87) 
2 0.52 -0.02 -0.05 -0.30 -0.25 0.77 
 (3.64) (-0.23) (-0.46) (-2.45) (-1.11) (3.12) 
3 0.45 0.19 -0.41 -0.53 -0.84 1.29 
 (2.88) (1.18) (-2.39) (-2.93) (-2.75) (3.52) 
4 0.34 -0.08 -0.54 -0.70 -1.50 1.84 
 (1.35) (-0.37) (-2.64) (-2.92) (-4.47) (4.12) 
High IVOL -0.04 -0.79 -1.04 -1.06 -2.31 2.27 
 (-0.17) (-2.97) (-3.74) (-3.86) (-6.68) (6.03) 
IVOL 0.46 1.05 1.15 1.19 2.27  
Low-High (1.72) (3.48) (3.70) (3.84) (6.00)   
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4.4.3.2 Idiosyncratic volatility and financial distress 
Table 8 shows the pattern of the distress premium across idiosyncratic volatility 
(𝐼𝑉𝑂𝐿) quintiles. Based on the holding cost research documented by Pontiff 
(2006), distress premiums are expected to cluster where idiosyncratic volatility 
is high. Consistent with Pontiff’s justification, value-weighted distress 
premiums generally increase when portfolio’s average idiosyncratic volatility 
increases and the distress premium is concentrated in the High 𝐼𝑉𝑂𝐿 quintile 
(2.27% per month, t=6.03), in sharp contrast to the premium in Low 𝐼𝑉𝑂𝐿 firms 
(0.46% per month, t=1.83).   
Idiosyncratic volatility also generates negative premiums that cannot be 
explained by asset pricing models, as reported in Ang et al. (2006 and 2009). In 
the last row of Table 8, all 𝐼𝑉𝑂𝐿 𝐿𝑜𝑤 − 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ portfolios across 𝐹𝑃 quintiles are 
negatively significant at 10% level or even higher, showing that controlling for 
𝐹𝑃, high 𝐼𝑉𝑂𝐿firms underperform low 𝐼𝑉𝑂𝐿 firms pervasively. 
When holding costs matter, as the average 𝐼𝑉𝑂𝐿 increases, the distress premium 
becomes even higher because the average return from high distress risk firms 
falls drastically, from -0.25% per month value-weighted excess return in the 
second 𝐼𝑉𝑂𝐿 quintile -0.84% per month, -1.50% and -2.31% per month in the 
subsequent three quintiles. While firms with low distress risk generally have 
significant positive returns as 4 out of 5 portfolios in the low 𝐹𝑃 quintile have 
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average return at 0.34%-0.52% per month, the change of distress premium is 
mostly driven by the short-side of the zero-cost portfolio. Thus, a combined 
reading of evidence presented in Table 7 and Table 8 suggests that the distress 
premium is disproportionately found in stocks. The stocks suffered from high 
transaction costs (proxied by high bid-ask spread, Amihud’s illiquidity ratio and 
low trading volume), high holding costs (proxied by high idiosyncratic volatility 
related to 𝐹𝐹 − 3 model) have recorded higher distress premium than stocks 
with low arbitrage costs, and the difference between high and low arbitrage limit 
effect stocks are statistically significant. If the distress premium is truly from 
bearing distress risk, controlling for such characteristics should not alter the 
scale of distress premium. In summary, the portfolio analysis shows that the 
distress premium is affected and is likely driven by arbitrage limit effect. 
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4.4.4 Robustness tests on portfolio sorts 
4.4.4.1 Short-Selling constraints and financial distress 
The results from Table 7 and Table 8 demonstrate that the major contributor of 
the distress puzzle is the short-side of the hedging portfolio, where high distress 
risk firms perform distinctively in low and high arbitrage limit conditions. 
Inspired by Nagel (2005) and Asquith et al. (2005), a further test of two short-
selling constraint proxies are applied to test if arbitrage limit could explain 
distress puzzle: institutional ownership, representing the supply of short-selling 
stocks and short interest ratio, representing the demand for short-selling. Their 
effects, according to the literature, account for the abnormal return that is 
clustered in short-side of a zero-cost portfolio. As with other variables used as 
limit-of-arbitrage proxies, the return premium from low-high distress risk 
portfolio should decline in the event there is a corresponding increase in short-
selling constraints. 
Specifically, for institutional ownership-distress risk double-sorted portfolios, 
the equal-weight monthly distress premium is strongest in the top and bottom 
institutional ownership quintiles, at 1.79% and 0.66%, respectively. 
Additionally, the distress premium is only significant in the lowest institutional 
ownership quintile, at a 2.17% value-weighted per month. Again, the effect of 
size determines the insignificance of value-weighted distress premiums in the 
high institutional ownership quintile, where small firms account for the majority 
of firms in the portfolios with high institutional ownership. In addition, the 
value-weighted distress premium generally decreases from low to high 
institutional ownership quintiles, from 2.17% to -0.14% per month, which 
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suggests that the ease of short selling significantly reduces the effect of arbitrage 
profits on the distress puzzle.   
Although the distress premium from short interest ratio-distress risk double-
sorted portfolios does not depict a clear pattern as is the case with institutional 
ownership portfolios, a significant equal-weighted distress premium is still 
observable in the highest short interest ratio quintile, at 1.32% per month. While 
the average value-weighted return in the same quintile is 0.75%; both values are 
statistically significant. In conclusion, the distress premium is negatively 
associated with institutional ownership as well as short interest ratio, indicating 
that institutions do not participate in trading high distress risk stocks. This is 
presumably the source of arbitrage limit among high distress risk stocks and 
explains why mispricing of FF-3 model is more severe in these stocks. 
4.4.4.2 Robustness: Distress risk across limit of arbitrage in longer holding 
periods 
If the limit of arbitrage effect conveys more information about short-term 
market impacts than fundamental conditions, then the distress premium is 
potentially not an anomaly within the efficient market hypothesis. Short-term 
market impact is unstable. Thus, the sign of distress premium switches more 
frequently, and its pricing power is not constant. The relationship between limit-
of-arbitrage and distress risk was therefore tested to see whether it is driven by 
short-term market drift or by fundamental underlying market information. 
Campbell et al. (2008, 2011) and Hackbarth et al. (2015) all hold distress risk-
related portfolios for a one-year period rather than only one month. Their 
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methodologies are repeated here. The decrease in rebalancing frequency 
reduces the impact of turnover cost within the distress risk-hedge trading 
strategy, leaving the distress premium net of any potential cost due to trading. 
As seen in Table 1, high distress risk firms always have substantial high 
shorting-selling costs when measured as a monthly average value. 
Annual holding portfolios are constructed using the same methodology as in the 
earlier sections, with the key difference that stocks were held for one year. The 
weight of stock returns included in the portfolio is determined by the portfolio 
formation date and remain constant over the following 12 months in terms of 
calculating the value-weighted returns. For the scope of the thesis, those results 
are omitted, as they are consistent with all finding sin monthly-rebalanced 
portfolios. 
4.5 Cross-sectional Regression Analyses 
4.5.1 Fama-MacBeth regression methodology 
In order to examine whether the distress risk effect differs in different levels of 
arbitrage limit with and without control variables, the Fama-MacBeth (1973) 
regression method is employed as introduced previously introduced in section 
3.2.2. The set of explanatory variables 𝛽𝑛, includes the proxy of firm’s distress 
risk (𝐹𝑃), the proxy of firm’s arbitrage limit effect (𝐴𝑟𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡) and a 
vector of the lagged control variable, denote 𝑿𝒊,𝒕, that are 𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐸, 𝑙𝑛𝐵𝑀, and 
𝑀𝑂𝑀12. 𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐸 is the natural logarithm of firm’s 𝑀𝐸 at the end of June. 𝑙𝑛𝐵𝑀 
is the natural logarithm of the 𝐵𝐸𝑀𝐸. 𝑀𝑂𝑀12 is the cumulative compounded 
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stock return over the last 12 months until month 𝑡. Specifically, the regression 
has the form as follows:  
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡 = 𝜆0 + 𝜆1𝐹𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜆2𝐴𝑟𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝝀𝟑
,𝑿𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (4. 6) 
Where  
𝑿𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 = [𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1     𝑙𝑛𝐵𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1     𝑀𝑂𝑀12𝑖,𝑡−1]  (4.7) 
The regression tests whether the limit of arbitrage factors could weaken the 
predicting power of distress risk. If the coefficient of 𝐹𝑃 is no longer significant 
when 𝐴𝑟𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡  also includes, one could conclude that the pricing 
power of distress risk is from stock’s liquidity condition. In such case the 
distress puzzle is a manifesto of liquidity premium and can be explained by 
liquidity risk theory as argued by Da and Gao (2010).  In a similar manner to 
prior research done by Avramov et al. (2009) and George and Hwang (2010), 
when 𝑙𝑛𝐵𝑀  and 𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐸  are jointly entered into a Fama-MacBeth regression,  
𝑙𝑛𝐵𝑀  produces a positively priced expected return while  𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐸  has no 
significant pricing power. In addition, the pricing power of distress risk is not 
subsumed by value and size effects. As 𝑙𝑛𝐵𝑀 refers to the effect of the value 
premium, and 𝑙𝑛 𝑀𝐸 refers to the effect of the size premium, when these are 
entered into the regression with 𝐹𝑃, the coefficient of 𝐹𝑃 and its significance is 
enhanced. To further test the conclusion from Garlappi et al. (2008) and 
Garlappi and Yan (2011) that momentum profits can be explained by distress 
risk, momentum variables were added to the regression. 𝑀𝑂𝑀12  is the 
cumulative return from 𝑡 − 12 to 𝑡 − 2.  
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Moreover, a regression with an interaction term between firm’s distress risk and 
arbitrage limit effect is added in order to examine whether there is an interaction 
effect between the two proxies, and to test whether there is a significant 
difference in pricing capacity of distress risk, depending on the firm’s arbitrage 
limit status. The arbitrage limit variable is transformed as a dummy variable: 
when its value is below the market average value, it is set as 1 (high liquidity, 
low limit-of-arbitrage effect), and 0 for other cases (low liquidity, high limit-of-
arbitrage). The value of the interaction variable thus equal to the 𝐹𝑃 when the 
firm’s arbitrage limit value is above the market average level, and is zero 
otherwise. The significance of the interaction term depicts how the pricing 
power of distress risk deviates from low and high arbitrage limit firms.  
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡 = 𝜆0 + 𝜆1𝐹𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜆2𝐴𝑟𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝜆3𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝝀𝟒
,𝑿𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (4.8) 
Where  
𝑿𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 = [𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1     𝑙𝑛𝐵𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1     𝑀𝑂𝑀12𝑖,𝑡−1]  (4.9) 
To recap, equation (4.6) and (4.8) tests whether the distress puzzle can be 
explained by proposed proxies and test whether the liquidity risk theory or the 
limit of arbitrage theory is underlying. Then each 𝜆 are calculated in the second 
step as the average of all cross-sectional regression estimates through 1981 to 
2014, or 408 months: 
The corresponding standard error is then estimated from the difference between 
the averaged mean value and estimated value. Newey-West (1987) methods are 
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adopted for this. For the selection of lag 𝐿, the estimation suggested by Stock 
and Watson (2011) is adopted: 
𝐿 = 1.5 × 𝑁
1
3 (4.10) 
where L  is the number of optimal lag and N  is the total number of the 
observations used in the Newey-West estimation. Values of 1.5 and 1/3 were 
obtained from the Newey and West technique (1994), and hence the output of 
the sample is 11.25. However, using 11 or 12 as the optimal lag does not change 
the results.   
 
4.5.2 𝐹𝑃, arbitrage limit, and cross-section of stock returns 
The pricing power of distress risk is measured by the significance of the variable 
𝐹𝑃 and the sign of 𝐹𝑃 ccoefficient indicates whether the distress risk-return 
relation is positive or negative.  Using 1981 to 2014 U.S. market data, each 
month 𝑡 + 1 stock’s monthly return over the one-month T-bill rate is regressed 
by distress risk factor measured by failure probability, one of the arbitrage limit 
proxies previously examined in the portfolio analysis section: bid-ask spread, 
dollar volume, illiquidity ratio and idiosyncratic volatility measured at 𝑡. 
4.5.2.1 Trading costs and 𝐹𝑃 in the cross-sectional stock returns 
In general, the distress risk is negatively priced expected stock returns. As 
reported in Table 9, the coefficient of 𝐹𝑃 is negative (-2.258, t=-1.41), and its 
significance is even higher when control variables enter into regressions (-
3.828, t=-2.65). In Table 10, the coefficient of  𝐹𝑃 is -2.669 (t=-1.61) without 
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control variable and -4.197 (t=-2.67) with control variable. The difference of 
𝐹𝑃  coefficient and t-statistics is due to the different volume of samples. 
However, the quantitatively comparable results of 𝐹𝑃in two samples show that 
the difference does not affect the persistence of the distress puzzle. The negative 
sign of 𝐹𝑃 is consistent with portfolio analysis results that distress premium is 
more pronounced after considering common risks that can explain stock returns. 
All proxies measuring market limit-of-arbitrage effect have a predicting power 
for expected returns. The results show that both 𝐵𝐴 and 𝐷𝑉 are priced in the 
expected return with the expected sign, as the coefficient of 𝐵𝐴  is 0.093 
(t=2.78) and for 𝐷𝑉 the coefficient is -0.018 (t=-1.50). The significance of 𝐵𝐴 
and 𝐷𝑉 is further increased with control variables together, at 0.114 (t=3.57) 
and -0.017 (t=2.39) respectively. This shows that the predicting power of bid-
ask spread and dollar volume is independent to firm’s size, book-to-market 
equity as well as past returns, and controlling for these variables further 
enhances the predicting power of the two transaction cost variables.  
In the subsequent tests, the research now turns to evaluate the interaction effect 
between distress risk and transaction costs. The significance of 𝐹𝑃  is not 
reduced when 𝐵𝐴  or 𝐷𝑉  is in the regression simultaneously, providing 
evidence that the pricing power of distress risk does not represent an existing 
effect from trading costs in determining stock returns. In the 𝐹𝑃 − 𝐵𝐴 group, 
the coefficients of 𝐹𝑃 and 𝐵𝐴 is -4.427 and 0.143 respectively. The coefficient 
is -3.933 for 𝐹𝑃  and 0.133 for 𝐵𝐴  with control variables. In the 𝐹𝑃 − 𝐷𝑉 
group, the coefficient for 𝐹𝑃 is -3.063 and for 𝐷𝑉 is -0.019 without control 
variable, and is -4.547 and -0.019 respectively with control variables. Compared 
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with regressions where 𝐹𝑃, 𝐵𝐴, and 𝐷𝑉 is individually existing as regressor, 
the significance of these variables is increased in this context. These results 
provide evidence that in determining cross-sectional expected stock returns, the 
predicting power of liquidity, or liquidity risk does not substitute the pricing 
power of failure probability.  
Finally, the research tests whether distress premium is concentrated in high 
transaction cost firms, which is one of the core arguments of whether the limit-
of-arbitrage theory can explains distress puzzle. Regression analysis finds a 
significant return cluster in high bid-ask spread firms by showing significant 
𝐹𝑃 ×  𝐵𝐴 coefficients in Table 9. While the coefficient of 𝐹𝑃 is still significant 
(?̂?2=6.799, t=-3.72), the interaction variable (?̂?3) has a coefficient at 5.199, with 
a t-statics at 3.67. This gives straightforward evidence that the predicting power 
of distress risk is characterised by firm’s bid-ask spread and the difference is 
over 3 standard errors from zero. The coefficient of interaction effect is 
quantitatively similar to the coefficient of 𝐹𝑃, providing evidence that distress 
premium predominantly comes from high 𝐵𝐴 firms. The coefficient remains 
stable even when control variables are included where the coefficient of 𝐹𝑃 is -
8.378 (t=-5.18) and for the interaction variable is 6.822 (t=5.46), proving that 
variation of 𝐹𝑃’s predicting power is not driven by omitting some key firm 
characteristics.  
 On the other hand, the interaction effect of 𝐹𝑃 × 𝐷𝑉, reported in Table 10, is 
not significant in the regression with or without control variables. The average 
coefficient of ?̂?3  is 0.617 and is 2.073 where control variables are added; 
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neither is significant at 10% level. This is contrary to the arbitrage limit 
hypothesis as the coefficient should be significantly different from zero. 
Presumably this is caused due to the spurious correlation between dollar volume 
and firm’s size, which Ali et al (2003) also point out. This explanation is 
supported by the significance of 𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐸. When 𝐷𝑉  and 𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐸  coexist in the 
regression, the coefficient of 𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐸 is statistically significant at 5% level, while 
𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐸 is insignificant combining with 𝐵𝐴. Since Campbell et al. (2008) has 
showed that the distress puzzle exits regardless of the firm size, the close 
relation between firm’s dollar volume and size may therefore fail to characterise 
the pricing power of distress risk. 
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Table 9 Fama-MacBeth regressions with an interaction term between distress risk and bid-ask spread 
 
For each month from January 1981 to December 2014, Fama-MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions of monthly excess returns (CRSP monthly return over one-month 
T-bill rate) are run on a set of independent variables. 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 is measured as firm’s failure probability (𝐹𝑃). The calculation of 𝐵𝐴, 𝑙𝑛𝐵𝑀, 𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐸 as well as 𝑀𝑂𝑀12 
is in section 4.3.2 and the calculation of interaction variable is in section 4.5.2. The t-statistics, adjusted by the Newey-West standard error, are in parentheses. Panel A 
reports basic regressions and Panel B reports regressions with control variables. *denotes p<0.10, ** denotes p<0.05 and *** denotes p<0.01 
 
Constant FP BA Interaction lnBM lnME MOM12 Observations Avg. R2 
Panel A. Without Control Variables      
0.919*** -2.258      1475496 0.009 
(3.54) (-1.41)        
0.588** 0. 093***    1475496 0.008 
(2.13)  (2.78)       
0.687*** -4.427*** 0.143***    1475496 0.016 
(2.80) (-2.99) (5.00)       
0.992*** -6.799*** 0.149 5.199***   1475496 0.019 
(4.06) (-3.72) (0.85) (3.67)      
 
Panel B. With Control Variables 
      
1.924*** -3.828***  0.525*** -0.154*** 0.629*** 1475496 0.026 
(4.50) (-2.65)   (4.54) (-2.93) (3.04)   
0.893* 0.114*** 0.528*** -0.034 0.726*** 1475496 0.026 
(1.69)  (3.57)  (4.66) (-0.53) (2.90)   
1.136** -3.931*** 0.133*** 0.524*** -0.048 0.592*** 1475496 0.030 
(2.43) (-2.78) (3.96)  (4.61) (-0.81) (2.87)   
2.086*** -8.378*** -0.321*** 6.822*** 0.547*** -0.149*** 0.622*** 1475496 0.031 
(4.85) (-5.18) (-2.63) (5.46) (4.83) (-2.73) (3.03)     
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Table 10 Fama-MacBeth regressions with an interaction term between distress risk and dollar volume 
For each month from January 1981 to December 2014, Fama-MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions of monthly excess returns (CRSP monthly return over one-month T-
bill rate) are run on a set of independent variables. 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 is measured as firm’s failure probability (𝐹𝑃). The calculation of 𝐷𝑉, 𝑙𝑛𝐵𝑀, 𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐸 as well as 𝑀𝑂𝑀12 is in 
section 4.3.2 and the calculation of interaction variable is in section 4.5.2. The t-statistics, adjusted by the Newey-West standard error, are in parentheses. Panel A reports basic 
regressions and Panel B reports regressions with control variables. *denotes p<0.10, ** denotes p<0.05 and *** denotes p<0.01 
 
Constant FP DV Interaction lnBM lnME MOM12 Observations Avg. R2 
Panel A. Without Control Variables      
0.927*** -2.669      1460255 0.009 
(3.56) (-1.61)        
0.935*** -0.018     1460255 0.003 
(2.81)  (-1.50)       
1.007*** -3.063* -0.019*    1460255 0.012 
(3.68) (-1.88) (-1.66)       
0.817*** -3.798 0.190 0.617    1460255 0.014 
(3.22) (-1.58) (1.17) (0.27)      
 
Panel B. With Control Variables 
      
1.943*** -4.197***  0.525*** -0.157*** 0.621*** 1460255 0.027 
(4.48) (-2.67)   (4.53) (-2.94) (3.00)   
1.870*** -0.017** 0.523*** -0.190** 0.764*** 1460255 0.025 
(3.23)  (-2.19)  (4.71) (-2.40) (3.26)   
2.227*** -4.547*** -0.019*** 0.529*** -0.225*** 0.641*** 1460255 0.029 
(4.72) (-3.00) (-2.65)  (4.68) (-3.31) (3.25)   
2.822*** -6.502*** -0. 601*** 2.073 0.530*** -0.230*** 0.639*** 1460255 0.029 
(5.23) (-2.89) (-3.97) (1.26) (4.66) (-3.50) (3.19)     
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4.5.2.2 Interaction between Illiquidity and distress premiums 
To test whether illiquidity is able to explain distress premium as it has been 
shown in section 4.4.3, following the same design, I added illiquidity and 
distress risk into the model where 𝑙𝑛𝐵𝑀 , 𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐸  and 𝑀𝑂𝑀12  are the risk 
factors that have been widely adopted in existing literature. Table 11 reports the 
results from Fama-MacBeth regression where distress risk and illiquidity ratio 
enter as explanatory variables individually where the coefficient of  𝐹𝑃 as well 
as 𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄 is negative and statistically significant at 1% level, so that stocks with 
high levels of distress risk, or stocks with high levels of illiquidity, earn lower 
returns than others. However, on its own, the illiquidity ratio is unable to 
account for distress risk’s pricing power, or the negative relationship of distress 
risk-return by showing the significant 𝐹𝑃  coefficient (t=-3.51) where 𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄 
(t=7.09) also enters regressions.  These results are consistent when control 
variables are added. 
The interaction variable of distress risk and illiquidity (denoted as 𝐹𝑃 × 𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄), 
is built, following the same methods as 𝐹𝑃 × 𝐵𝐴 and 𝐹𝑃 × 𝐷𝑉. As reported in 
Table 11, there is a significant positive sign of 𝐹𝑃 × 𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄 (?̂?3=5.742, t=2.95), 
and the standard error of this coefficient exceeds 3. This shows 𝐹𝑃's stock price 
predicting power is significantly positively correlated with 𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄. This gives 
additional supportive evidence for the arbitrage limit effect and is consistent 
with distress risk-illiquidity double sort portfolios. The interaction variable 
carries information that the 𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄 does not carry. Therefore, adding 𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄 in 
the regression model does not change the scale of the coefficient of interaction 
 124 
 
variable. The pricing effect of 𝐹𝑃 and 𝐹𝑃 × 𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄 together determine future 
return is even stronger where regression includes control variables (?̂?47.829, 
t=5.02), suggesting that the difference of the distress puzzle is not a result from 
those well-documented firm factors. 
Results from Table 12 show that as a measure of holding cost, idiosyncratic 
volatility also helps to explain the distress puzzle. The first regression shows 
that, in line with other models, distress risk is negatively priced to future returns 
(?̂?1=2.344, t=-1.45), and idiosyncratic volatility is negatively priced (?̂?2=-9.030, 
t=-1.24). When the interaction variable 𝐹𝑃 × 𝐼𝑉𝑂𝐿 enters into the regression 
alongside 𝐹𝑃  and 𝐼𝑉𝑂𝐿 , the interaction term is negative but not significant 
(?̂?3=1.739, t=1.18) and the significance of 𝐹𝑃  is enhanced (t=-2.03). When 
𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐸, 𝑙𝑛𝐵𝑀, and 𝑀𝑂𝑀12 enters regression as control variable, the interaction 
variable becomes significant (?̂?3 =3.650, t=2.89). The drift of 𝐹𝑃, 𝐼𝑉𝑂𝐿, and 
interaction variable significance is consistent with the characteristic of the 
distress puzzle and idiosyncratic volatility puzzle that both two factors are more 
pronounced controlling for firm’s size, book-to-market ratio and momentum 
(see Campbell et al. 2008 and Ang et al. 2006).  
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Table 11 Fama-MacBeth regressions with an interaction term between distress risk and illiquidity 
For each month from January 1981 to December 2014, Fama-MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions of monthly excess returns (CRSP monthly return over one-month T-
bill rate) are run on a set of independent variables. 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 is measured as firm’s failure probability (𝐹𝑃). The calculation of 𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄, 𝑙𝑛𝐵𝑀, 𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐸 as well as 𝑀𝑂𝑀12 is 
in section 4.3.2 and the calculation of interaction variable is in section 4.5.2. The t-statistics, adjusted by the Newey-West standard error, are in parentheses. Panel A reports 
basic regressions and Panel B reports regressions with control variables. *denotes p<0.10, ** denotes p<0.05 and *** denotes p<0.01 
 
Constant FP ILLIQ Interaction lnBM lnME MOM Observations Avg. R2 
Panel A. Without Control Variables      
0.923*** -3.260*     1406851 0.009 
(3.62) (-1.92)        
0.667** 0.071***    1406851 0.007 
(2.27)  (5.30)       
0.829*** -5.697*** 0.087***    1406851 0.015 
(3.30) (-3.51) (7.09)       
0.960*** -7.510*** 0.394** 5.742***   1406851 0.017 
(3.82) (-3.92) (2.07) (2.95)      
 
Panel B. With Control Variables 
      
1.910*** -4.540***  0.516*** -0.149*** 0.642*** 1406851 0.028 
(4.41) (-2.85)   (4.50) (-2.82) (3.13)   
0.995* 0.059*** 0.474*** -0.035 0.738*** 1406851 0.026 
(1.88)  (4.85)  (4.16) (-0.55) (2.98)   
1.323*** -5.421*** 0.064*** 0.474*** -0.056 0.579*** 1406851 0.031 
(2.90) (-3.46) (5.36)  (4.11) (-0.99) (2.87)   
1.886*** -8.518*** -0.221 7.829*** 0.512*** -0.124** 0.587*** 1406851 0.032 
(4.01) (-4.83) (-1.33) (5.02) (4.48) (-2.06) (2.90)     
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Table 12 Fama-MacBeth regressions with an interaction term between distress risk and idiosyncratic volatility 
For each month from January 1981 to December 2014, Fama-MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions of monthly excess returns (CRSP monthly return over one-month T-
bill rate) are run on a set of independent variables. 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 is measured as firm’s failure probability (𝐹𝑃). The calculation of 𝐼𝑉𝑂𝐿, 𝑙𝑛𝐵𝑀, 𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐸 as well as 𝑀𝑂𝑀12 is 
in section 4.3.2 and the calculation of interaction variable is in section 4.5.2. The t-statistics, adjusted by the Newey-West standard error, are in parentheses. Panel A reports 
basic regressions and Panel B reports regressions with control variables. *denotes p<0.10, ** denotes p<0.05 and *** denotes p<0.01 
 
Constant FP IVOL Interaction lnBM lnME MOM Observations Avg. R2 
Panel A. Without Control Variables      
0.904*** -2.344      1459784 0.009 
(3.46) (-1.45)        
0.969*** -9.030     1459784 0.012 
(4.27)  (-1.24)       
1.006*** -1.997 -6.753     1459784 0.017 
(4.44) (-1.50) (-1.04)       
1.034*** -3.467** -0.277 1.739   1459784 0.018 
(4.50) (-2.03) (-1.37) (1.18)      
 
Panel B. With Control Variables 
      
1.907*** -3.904***  0.532*** -0.153*** 0.632*** 1459784 0.027 
(4.47) (-2.65)   (4.52) (-2.92) (3.02)   
2.244*** -14.836*** 0.479*** -0.187*** 0.717*** 1459784 0.028 
(5.97)  (-2.63)  (4.83) (-4.43) (3.02)   
2.376*** -2.951** -13.313** 0.487*** -0.196*** 0.639*** 1459784 0.031 
(6.43) (-2.27) (-2.59)  (4.84) (-4.66) (3.23)   
2.299*** -6.102*** -0.538*** 3.650*** 0.502*** -0.193*** 0.628*** 1459784 0.030 
(6.26) (-4.09) (-3.59) (2.89) (4.77) (-4.47) (3.09)     
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4.5.3 Robustness tests on regression analyses 
4.5.3.1 Does the Turn-of-Month effect explain the distress puzzle? 
Da and Gao (2010) find that the distress premium is mainly driven by stocks 
among high distress risk stocks with poor return performance in recent months. 
They conclude that for a one-year holding period portfolio, highest 10% distress 
risk stocks earn an average return at 2.10% in the first month and drop to 1.52% 
per month in the second holding month, and then vanishes in subsequent months 
of the entire holding period. They also find that distress risk thus loses its 
predictive power for expected returns when the previous one-month return and 
illiquidity ratio enters the Fama-MacBeth regression. To test if the distress 
puzzle is related to the short-term reversal effect, the monthly excess return is 
then regressed on two short-term reversal variables as presented below: 
Short-term Return Reversal (𝑹𝒊,𝒕−𝟏): The monthly return one month prior to 
the formation of a portfolio. According to Da and Gao (2010), this is negatively 
priced in the cross-sectional returns and overrules the pricing power of firm’s 
distress risk. 
 
Two-month Short-term Return Reversal (𝑹𝒊,𝒕−𝟐): The monthly return two 
months prior to the formation of a portfolio. According to Da and Gao (2010), 
this is negatively priced in the cross-sectional returns and reduces the coefficient 
of distress risk controlling for stock’s illiquidity. 
However, the results in Table 13 suggest that the Turn-of-Month effect does not 
account for the distress puzzle, as Da and Gao (2010) argue. In line with their 
argument, the Amihud illiquidity ratio (𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄) is included alongside 𝑙𝑛𝐵𝑀,  
𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐸 , 𝑀𝑂𝑀12 , and remains significant considering the short-term reversal 
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effect (Model 1 and Model 2). The 𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 (t=-9.22) and 𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄 (t=5.73) show 
strong predictive power in terms of each stock’s expected return, but the pricing 
power of distress risk remains strong and stable that 𝐹𝑃 in all three models has 
a t-stat over 3.0. The previous month’s return, 𝑅𝑡−1 , does not subsume the 
predictive power of 𝐹𝑃, and 𝐹𝑃 still retains a negative sign.  Checking whether 
monthly returns from two months before the formation of the portfolio may 
provide additional information is also relevant in judging the conclusions drawn 
by Da and Gao (2010). The relevant results from Model 2 show that even returns 
from two-months (=-0.367, t=-1.20) prior to portfolio formation cannot explain 
the significance of the distress puzzle (=-0.319, t=-3.62), though the coefficient 
of 𝐹𝑃 is slightly reduced compared to the Model 1 (-0.319 against -0.325). 
One possible explanation for the divergence of Da and Gao (2010) and the 
current results is that they use the default likelihood ratio to represent distress 
risk, a method taken directly from Vassalou and Xing (2004). This is used based 
on information from U.S. stocks from 1971 to 1999. However, here, the proxy 
of distress risk is the failure probability, in line with Campbell et al. (2008), and 
the data comes from U.S. stocks from 1981 to 2014. Campbell et al. (2008) 
prove that failure probability and DLI are generally negatively related to equity 
returns in the 1981 to 2003 period, which contradicts Da and Gao (2010).  
Furthermore, the current research suggests that the distress premium exists 
within longer holding periods and, as such, it is unlikely that a short-term return 
reversal could cause abnormal returns over a period of months.  
 129 
 
 
Table 13 Fama-MacBeth regression on distress risk and turn-of-month effect 
Each month 𝑡, stocks monthly excess return is regressed on lagged characteristics based on 
distress risk (𝐹𝑃), Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio (𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄), and control variables including 
firm’s size (𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐸), book-to-market ratio (𝑙𝑛𝐵𝑀), momentum (𝑀𝑂𝑀12) using all NYSE, 
AMEX and NASDAQ common stocks as benchmark, and Model 1 and Model 2 adds short-
term reversal variable (see section 4.5.5.1 for detail). T-statistics adjusted by the Newey-
West standard error, are reported in parentheses. This dataset covers January 1981 to 
December 2014. *denotes p<0.10, ** denotes p<0.05 and *** denotes p<0.01. 
  Benchmark Model 1 Model 2 
𝑙𝑛𝐵𝑀 0.491*** 0.490*** 0.492*** 
 (4.64) (4.61) (4.83) 
    
𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐸 -0.089* -0.085* -0.079* 
 (-1.87) (-1.81) (-1.68) 
    
𝑀𝑂𝑀12 0.381*** 0.369*** 0.361** 
 (2.83) (2.61) (2.49) 
    
𝐹𝑃 -0.294*** -0.325*** -0.319*** 
 (-3.30) (-3.54) (-3.62) 
    
𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄 0.046*** 0.048*** 0.045*** 
 (5.73) (6.00) (6.40) 
    
𝑅𝑡−1  -3.683***  
  (-9.22)  
    
𝑅𝑡−2   -0.367 
   (-1.20) 
    
Constant -0.565 -0.825 -0.863 
 (-0.56) (-0.80) (-0.86) 
    
Observations 1347785 1347785 1347785 
Adj R2 0.031 0.037 0.032 
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4.5.3.2 Robustness: Do penny stocks matter? 
Untabulated regression results also show that the pricing power of distress risk 
is not merely a tautology of penny stock effect. When penny stocks are removed 
from the dataset, that is, any firm-month observation that has a stock price below 
$1 is removed, the t-statistic of 𝐹𝑃 in the cross-sectional regression is ranging -
3.46 and -3.53, a significant increase of t-statistics from the value range of -1.45 
and -1.92 found in the previous sample where penny stocks were included. This 
strongly rejects the hypothesis that the penny stocks effect is a major contributor 
to the distress puzzle. In addition, the 𝐵𝐴  variable showed significant 
explanatory power in terms of explaining the pricing power of distress risk. 
When penny stocks are included, the results from the portfolio-level analysis 
and stock-level analysis are consistent. The coefficient sign of 𝐼𝑉𝑂𝐿  also 
changes. In the analysis in Section 4.5.3, 𝐼𝑉𝑂𝐿 is negatively related to stock 
returns, but in the new sample it is negatively related to stock returns, a result 
that is consistent with Ang et al. (2006). Thus, robustness analysis supports the 
hypothesis of the arbitrage limit playing a major role in explaining the distress 
risk anomaly, and it rejects the alternative explanation where penny stock 
effects drives most of the distress puzzle. 
  
 131 
 
4.6 Default likelihood indicator, the distress puzzle and arbitrage limit effect 
Default likelihood indicator (𝐷𝐿𝐼) is another measure of distress risk, which 
Vassalou and Xing (2004), Campbell et al. (2008), Bharath and Shumway 
(2008) and Da and Gao (2010) has extensively discussed the estimation and 
implication in predicting distress event. Particularly, the distress puzzle in 
Vassalou and Xing (2004) is found as a significant return premium but the 
distress risk, proxied by 𝐷𝐿𝐼, is positively associated with stock returns under 
portfolio-level analysis in 1971-1999 period, a seemingly contradictory finding 
against Campbell et al. (2008) and several literatures.  
To test if the arbitrage limit effect hypothesis also applies in the predicting 
power of 𝐷𝐿𝐼, the premium of distress risk should exist in the one-way sort 
portfolio. Table 14 reports the portfolio performance of ten 𝐷𝐿𝐼  sorted 
portfolio, using the same forming method as Table 5. The univariate sort 
portfolio analysis depicts several aspects that deviate from 𝐹𝑃 portfolios. First, 
the relation between 𝐷𝐿𝐼  and stock returns is still negative, which is not 
consistent with Vassalou and Xing (2004) or Da and Gao (2010). For equal-
weight portfolio returns, the low distress risk portfolio earns 0.6% per month in 
average, and the premium maintains between 0.5% to 0.7% in the subsequent 
portfolios. The high distress risk portfolio breaks the stability, yielding only 
0.09% per month equally-weighted. Adjusting portfolios with stock size 
relieves the poor performance of high distress risk portfolio, but the negative 
distress risk-return pattern still holds.  
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The second finding is regarding the distress premium. The distress risk premium 
measured as equally weighted excess return is at 0.548% per month or 1.390% 
per month as  𝐹𝐹 − 3  alpha, both are statistically significant at 1% level. 
However, value-weight portfolio performance is far less pronounced and is only 
0.184% (excess return) and 0.555% (𝐹𝐹 − 3 alpha) respectively.  The drastic 
reduction of distress risk premium from equal-weight to value-weight shows 
that firm’s size is associated with the 𝐷𝐿𝐼-driven premium, but unlike Campbell 
et al. (2008) that value-weight distress premium is still significant, the premium 
from 𝐷𝐿𝐼 sorted portfolio does not pass the 5% significant threshold.  
Though 𝐷𝐿𝐼  presents a different picture as 𝐹𝑃 , they still have some 
commonalities: The 𝐹𝐹 − 3  alpha is higher than its raw excess return, 
regardless whether portfolio performance is equally weighted or value 
weighted. Dissecting the factor loading of the distress premium, the average 
𝐷𝐿𝐼 is positively associated with market risk factor loadings, and negatively 
associated with size factor loadings. The relation between 𝐷𝐿𝐼 and 𝐻𝑀𝐿 factor 
loading is hump-shaped, but the difference between high and low 𝐷𝐿𝐼  is 
statistically significant. The premium has an exceptionally high loading of size 
factor (-0.790, t=-12.85), suggesting that the distress premium is closely related 
to size effect, and value-weight performance measures are able to subsume its 
premium scale. In short, the factor loading analysis confirms that both 𝐹𝑃 and 
𝐷𝐿𝐼 can result in a higher risk-adjusted performance than its raw return, but size 
effect has higher impact on the premium that driven by 𝐷𝐿𝐼. 
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Table 14 Return of Distance-to-Default-sort decile portfolios (1981.1-2014.12) 
At the beginning of every January from 1981 to 2014, all qualified stocks (nonfinancial firms, with valid DD, ME, BM, MOM12 and are traded on NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq 
as common shares at the forming date) are independently grouped by default likelihood indicator (DLI) from low to high. This generates 10 portfolios divided at every 10% 
of the spectrum of DLI. Portfolios are rebalanced every year. Both Equal-weighted (EW) and Value-weighted (VW) monthly average returns in excess of 1-month T-bill 
rate (Excess Return) and alphas from Fama-French 3-factor model (FF-3 Alpha) for all 10 decile portfolios and long-short portfolios holding the low distress risk portfolio 
and short selling the high distress risk portfolio are shown. The FF-3 factor loadings of EW FF-3 alpha are reported in panel B. The t-statistics as adjusted by Newey-West 
standard error are reported below each row of return in parentheses. 
Portfolios 
1 
 Low  
DLI 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
High 
 DLI 
1-10 
 Low-High 
Panel A. Portfolio Performance               
EW Excess Return 0.640 0.518 0.847 0.535 0.728 0.726 0.635 0.534 0.656 0.092 0.548 
 (3.22) (1.85) (3.36) (2.08) (2.78) (2.77) (2.23) (1.50) (1.76) (0.21) (2.81) 
EW FF-3 Alpha 0.192  -0.175  0.192  -0.155  0.026  -0.063  -0.220  -0.529  -0.484  -1.198  1.390 
 (3.15) (-1.37) (1.76) (-1.52) (0.25) (-0.56) (-1.59) (-2.82) (-2.08) (-4.15) (3.95) 
VW Excess Return 0.507  0.551  0.560  0.354  0.306  0.397  0.320  0.302  0.390  0.323  0.184 
 (1.83) (1.79) (1.96) (1.24) (1.07) (1.33) (0.98) (0.87) (1.02) (0.69) (0.77) 
VW FF-3 Alpha 0.365  0.149  0.210  0.090  -0.015  0.051  -0.080  -0.121  -0.045  -0.190  0.555 
 (1.99) (1.52) (2.53) (1.03) (-0.16) (0.54) (-0.57) (-0.76) (-0.20) (-0.57) (1.93) 
Panel B. Fama-French 3-factor loading                   
𝑀𝐾𝑇 0.852  0.908  0.944  1.001  1.046  1.057  1.106  1.123  1.095  1.155  -0.303 
 (19.87) (42.02) (49.93) (49.73) (48.06) (43.96) (33.71) (30.40) (20.72) (14.90) (-3.14) 
𝑆𝑀𝐵 0.510  0.605  0.611  0.776  0.787  0.868  0.961  1.082  1.163  1.300  -0.790  
 (8.19) (20.13) (23.18) (26.29) (24.90) (24.86) (20.17) (20.18) (15.16) (11.54) (-12.85) 
𝐻𝑀𝐿 0.150  0.131  0.114  0.120  0.219  0.243  0.277  0.270  0.325  0.395  -0.245  
 (2.28) (4.13) (4.05) (3.87) (6.59) (6.61) (5.52) (4.79) (4.02) (3.33) (-1.87) 
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Since the premium relating to  𝐷𝐿𝐼  depicts a pattern different from 𝐹𝑃 , this 
subsection tests only the predicting power of 𝐷𝐿𝐼 in the firm-level analysis, 
which is, in line with Da and Gao (2010) who use cross-sectional regression to 
explain the distress puzzle. Given that the 𝐷𝐿𝐼  premium is higher in equal-
weight portfolio, the predicting power of 𝐷𝐿𝐼 should be significant. The cross-
sectional regression is conducted, similar to equation (4.6) and (4.8), as follows: 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡 = 𝜆0 + 𝜆1𝐷𝐿𝐼 + 𝜆2𝐴𝑟𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝝀𝟑
,𝑿𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (4.10) 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡 = 𝜆0 + 𝜆1𝐷𝐿𝐼 + 𝐴𝑟𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜆3𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝝀𝟒
,𝑿𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (4.11) 
Where  
𝑿𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 = [𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1     𝑙𝑛𝐵𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1     𝑀𝑂𝑀12𝑖,𝑡−1]    
In line with section 4.4, the proxy of 𝐴𝑟𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡 is stock monthly BA, 
𝐷𝑉 , 𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄 ,and 𝐼𝑉𝑂𝐿  respectively. The equation (4.10) is to test if the 
predicting power of  𝐷𝐿𝐼 is diluted by arbitrage limit effect, and (4.11) tests if 
the predicting power of 𝐷𝐿𝐼 is statistically different between stocks with low 
and high arbitrage limit effect. Since regression analysis in section 4.5 has found 
that the predicting power of distress risk is associated with 𝑿𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 , the 
regressions without control variables are omitted. The empirical results are 
disclosed in Table 15. 
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The total observation is less than the sample in section 4.4. Due to the estimation 
of 𝐷𝐿𝐼 requires at least one-month period consecutive daily returns and strictly 
requires financial ratios from Annual Compustat Fundamental files, according 
to Vassalou and Xing (2004), the sample volume is reduced by approximately 
half a million observations in the same period. However, the reduction does not 
systematically affect the analysis. The coefficient of three control variables, 
𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐸 , 𝑙𝑛𝐵𝑀 , 𝑀𝑂𝑀12 , is maintained in terms of coefficient scale and 
significant level, showing their consistency with earlier literature and analyses 
in earlier sections.  
The relation between 𝐷𝐿𝐼 and arbitrage limit effect is different from Campbell 
et al. (2008) failure probability. Unlike 𝐹𝑃 that its predicting power is almost 
unrelated with arbitrage limit proxies, the predicting power of 𝐷𝐿𝐼 is influenced 
by these effects directly. When 𝐵𝐴  is proxied as arbitrage limit effect, the 
coefficient of ?̂?1is reduced statically and economically from -0.843 (t=-2.02) to 
-0.190 (t=-0.38). Considering its interaction effect, the predicting power of 
distress risk is eventually positively priced in the cross-sectional stock returns 
(?̂?1=0.384, t=0.99). The reduction also emerges in panel B (𝐷𝑉 as proxy), panel 
C (𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄 as proxy) and panel D (𝐼𝑉𝑂𝐿 as proxy), though the coefficient of 𝐷𝐿𝐼 
remains significant where 𝐷𝑉  and 𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄  enters into analyses. Overall, the 
regression analysis finds that the predicting power of 𝐷𝐿𝐼 is consistent with 
Hypothesis 3 that liquidity condition matters the distress puzzle.  
The deviation is, based on Hackbarth et al. (2015) as well as Da and Gao (2010), 
has several possible explanations. The first possible explanation is the change 
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of bankruptcy legal environment in the post-1980 period, resulting that the 
relation distress risk and equity return is reverted from positive to negative. This 
explanation is consistent with the portfolio analysis in the univariate sort by 
𝐷𝐿𝐼, and presents a resolution of our inconsistent findings relating to Vassalou 
and Xing (2004). However, further analysis including a breakpoint analysis is 
required before documenting the change of legal environment is responsible to 
the empirical findings in this section, which is pending further investigation. 
The second possible explanation is that the change of short-term liquidity 
condition, especially turn-of-the-month effect has attributed to the distress 
puzzle. Thus, the predicting power of 𝐷𝐿𝐼 is reduced. This is supported with 
regression analysis reported in Da and Gao (2010), who find 𝐷𝐿𝐼  loses its 
significance when short-term liquidity condition enters into regression. In such 
case, one needs to discuss that if 𝐹𝑃 contains additional information that 𝐷𝐿𝐼 
does not reflect. Since the distress premium associated with 𝐷𝐿𝐼  are not 
significant as shown in Table 14, this explanation is just numerated and left for 
further discussion once new evidence of 𝐷𝐿𝐼 is available. 
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Table 15 Fama-MacBeth regressions with an interaction term between DD and arbitrage limit effects 
For each month from January 1981 to December 2014, Fama-MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions of monthly excess returns (CRSP 
monthly return over one-month T-bill rate) are run on a set of independent variables. Distress Risk is measured as firm’s distance-to-default (DLI). 
The calculation of IVOL, lnBM, lnME as well as MOM12 is in section 4.3.2 and the calculation of interaction variable is in section 4.5.2. The t-
statistics, adjusted by the Newey-West standard error, are in parentheses. Panel A reports basic regressions and Panel B reports regressions with 
control variables. *denotes p<0.10, ** denotes p<0.05 and *** denotes p<0.01 
Constant DLI Arbitrage Limit Interaction lnBM lnME MOM12 Observations Avg.R2 
Panel A. BA as Proxy 
 
3.526*** -0.843**   0.466*** -0.038 0.545** 945952 0.026 
(3.60) (-2.02)   (4.24) (-0.88) (2.20)   
 
      
  
1.078  6.804  0.397*** 0.055 0.682** 945952 0.027 
(1.12)  (1.35)  (3.92) (0.98) (2.58)   
 
      
  
3.408*** -0.190 8.306  0.404*** 0.049 0.683** 945952 0.029 
(3.50) (-0.38) (1.54)  (3.94) (0.89) (2.55)   
 
      
  
1.030 0.384 0.096 -0.320 0.409*** 0.013 0.701** 945952 0.033 
(0.91) (0.90) (0.99) (-1.23) (3.93) (0.26) (2.60)   
         
Panel B. DV as Proxy 
 
3.521* -0.843**   0.468*** -0.040 0.551** 935940 0.025 
(3.52) (-2.01)   (4.24) (-0.88) (2.24)   
 
      
 (Continue) 
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(Continued.) 
 
1.120  -0.016  0.458*** -0.023 0.542** 935940 0.025 
(1.36)  (-1.58)  (4.34) (-0.46) (2.17)   
 
      
  
1.347* -0.832** -0.050  0.469*** -0.040 0.536** 935940 0.027 
(1.69) (-2.01) (-1.03)  (4.31) (-0.81) (2.17)   
 
      
  
1.044 -0.607* -0.022 -1.018** 0.465*** 0.002 0.559** 935940 0.033 
(1.24) (-1.68) (-1.28) (-2.52) (4.27) (0.030) (2.32)   
         
Panel C. ILLIQ as Proxy 
 
3.526*** -0.847**   0.479*** -0.044  0.541** 945952 0.026 
(3.60) (-2.03)   (4.32) (-1.01) (2.21)   
         
1.748*  0.102   0.466*** -0.043  0.550** 945952 0.027 
(1.95)  (1.43)  (4.32) (-0.75) (2.31)   
         
3.710*** -0.648** 0.128*  0.475*** -0.053  0.545** 945952 0.029 
(3.37) (-2.19) (1.81)  (4.28) (-0.92) (2.26)   
         
3.434*** -0.782  0.070  -0.706  0.478*** -0.095  0.546** 945952 0.031 
(3.33) (-1.27) (0.41) (-1.57) (4.23) (-1.30) (2.28)   
         
        (Continue) 
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(Continued.) 
Panel D. IVOL as Proxy 
3.340**  -0.843**   0.468*** -0.036 0.545** 938967 0.025 
(2.82) (-2.02)   (4.24) (-0.89) (2.19)   
         
2.794***  -13.413***  0.388*** -0.115** 0.484** 938967 0.030 
(4.03)  (-4.64)  (4.08) (-2.78) (2.06)   
         
2.862*** -0.387  -12.924***  0.394*** -0.121*** 0.475** 938967 0.031 
(4.13) (-1.02) (-4.76)  (4.04) (-2.90) (1.99)   
         
2.942*** -0.464  -0.250** -0.843** 0.389*** -0.127*** 0.478** 938967 0.034 
(4.27) (-0.36) (-2.57) (-2.43) (3.98) (-3.02) (2.01)     
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4.7 Conclusions 
A number of rational asset pricing theories have tried to explain the distress 
puzzle, that is, the question of why distress risk is negatively priced in terms of 
expected returns, and why investors have left such arbitrage opportunities for 
decades. Complex models that include firm characteristics such as the cost of 
financial distress, return skewness, or shareholders’ bargaining power has 
explained where the predicting power of distress risk comes from, but none have 
explained the two questions above in full. Fama and French (2008) document 
that if the return premium of an anomaly is concentrated in the short-side of a 
zero-cost portfolio, the premium is unlikely to achieve rather as a realistic return 
due to the arbitrage costs and the difficulty of short-selling stocks. That is, 
mispricing in high-distress risk stocksexists, but such mistakes in prices do not 
imply easy profits. Investors may observe arbitrage opportunities, but they may 
have difficulty in seeking counterparties for trading, be unable to borrow stocks 
for short selling, or be unable or unwilling to bear the risk that their portfolios 
become less diversified. 
As equipped by the arbitrage limit theory, this study presents original results 
that show how the theory could explain the distress puzzle. Indeed, distress risk 
can predict expected returns, as the risk contains pricing information that is 
related to systematic risk as documented by Dichev (1998), Fama and French 
(1996), and Kapadia (2011). However, the premium that arises as a result of 
hedging distress risk is associated with various constraints. Distressed stocks 
are generally small, and frequently display high bid-ask spreads and low trading 
 141 
 
volumes that add costs to be traded in the market. The pervasive illiquidity 
condition among high distress risk stocks further blocks arbitrage activities, as 
there are fewer investors and market makers participating in those stocks. 
D’Avolio (2002) finds that less than 1% of stocks have loan fees larger than 1% 
per annum. Those stocks are tiny in size, with a low price per stock and less 
liquidity; these are also characteristics of high distress risk stocks. In this 
research, a number of variables are investigated to show that market arbitrage 
limit levels significantly explain the distress puzzle, providing evidence that 
supports the arbitrage limit theory. 
Indeed, in line with earlier research on the limit of arbitrage that stocks are 
seemingly mispriced when arbitrage limit is high, the distress premium 
primarily results from high distress risk stocks that are being underpriced in 
relation to other stocks with similar distress risk but easy to arbitrage. Garlappi 
and Yan (2011) argue that high distress stocks have a strong negative 
momentum effect during their final life stage, showing that high distress risk 
stocks have influenced by negative momentum. However, the recovery of 
equity returns from bankrupted firms is a violation of the US bankruptcy 
“Absolute Priority Rule” (Hackbarth et al. 2015), which ensures that 
institutional equity holders will have strong bargaining powers against debt 
holders and can, therefore, expect to claim more value for their investments if 
more of the firm’s stock is held by the institution.  This chapter presents 
empirical findings that extend the Garlappi and Yan (2011) conclusion that 
among firms with low cost for conducting transactions and holdings, the distress 
risk puzzle is explainable by Fama-French 3-factor models. 
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The limitations of this research are several. In particular, this paper investigates 
only one type of distress risk, and thus the conclusion remains to be tested on 
other distress risk measures such as Distance-to-Default (Vassalou and Xing, 
2004) and O-score (Avramov et al. 2013). Further research could start from the 
position of using alternative distress risk measures to test the arbitrage limit 
theory. 
 
  
 143 
 
5 PROFITABILITY, INSIDER OWNERSHIP, AND CROSS-SECTIONAL 
STOCK RETURNS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The latest documented anomaly, firm profitability, can explain a series of asset 
pricing anomalies at the cross-section level (Novy-Marx, 2013; Fama and 
French, 2015; Fama and French, 2016), but has a return premium that cannot be 
explained by rational assets pricing models such as the Fama-French 3-Factor 
Model or CAPM. As profitability is directly linked to firm performance and 
earnings, high profitability firms should outperform unprofitable firms, as noted 
by Novy-Marx (2013) and Ball et al. (2015). However, the current research 
suggests that the profitability premium is not a risk factor that affects all firms 
in the market; hence, it cannot systematically determine the expected cross-
sectional stock return. A firm’s profitability is also influenced by its structure 
of insider ownership, leading to the return of profitability premium varying 
across a range of levels of insider ownership. This paper, therefore, explores the 
link between firm’s insider ownership and profitability anomalies, offering 
novel empirical evidence about the asset pricing implications of firm’s 
corporate governance. 
According to financial theory, assets that have riskier payoffs should earn higher 
returns, on average, to compensate investors for bearing the increased risk 
(Schwert, 2003). Not all risk affects the payoffs in such a way, however. When 
markets are perfect and frictionless, investors require compensation for bearing 
systematic risks that cannot be diversified away, and thus the profitability 
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premium is a type of anomaly that violates economic theory. As it seems to 
create a market-wide return pattern that rewards from bearing less systematic 
risk. Ball et al. (2015) find long-short top/bottom 10% operating profitability 
stocks earn 0.35% per month in excess of the one-month T-bill rate, with a 
significant negative systematic risk factor loading that is positive for market 
risk. Novy-Marx (2013) finds that using a similar portfolio formation method 
for the top/bottom 10% gross profitability firms generates a 0.29% per month 
excess return. These findings suggest that the premium from profitability 
trading strategies is not the result of bearing high levels of market risk. 
A review of the literature offers a plausible explanation for the profitability 
anomaly by taking firm’s agency cost into account: a good governance is 
associated with firm’s subsequent high profitability. According to Cremers and 
Nair (2005), good governance mechanism reduces the agency cost by guiding 
manager’s decision making with internal control: allowing them to hold firm’s 
stock so that they can behave on behalf of shareholders, and external control as 
well: large institutions can access firm’s decision making by playing the role of 
blockholders. Hence, firms with high insider holding levels, which are a 
documented sign of high levels of corporate governance, could outperform 
those with low insider holdings. It is well-documented in the corporate finance 
area that firm’s profitability can be predictably determined by its corporate 
governance structure. Gompers et al. (2013) and Bebchuk et al. (2009) find that 
good (poor) governance is related to high (low) subsequent stock return and 
they observe an averaged value-weighted return of 0.71% to 1.16% per month 
from holding the top 10% good governance stocks and short selling the bottom 
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10% poor governance stocks.  In terms of the pricing power of insider holdings, 
Zack (2011) find that trades made by insiders, in general, beat the market by 
0.35% per month in the 1978 to 2005 period. Also, a long-short portfolio 
constructed by holding stocks that insiders buy and selling stocks that insiders 
sell generate a 1.48% monthly return. Cremer and Ferrell (2014) believe that 
the relationship between corporate governance and profitability became stable 
only after 1985 due to a series of exogenous structure changes in the U.S. legal 
system to protect shareholder’s rights. Harford et al. (2008) also confirm the 
profitability-governance relationship by testing it with different proxies of 
profitability and governance indices.  Their findings are in line with Shleifer 
and Vishny (1997), who note that institutional shareholders and high ownership 
concentrations reduce a firm’s agency costs, leading to better firm performance. 
Empirical research on corporate governance investigates the mechanisms that 
reduce the agency costs between a firm’s shareholders and managers. 
According to the theoretical models proposed by Jensen (1986) and Stulz 
(1990), agency costs are the free cash flows that managers are able to access 
and use to fund projects and acquisitions that come with costs to shareholders. 
One of the predicted conclusions is that agency costs will eventually reduce the 
welfare of shareholders if corporate governance is absent. Laws and contracts 
between shareholders and managers are the most common corporate 
governance arrangements to reduce agency costs. However, the influential 
survey by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) produced the argument that large 
investors represent another channel of control rights within the firm and can, 
therefore, act as a defence in addition to legal protection for shareholders. The 
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large shareholders, generally institutional shareholders, takeover activists or 
defenders, and large creditors concentrate voting rights and free cash flows that 
were originally allocated to individuals. Thus, agency costs are reduced where 
large investors exist. Depending on the ways that managers are monitored, 
Cremers and Nair (2005) categorise corporate governance into internal 
governance and external governance. Internal governance reflects how 
shareholders are active in a firm’s decision and external governance 
mechanisms and reflect how the market is related to a firm’s corporate 
governance mechanisms. This categorization further advances relevant research 
methods by considering sophisticated governance mechanisms in empirical 
analyses. Thus, this research offers conjectures on two existing topics: stock 
return-profitability relationships and profitability-corporate governance 
relationships.  
Taking work by Cremers and Nair (2005) and Lilienfed-Toal and Ruenzi (2014) 
into account, this research adopts several insider ownership proxies to test 
whether the profitability premium is associated with: CEO ownership and top 
five executive managers’ ownership represent internal insiders, as they have 
access to a firm’s cash flow distribution decisions, and are supposed to be 
positively incentivised by the governance structure. Institutions also treat 
certain non-employees as insiders, especially those who own large shares of the 
firm and can be called “blockholders”. They also have access to a firm’s 
investment and free-cashflow distribution decisions. Institutional ownership 
and institutional ownership concentration are used as proxies for external 
insiders. In this chapter, the current research’s findings are discussed in order to 
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demonstrate that a firm’s insider holding information, in terms of CEO 
holdings, the top five executive managers’ holdings, institutional holdings, or 
institutional ownership concentration, can explain the firm’s gross profitability 
anomaly, proposed by Novy-Marx (2013), and the operating profitability 
anomaly suggested by Ball et al. (2015). 
The findings are summarised as follows: Firstly, the main conclusions from 
Novy-Marx (2013) and Ball et al. (2015) are replicated by using the 
methodology within their research, and then these findings are extended over a 
longer period of data. Thus, the gross profitability anomaly is found to generate 
a 0.351% monthly excess return and the operating profitability anomaly 
generates a 0.376% monthly excess return. Both of these are value weighted 
and statistically significant at the 10% level. In the 1963 to 2015 sample, returns 
from a long/short portfolio of the top/bottom deciles of profitability stocks earn 
0.388% (operating profitability) and 0.378% (gross profitability), both 
statistically significant. This provides supportive evidence for the existence of 
profitability anomaly in the sample. 
As the availability of information on insider ownership is limited to S&P 1500 
listed firms, cross-sectional regression at firm level may not fully reflect the 
interaction of profitability and insider ownership, especially since the available 
observations are mostly from large companies. One challenge faced by this 
research is finding a suitable governance index with sufficiently large numbers 
of observations. Typically, research on corporate governance uses relatively 
small data sets. For example, Core et al. (1999) test the relationship between 
manager compensation and firm performance using a three-year sample of 495 
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firm-year observations, while Gompers et al. (2003) examine the relationship 
between governance and stock returns using a 10-year sample of 3,241 firm-
year observations. Similarly, the number of firm-year observations in Harford 
et al. (2008) research is 11,645, and Novy-Marx (2013) examined profitability 
and stock returns using 210,000 firm-year observations in the 1963 to 2010 
period. Additionally, if a candidate agency cost indicator does not represent a 
reliable proxy market-wide, then the analysis results are not reliable. 
To address potential biases, all stocks are independently sorted by their 
profitability and insider holdings; the data is then examined to determine 
whether the profitability anomaly is concentrated where insider holding tends 
to be highest. The results support the hypothesis that the profitability premium 
from long-short portfolio on firm’s profitability is positively associated with 
firm’s average insider ownership. Thus returns from the profitability anomaly 
are more pronounced within high insider holding firms. This finding is robust 
by taking different measures of insider ownership to explain the anomaly 
associated with firm’s gross profitability and operating profitability.  
Then, the relationship between profitability anomalies and insider holdings is 
examined at firm-level by Fama-MacBeth regression to test whether the 
predicting power of GPTA/OPTA is distinguished with insider ownership. The 
results show that returns from two profitability trading strategies cluster where 
the proxies of insider holding, institutional ownership and ownership 
concentration, are higher than the market average level. This suggests that the 
abnormal return is associated with firms where more stocks are held by insiders 
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than other types of stock holders. However, this interaction may result from 
compensatory factors arising from other common risk factors such as book-to-
market ratio, size, and momentum. 
This chapter, although its research objects are firm’s profitability and insider 
ownership, is differs from previous research especially Core et al. (1999) and 
Harford et al. (2008) in several ways. First, this chapter is seeking explanation 
of an abnormal stock return pattern that is believed to associated with firm’s 
gross profitability and operating profitability. Therefore, this research does not 
cover other profitability measures such as net income to total assets, sales 
growth, and return on equity because they are not identified as an anomaly. 
Second, our research is cross-sectional analysis, and explanatory variables are 
lagged information with at least one-month gap in order to predict stock returns. 
The model setting means the issue of endogeneity, especially the endogeneity 
related with time-series analysis does not plays a critical issue in the research. 
Third, this ultimate goal of research is understanding stock return predictability 
but not finding the mechanism of firm’s profitability. 
This chapter also differs from previous research that investigate anomalies with 
various corporate governance indicators. The relationship between firm’s 
profitability, insider ownership is investigated at the cross-sectional level, 
which differs from the testing of abnormal returns caused by earnings 
announcement related to corporate governance such as changes of managers, 
changes in blockholders, or changes in accounting standards within an event 
window (see La Porta et al. 1997), or explaining analysts’ forecast errors about 
firm’s profitability (Giroud and Mueller, 2011). Additionally, though Gompers 
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et al. (2003) and Bebchuk et al. (2009) find that corporate governance generates 
a premium on returns at the cross-sectional level and they provide no 
explanation for these findings. This chapter seeks to fill this blank by 
discovering the relationship between governance and other common risk factors 
identified by Fama and French (1993, 1996).  
 
5.2 Further Motivations and Hypothesis Development 
Novy-Marx (2013) explains that the premium from high profitability firms 
outperform low profitability firms based on the dividend discount model, 
following the hypothesis by Fama and French (2008) that all anomalies should 
offer “at least rough proxies for expected cash flows” (p.1675). The dividend 
discount model is defined as; stock price equals the present value of its 
cumulative expected dividends over time. Harford et al. (2008) find that 
shareholder rights are positively related to industry-adjusted profitability. This 
implies that the equation holds if corporate governance is related to profitability, 
as in Novy-Marx (2013), who assumes that gross profitability is a proxy for 
expected dividends. In light of this, the relation between firm’s profitability and 
corporate governance can be generalised as follow. 
Denote 𝑀 as firm’s market value of equity, the relationship between earning, 
book equity is expressed as: 
𝑀𝑡 = ∑
𝐄t[Yt+τ−dBt+τ]
(1+𝑟)τ
∞
τ=0   (5.1) 
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Where Yt is the time-t earnings, dBt ≡ Bt + Bt−1 is the change in book equity, 
which results from the earning being retained in the firm, and r is the required 
rate of return on expected dividends. Assuming Mt , Yt , dBt  and rt  are 
exogenous, holding all else equal, higher valuations imply lower expected 
returns. That is, value firms should outperform growth firms, and profitable 
firms should outperform unprofitable firms. Those properties can be viewed 
when the function is re-written as stock return on the left-hand side of the 
equation: 
𝑟 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (
𝐄t[Yt+τ−dBt+τ]
𝑀𝑡
) − 1 (5.2) 
Harford et al. (2008) find shareholder rights are positively related to Industry-
adjusted profitability. This finding implies the equation 5.2 holds with a positive 
sign on its first-order condition. 
𝐄t[Yt+τ − dBt+τ] = 𝑓(𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒, 𝜇𝑖𝑡) (5.3) 
The function holds if corporate governance is truly related with profitability, 
which Novy-Marx (2013) assume the gross profitability proxies expected 
dividends. Since this chapter is using  𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡 to predict profitability on 
𝑡 + 1, the model is less affected by endogeneity problem related with expected 
profitability.  
Empirically, the relationship between corporate governance and stock returns is 
viewed and tested under the framework of firm performance research. Starting 
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with Gompers and Metrick (2001), who argue that increasing institutional 
ownership from 1980 resulted from a demand for particular firm characteristics. 
Past institutional ownership can be seen to be positively related to stock returns.  
Gompers et al. (2003) tested the relationship in more detail, using the G-Index, 
a rating of high shareholder rights, as a proxy of governance. They found that 
corporate governance is positively predictive of future stock return, and they 
attribute this finding to the significant marginal relationship, whereby weak 
governance causes poor firm performance, and hence, poor stock return. Core 
et al. (1999) find that CEO compensation as a cost of the agency could explain 
annual buy-and-hold stock returns.  Their findings are further supported by 
Lilienfeld-Toal and Ruenzi (2014), who find CEO ownership to be related to 
stock market performance, and who attribute pricing power to the incentives of 
insiders in a firm’s governance mechanism. 
Hypothesis 1: Firms with high profitability have high levels of insider 
ownership.  
Gompers et al. (2003) note that Democracy Portfolios, which are composed of 
high corporate governance firms with G-indices less than 5, have higher net 
profit margins, return on equity, and sales growth that Dictator Portfolios, which 
contain firms with G-Index over 14. Harford et al. (2008) find firm’s G-Index 
also positively links to high return-on-assets. The profitability-corporate 
governance relationship is predicted to be stable and to hold when proxies are 
replaced by other candidate variables. 
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Hypothesis 2: Returns from high profitability firms are driven by those firms 
with high levels of insider ownership, controlling for variations from other 
factors. 
If firm’s agency costs are negatively associated with firm’s expected 
profitability, then the pricing power firm’s profitability should perform 
differently in high and low insider ownership firms. Firms’ profitability and 
dividends are significantly related to corporate governance, as empirically 
shown in GIM (2003) and Harford et al. (2008). The hypothesis implies that the 
interaction of insider ownerhsip and profitability should reduce predictive 
power and its significance in the cross-sectional test. 
 
5.3 Data and Research Methods 
All monthly stock returns and firm’s S&P industry classifications are obtained 
from CRSP, with annual accounting data from the Compustat Annual File to 
build the dataset for research.  Accounting information is lagged six months 
from the fiscal year-end month. The combined dataset includes all firms traded 
on the NYSE, Amex, and NASDAQ, and excludes securities other than ordinary 
common shares. Delisting returns are taken from CRSP where available. If a 
delisting return is missing, but it is recognised as a performance-related delisting 
event in CRSP (CRSP Delisting code 400, 550-585), a return of -30% is used. 
Any observation containing missing market values of equity, missing book-to-
market ratio, missing profitability (gross profitability or operating profitability), 
the missing book value of total assets in the current month’s return, or missing 
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returns from the prior one-year period is removed from the dataset. Financial 
firms (SIC code 6000-6999) are also excluded. The final dataset contains firm-
month observations that meet the above criteria from June 1980 to December 
2015, including 1,501,724 firm-month observations across 426 months. 
Profitability breakpoints for constructing ten decile portfolios are based on all 
NYSE samples of ordinary shares with valid stock prices, MEs, and profitability 
measures. Following the convention of asset pricing studies, this chapter uses 
firm’s size, book-to-market equity ratio and past 12-month returns as common 
pricing factors that determining stock returns, and the calculation is consistent 
with Chapter 4.3. 
 
5.3.1 Firm’s profitability 
Gross Profitability (𝑮𝑷𝑻𝑨): Gross profitability is defined in line with Novy-
Marx (2013) as total revenue (Compustat Annual item: 𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑇) minus cost of 
goods sold (Compustat Annual item: 𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆 ), then divided by total assets 
(Compustat Annual item: 𝐴𝑇). The measure is assuming a total of six months 
later of the firm’s fiscal year-end month to ensure accounting information is 
fully known to the market. That means, if a firm’s fiscal year ends in December, 
the profitability shall be known in June. This setting also means that if a firm’s 
fiscal year ends in January-June and the portfolio is constructed using end-of-
June information, the profitability shall be used for constructing portfolios in 
the next year. 
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Operating Profitability (𝑶𝑷𝑻𝑨): Operating profitability is defined by Ball et 
al. (2015), as total revenue (Compustat Annual item: 𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑇) minus cost of 
goods sold (Compustat Annual item: 𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆 ) and sales, general, and 
administrative expenses (Compustat Annual item: 𝑋𝑆𝐺𝐴), plus research and 
development expenses (Compustat Annual item: 𝑋𝑅𝐷 ) if available, then 
divided by total assets (Compustat Annual item: 𝐴𝑇). Similar to the measure of 
GPTA, the estimation requires six months lagged after firm’s fiscal year-end 
month.  
5.3.2 Insider Ownership Measures 
Depending on the type that how managers are monitored, Cremers & Nair 
(2005) categorise corporate governance mechanism into internal governance 
and external governance. Internal governance reflects how shareholders are 
active in firm’s decision and external governance reflects how market is related 
to firm’s corporate governance mechanism. Nikolov and Whited (2014) 
discussed the ownership categorised as managerial ownership and external 
ownership such as institutions as blockholders. They find both channels have 
its independent power in the corporate governance mechanism. This 
categorisation further polishes relevant research methods by considering 
sophisticated governance mechanism in empirical analyses and is used in this 
chapter. The term “internal insider” reflects managerial ownership. Jensen 
(1986) argues that managers have information that shareholders are difficult to 
obtain, as insiders managers have incentive in fulfilling their own benefits. The 
term “external insider” reflects institution who holds a portion of firm and 
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therefore, are able to influence the decision of firm strategies (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997). Because institutions, especially those who presents the board of 
direct as blockholders, are able to obtain firm’s information from its role of 
insider, thus the impact of institutional ownership are named as external 
insiders. 
This chapter recognises the categorification is intuitive and has some limitations. 
First, even if the relation between insider ownership and profitability premium 
exits, managerial ownership and institutional ownership may contribute to the 
relation independently, in which the categorification “insider ownership” may 
not suitable to distinguish the effect separately. Second, if the relation reflects 
how corporate governance alters firm’s profitability, then other measures of 
corporate governance rather than insider ownership should, following the 
similar argument, affect profitability premium as well. To alleviate these 
concerns, this chapter discusses the empirical results carefully and lists all 
possible explanations for discussion and uses additional governance proxies in 
the section 5.6 as further investigation.  
 
5.3.2.1 Internal insider ownership 
CEO Ownership (𝑪𝑬𝑶): Lilienfeld-Toal and Ruenzi (2014) find that high 
CEO ownership stocks generally outperform low CEO ownership stocks, and 
historical CEO ownership positively determines firm profitability as measured 
by ROE. In the online appendix, the authors provided a subsample using 
Compustat ExecuComp data that replicated their main findings and they 
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confirm that the sample has similar characteristics in terms of the CEO 
ownership anomaly. 
In this study, CEO ownership is defined by the executive who has the highest 
stock ownership at the end of the fiscal year. Stock ownership is defined as the 
shares held by executives (ExecuComp item 𝑆𝐻𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑁) minus restricted stocks 
(ExecuComp item 𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐶𝐾_𝑈𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇𝐸𝐷 ) and options (ExecuComp item 
𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁_𝑁𝑈𝑀) over the total common shares outstanding (Compustat Annual 
item 𝐶𝑆𝐻𝑂 ). ExecuComp backfills ownership information by including 
ownership information one year prior to the firm being listed in S&P 1500, for 
the given fiscal year (ExecuComp item 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅) This is converted into calendar 
years and two-year lagged CEO ownership is then used to value sort portfolios. 
Thus, if a firm reports CEO ownership in 2004, this value is then used to sort 
stocks in 2006. According to literatures, 𝐶𝐸𝑂 should be positively related to the 
profitability premium.  
Insider Ownership (𝑰𝑵𝑺𝑰𝑫𝑬𝑹):  To test corporate governance’s explanatory 
power on the profitability anomaly, insider ownership is measured per Harford 
et al. (2008) and Kim and Lu (2011). Based on the percentage of common shares 
held by top five executive officers over the total common shares outstanding at 
the fiscal year end date (Compustat Execucomp item 𝑆ℎ𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑛_𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑙_𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑠_𝑝𝑐𝑡). 
The ranking of officers in a firm is ordered by the sum of salary and bonuses 
received in the fiscal year (Compustat Execucomp item 𝐸𝑋𝐸𝐶𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝐴𝑁𝑁). If 
𝐸𝑋𝐸𝐶𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝐴𝑁𝑁 is missing and there are fewer than five executives recorded 
in the firm for a given fiscal year, their stocks are summerized.  As 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 
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uses information from annual reports, a six-month lag from the fiscal-year end 
month to the month that information is available to the public is assumed. 
According to the literature, 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟  should be positively related to the 
profitability premium as 𝐶𝐸𝑂. 
5.3.3 External insider ownership  
Institutional Ownership (𝑰𝑶): This is calculated as the total number of shares 
(in millions) held by institutions as reported on the Thomson Reuters 13-F file 
database, divided by the total number of shares outstanding on the CRSP 
monthly file (CRSP code 𝑆𝐻𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑇 times 1,000 in order to accommodate the 
unit of Thomson Database variable).  Institutional holding data is from the 
actual 13F Forms filed to the SEC on a quarterly basis (calendar quarter ends) 
by institutional money managers, as per Asquith et al. (2005). 
Stocks recorded in Thomson 13-F database are originally assigned with CUSIP-
8, which this study converts to PERMNO using CRSP Tools. For each 
PERMNO, the total number of shares held by institutions is the sum of shares 
owned by all institutions at each quarter-end month. CRSP cumulative 
adjustment factors (CRSP code 𝐶𝐹𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐻𝑅) are used to adjust the total number 
of shares outstanding at the month-end (Thomson code 𝐹𝐷𝐴𝑇𝐸) to compensate 
for corporate events such as stock splits. 𝐼𝑂 is measured every quarter-end date, 
and the most recent 𝐼𝑂 value is matched to each firm-month observation. For 
observations with a short interest report month t, the changing lengths of 
calendar months mean that they may be matched with an IO of month t, month 
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t − 1, or month t − 2. This research assumes 𝐼𝑂 should be positively related with 
profitability premium. 
Institutional Ownership Concentration (𝑰𝑶 − 𝑯𝑯𝑰): Grinstein and Michaely 
(2005) find that, alongside institutional holding, institutional ownership 
concentration is another governance proxy. When most institutional ownership 
is held by fewer institutions, firms are more likely to adopt anti-takeover 
decisions, reducing dividend payouts. Thus, institutional ownership 
concentration is negatively related to a firm’s agency cost and implies a weak 
governance structure. 
In line with this, the institutional concentration ratio used in this research is 
defined by the Herfindahl index of the top five institutions from Thomson 
Reuters 13-F files.  
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = ∑ (
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠
)5𝑖=1
2
(5.4) 
 
 
5.3.4 Summary Statistics 
Table 14 reports the average of cross-sectional correlations of all mentioned 
variables. All insider ownership measures have the same sign of correlation as 
displayed in the portfolio sorts. Both 𝐺𝑃𝑇𝐴 and 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐴 are positively correlated 
with 𝐶𝐸𝑂, while 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 and 𝐼𝑂 and are negatively correlated with 𝐼𝑂 − 𝐻𝐻𝐼. 
The correlation between 𝐶𝐸𝑂 and 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 is 0.833, which is most likely due to 
the fact that the CEO is virtually always the largest insider owner among a 
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firm’s top executives. The correlation between 𝐺𝑃𝑇𝐴  and 𝐺𝑃𝑇𝐴  is 0.564, 
suggesting that alongside their commonality of representing a firm’s 
profitability, they also carry additional information that distinguishes them.
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Table 16 Correlation matrix of firm’s profitability, corporate governance and firm characteristics 
The matrix below gives the time series averaged summary statistics and Spearman’s rank correlation between the main variables. GPTA is the gross profitability of total 
assets following Novy-Marx (2013). OPTA is the operating profitability of total assets following Ball et al. (2015). ME is the market capitalisation in million US dollars. 
BE/ME is the book-to-market ratio following Davis and the Fama and French (2000) estimation. CEO is the percentage of shares held by the top executive over total 
common shares outstanding. INSIDER is the insider ownership percentage as the sum of common shares owned by the top 5 executive managers over total common shares 
outstanding.  IO is the institutional ownership, which is the number of total shares held by institutions over total common shares outstanding. IO-HHI is the top 5 institutional 
ownership concentrations following the Herfindahl index. The dataset is composed based on all firm-month observations from June 1980 to December 2015, a total month 
of 426. 
  GPTA OPTA ME BEME MOM12 CEO INSIDER IO IO-HHI 
Mean 0.411 0.113 2034.993 0.870 0.152 3.763 3.736 0.372 0.239 
P1 -0.046 -0.608 3.271 0.033 -0.755 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.020 
Median 0.369 0.136 197.620 0.604 0.049 0.593 0.307 0.359 0.156 
P99 1.291 0.483 37815.840 4.906 2.532 38.109 41.675 0.877 0.940 
SD 0.289 0.255 10011.370 1.460 0.678 8.387 8.722 0.365 0.225 
SKEW 1.129 -8.068 14.026 13.174 4.538 5.154 4.723 1.742 1.661 
  GPTA OPTA ME BEME MOM12 CEO INSIDER IO IO-HHI 
GPTA          
OPTA 0.564         
ME 0.020 0.140        
BEME -0.212 -0.339 -0.123       
MOM12 0.136 0.201 0.140 -0.115      
CEO 0.096 0.018 -0.037 -0.012 0.046     
Insider 0.105 0.010 -0.038 -0.009 0.041 0.833    
IO 0.040 0.093 -0.092 -0.094 -0.030 0.291 0.293   
IO-HHI -0.010 -0.206 -0.141 0.219 0.018 -0.138 -0.142 -0.328  
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5.4 Insider Ownership and the Profitability Anomaly 
 
5.4.1 Portfolio formation 
 
The question of whether there is a difference of insider ownership across 
portfolios formed by firms with different level profitability is first examined.  
To mimic the findings of Novy-Marx (2013) and Ball et al. (2015), monthly 
stock returns and firms’ S&P industry classifications are obtained from CRSP, 
and the annual accounting data obtained from the Compustat Annual File.  
Accounting information is lagged by six months from the fiscal year-end month. 
The CRSP-Compustat combined dataset includes all firms traded on the NYSE, 
Amex and NASDAQ, and excludes securities other than ordinary common 
shares (CRSP assign common shares with a code 10 or 11). Delisting returns 
are taken from CRSP where available. Following Shumway and Warther 
(1999), if a delisting return is missing and it is recognised as performance 
related delisting in CRSP (CRSP Delisting code 400, 550-585), a return of -30% 
is used. Any observation containing a missing market value of equity, missing 
book-to-market ratio, missing profitability (gross profitability or operating 
profitability), the missing book value of total assets current month’s return, or 
missing returns from the prior one-year period is removed from the dataset. 
Financial firms (SIC code 6000-6999) are also excluded.  
The final dataset contains firm-month observations that qualify according to the 
above criteria during the period July 1980 to December 2015. The stocks are 
sorted in to ten portfolios based on the deciles of the profitability proxy at the 
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beginning of July 1980 then rebalanced on the end of June the next year. 
Profitability breakpoints for constructing the decile portfolios are based on all 
NYSE samples of ordinary shares, with valid share prices, MEs, and 
profitability measures. Firm characteristics are reported as their time-averaged 
cross-sectional mean values in order to reveal the differences between portfolios 
at a given time.  
Both the equal and value weighted portfolio monthly returns are reported. 
Novy-Marx (2013) and Ball et al. (2015) discovered that anomalous returns 
from the profitability hedging portfolio are made worse by the use of the FF-3 
model, and thus the FF-3 adjusted return is also used. The excess risk-adjusted 
return, known as the Fama-French 3-factor alpha, 𝛼𝑖,𝑡, by regressing monthly 
stock excess return as equation (3.5). All variables apart from 𝑅𝑖,𝑡  are taken 
from Kenneth French’s website and estimated on a monthly basis.  
5.4.2 The gross profitability anomaly and operating profitability anomaly 
As this research uses a different sample period (1980.7 to 2015.12) than Novy-
Marx (2013), who used samples from 1963.7 to 2010, or Ball et al. (2015), 
whose research was based on a 1963.7 to 2013.12 sample database, it is 
naturally important to verify whether a profitability anomaly is still observable 
in the sample period before performing more detailed analysis. Two well-
covered pieces of research by Schwert (2003) and Mclean and Pontiff (2016) 
document that the predictive power of several anomalies or returns generated 
from anomaly-driving trading strategies has disappeared or weakened since 
they have been recognised and extensively examined by academia.  Therefore, 
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the association of a profitability anomaly to insider ownership may be driven by 
other unobserved factors that are not included in the sample period. 
The results displayed in Table 15 confirm the existence of two profitability 
anomalies in the period 1980 to 2015. In Panel A of Table 15, returns from the 
high-low portfolio are seen to be 0.429% per month equal-weighted and higher 
for the value-weighted return at 0.767% per month. Both figures are statistically 
insignificant. The value-weighted return appearing higher than the equal-
weighted return happens because small firms in the low or high gross 
profitability portfolios contribute to the return significantly, which implies a 
strong size effect affecting portfolio returns. Both high and low gross 
profitability portfolios record a lower return when value-weighted; in particular, 
the return from the low gross profitability firm drastically declines from 0.996% 
to 0.020% per month. 
 
When returns are adjusted by the Fama-French three-factor (FF-3) model, the 
average monthly FF-3 alphas for the high-low portfolio are 0.421% and 1.184%, 
equal or value weighted terms respectively. The value-weighted FF-3 alpha is 
higher than the excess value-weighted return for the high-low portfolio by about 
0.4% per month. This is in line with Novy-Marx’s (2013) finding that the gross 
profitability anomaly cannot be explained by the FF-3 model, but is in fact made 
worse. 
Panel B of Table 15 lists the portfolio returns of operating profitability sorted 
portfolios. Returns from the high-low portfolio are 0.265% (t=0.65) and 0.758% 
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(t=1.68) per month in excess of the one-month T-bill rate for equal and value 
weighted terms respectively. For the Fama-French 3-factor adjusted return, the 
monthly alphas for the portfolio are 0.4% and 1.358% per month, similar to the 
high-minus gross profitability portfolio, which indicates that the Fama-French 
3-factor model cannot explain the anomalous return. 
Thus, the two profitability anomalies exist when the returns are adjusted by the 
Fama-French 3-factor model. The raw excess return is marginally significant 
only when profitability is value-weighted. However, returns from the high 
profitability portfolio are generally significant and increase alongside 
profitability on average. Thus, some characteristics may also increase (or 
decrease) with the distribution of a portfolio’s average firm profitability; in this 
context, insider ownership could characterise profitability anomalies. 
  
 166 
 
Table 17 The profitability premium 
The final dataset contains non-financial firm-month observations qualified by select criteria from June 1980 to December 2015. Stocks are sorted into ten portfolios based 
on deciles of profitability proxies at the beginning of July 1980 (for CEO and Insider variables, July 1994), then rebalanced on the end of June the following year. Panel A 
reports ten gross profitability (GPTA) sorted portfolio returns, and Panel B reports operating profitability (OPTA) sorted portfolio returns. EW Excess Return refers to equal-
weight monthly average returns in excess of the one-month T-bill rate, and VW Excess Return refers to value-weight monthly average returns in excess of the one-month T-
bill rate. EW FF-3 Alpha refers to equal-weight monthly Fama-French 3-factor model alpha, and VW FF-3 Alpha refers to value-weight monthly Fama-French 3-factor 
model alpha. The t-statistics, with Newey-West adjusted standard error, are reported in parentheses.  
Panel A. GPTA Portfolio Statistics 
Portfolio   Low 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 High High-Low 
EW Excess Return 0.996 0.727 0.710 0.713 0.928 1.049 1.140 1.181 1.256 1.425 0.429 
  
(1.35) (1.50) (2.09) (2.00) (2.37) (2.24) (2.78) (2.89) (2.98) (3.23) (1.03) 
             
VW Excess Return 0.020 0.924 0.408 0.414 0.518 0.609 0.874 0.507 0.624 0.786 0.767 
  
(0.03) (2.53) (1.31) (1.36) (1.53) (1.97) (2.53) (1.25) (1.69) (2.52) (1.84) 
             
EW FF-3 Alpha 0.142 -0.426 -0.137 -0.267 -0.143 -0.116 0.114 0.202 0.327 0.563 0.421 
  
(0.33) (-2.10) (-0.73) (-1.66) (-0.84) (-1.01) (0.88) (1.64) (2.25) (3.69) (1.72) 
             
VW FF-3 Alpha -0.776 0.204 -0.424 -0.394 -0.347 -0.177 0.094 -0.154 0.177 0.408 1.184 
  
(-2.18) (1.03) (-2.34) (-2.77) (-2.38) (-1.41) (0.58) (-0.98) (1.26) (3.85) (3.19) 
(Continued) 
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(Continued) 
  
 
          
Panel B. OPTA Portfolio Statistics 
             
EW Excess Return 1.085 0.906 1.030 1.020 1.039 1.186 1.087 1.206 1.163 1.350 0.265 
  
(1.52) (1.95) (2.58) (2.69) (2.80) (3.27) (3.07) (3.31) (3.04) (2.88) (0.65) 
             
VW Excess Return -0.029 0.394 0.203 0.623 0.689 0.698 0.392 0.819 0.658 0.729 0.758 
  
(-0.04) (0.84) (0.50) (1.59) (1.96) (2.06) (1.28) (2.45) (2.14) (1.97) (1.68) 
             
EW FF-3 Alpha 0.091 -0.140 -0.036 -0.063 -0.048 0.183 0.072 0.249 0.270 0.531 0.440 
  
(0.27) (-0.80) (-0.25) (-0.46) (-0.34) (1.36) (0.64) (1.71) (2.29) (2.63) (1.19) 
             
VW FF-3 Alpha -0.916 -0.624 -0.721 -0.456 -0.146 -0.085 -0.347 0.106 0.012 0.444 1.358 
  
(-2.17) (-2.00) (-4.03) (-2.32) (-0.97) (-0.44) (-2.15) (0.75) (0.10) (3.64) (3.98) 
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5.4.3 Firm characteristics of profitability sorted portfolios 
Table 16 lays out the characteristics of the ten gross-profitability sorted 
portfolios. Panel A of Table 16 reports each portfolio’s average gross 
profitability, size, and book-to-market ratio. This shows that the lowest gross 
profitability portfolio (portfolio 1) has small firms, with a mean size of US$277 
million, while the highest gross profitability portfolio (portfolio 10) has large 
firms with an average size of US$1,473 million. In terms of book-to-market 
ratio, firms in the low gross profitability portfolio have a generally higher ratio 
than those in the high gross profitability portfolio, with averages of 0.794 and 
0.623 respectively. It is notable that the fundamental factors, particularly firm 
size, are not associated with gross profitability in linear terms. The lowest gross 
profitability portfolio has an exceptionally low average firm size, but the size 
jumps by over four times to the second lowest gross profitability portfolio, 
which has an average firm size of US$1,147 million.  The spread of average 
size and book-to-market ratio indicates that a long-short portfolio that retains 
portfolio 10 and short sells portfolio 1 will carry a significant larger risk 
premium, which is in line with one-way sort portfolio analysis in section 5.3.1. 
Panel B of Table 16 reports on each firm’s average internal and external insider 
ownership across all portfolios. Firms in the lowest profitability portfolio have 
low insider ownership and high institutional ownership concentrations, while 
firms in the highest profitability portfolio have high insider ownership and low 
institutional ownership concentrations. For the low profitability portfolio, the 
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average 𝐶𝐸𝑂 , 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 , 𝐼𝑂, and 𝐼𝑂 − 𝐻𝐻𝐼  are 3.837%, 3.020%, 20.9%, and 
36.9% respectively. For the highest profitability portfolio, those indicators are 
5.285%, 5.008%, 37.9%, and 24.9% on average, respectively. Since the low and 
high gross profitability firms also depicts a variation of insider ownership, the 
variation of insider ownership may help to explain the profitability premium. 
Panel C of Table 16 lists other firm characteristics that are frequently discussed 
in the related literature. The lowest profitability portfolio has higher levels of 
cash holding, higher R&D expenditure, and fewer total assets than the high 
profitability firms. In terms of leverage and capital expenditure, there seems to 
be no significant difference between low and high profitability portfolios.  
Table 17 reports on the characteristics of the ten 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐴 sorted portfolios in a 
similar manner to Table 16. The spread of average firm size and book-to-market 
ratio exists and is higher than the spread in Panel A of Table 16. The average 
firm size in portfolio 1 is $154 million, while in portfolio 10 it is $3,674 million. 
The average book-to-market ratio is 0.832 and 0.419 for portfolios 1 and 10, 
respectively. The variation of average 𝑀𝐸 as well as 𝐵𝐸𝑀𝐸 among low and 
high 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐴 decile portfolio indicates that a long-short portfolio that retains 
portfolio 10 and short sells portfolio 1 will carry a significant larger risk 
premium associated with size and value effect. 
Panel B of Table 16 lists firms’ common internal and external insider ownership 
across portfolios. Similar to the findings about gross-profitability decile 
portfolios, the average difference in insider ownership between high and low 
operating profitability portfolios is significant (4.375%, 4.283% and 19.3% for 
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C𝐸𝑂, 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟, and 𝐼𝑂 in a low operating profitability portfolio, and 4.845% 
4.546%, and 45.5% correspondingly in a high operating profitability portfolio). 
Also, the average difference made by institutional ownership concentration is 
positive (0.369 versus 0.249). These results suggest the co-existence of the 
variation of firm’s operating profitability and firm’s insider ownership, which 
could be used to further examine the operating profitability premium.  
For other firm characteristics that are reported in Panel C of Table 16, there is a 
spread of firm’s average leverage, R&D expenditure, and total assets among 
low and high operating profitability portfolios, but no distinction between firms’ 
average capital expenditure and cash holdings. 
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Table 18 Characteristics of ten portfolios sorted by gross profitability 
The final dataset contains non-financial firm-month observations qualified by select criteria from June 1980 to December 2015. Stocks are sorted into ten portfolios based 
on deciles of profitability proxies at the beginning of July 1980 (for CEO and Insider variables, July 1994), then rebalanced on the end of June the following year. Profitability 
breakpoints for constructing decile portfolios are based on an all-NYSE sample of ordinary shares, with valid stock prices, MEs and profitability measures. GPTA is the 
gross profitability of total assets following Novy-Marx (2013). ME is the market capitalisation in million US dollars. BE/ME is the book-to-market ratio following Davis 
and the Fama and French (2000) estimation. CEO is the percentage of shares held by the top executive over total common shares outstanding. INSIDER is the insider 
ownership percentage as the sum of common shares held by the top 5 executive managers over total common shares outstanding.  IO is the institutional ownership, which is 
the total shares held by institutions over total common shares outstanding. IO-HHI is the top 5 institutional ownership concentrations, following the Herfindahl index.  
Portfolio  
1 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
10 
 (Low Profitability)  (High Profitability) 
Panel A. Portfolio Characteristics 
        
            
GPTA 
 
0.050 0.121 0.151 0.184 0.227 0.274 0.327 0.392 0.489 0.774 
ME 
 
277 1147 1398 1577 1720 1631 1679 1902 1772 1473 
BE/ME 
 
0.794 0.997 0.983 0.986 0.879 0.885 0.523 0.767 0.706 0.623 
            
Panel B. Insider Ownership 
        
            
INSIDER 
 
3.837 3.231 2.742 3.169 3.270 3.263 2.868 3.367 3.797 5.285 
CEO 
 
3.020 2.995 2.479 2.437 2.785 3.095 2.519 3.264 3.586 5.008 
(Continued) 
 172 
 
(Continued) 
IO 
 
0.209 0.291 0.344 0.380 0.397 0.400 0.401 0.401 0.399 0.379 
IO-HHI 
 
0.369 0.332 0.288 0.254 0.242 0.243 0.236 0.237 0.234 0.249 
            
Panel C. Firm Characteristics 
         
            
Debt/Assets 0.163 0.248 0.282 0.300 0.282 0.259 0.234 0.208 0.184 0.144 
Capital Expenditures/Assets 0.087 0.077 0.083 0.083 0.081 0.072 0.069 0.061 0.058 0.063 
Cash/Assets 0.396 0.222 0.184 0.145 0.139 0.141 0.143 0.157 0.164 0.180 
R&D/Assets 0.228 0.105 0.187 0.155 0.111 0.075 0.071 0.073 0.091 0.067 
Log(Total Assets) 3.496 4.533 4.942 5.283 5.349 5.199 5.067 4.875 4.781 4.446 
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Table 19 Characteristics of ten portfolios sorted by operating profitability 
The final dataset contains non-financial firm-month observations qualified by select criteria from June 1980 to December 2015. Stocks are sorted into ten portfolios based 
on deciles of profitability proxies at the beginning of July 1980 (for CEO and Insider variables, July 1994), then rebalanced on the end of June the following year. Profitability 
breakpoints for constructing decile portfolios are based on an all-NYSE sample of ordinary shares, with valid stock prices, MEs and profitability measures. GPTA is the 
gross profitability of total assets following Novy-Marx (2013). ME is the market capitalisation in million US dollars. BE/ME is the book-to-market ratio following Davis 
and the Fama and French (2000) estimation. CEO is the percentage of shares held by the top executive over total common shares outstanding. Insider is the insider ownership 
percentage as the sum of common shares held by the top 5 executive managers over total common shares outstanding.  IO is the institutional ownership, which is the total 
shares held by institutions over total common shares outstanding. IO-HHI is the top 5 institutional ownership concentrations, following the Herfindahl index. 
Portfolio  
1 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
10 
 (Low 
Profitability) 
 (High Profitability) 
Panel A. Portfolio Characteristics 
        
            
OPTA 
 
-0.065 0.069 0.097 0.119 0.137 0.156 0.174 0.197 0.231 0.323 
ME 
 
154 694 831 967 1232 1659 2032 2100 2587 3674 
BE/ME 
 
0.832 1.134 1.058 0.964 0.835 0.767 0.673 0.530 0.534 0.419 
            
Panel B. Insider Ownership 
        
            
INSIDER 
 
4.375 4.640 3.807 3.725 3.601 3.646 3.324 3.438 4.258 4.845 
(Continued) 
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(Continued) 
CEO 
 
4.283 3.891 3.402 3.294 3.207 3.057 3.112 3.633 3.749 4.546 
IO 
 
0.193 0.311 0.360 0.395 0.410 0.430 0.445 0.448 0.454 0.455 
IO-HHI 
 
0.420 0.324 0.284 0.245 0.230 0.212 0.196 0.185 0.176 0.173 
            
Panel C. Firm Characteristics 
         
            
Debt/Assets 0.186 0.251 0.270 0.271 0.253 0.239 0.215 0.187 0.155 0.108 
Capital Expenditures/Assets 0.066 0.055 0.058 0.059 0.064 0.067 0.071 0.076 0.079 0.083 
Cash/Assets 0.274 0.148 0.121 0.114 0.119 0.124 0.130 0.145 0.175 0.239 
R&D/Assets 0.151 0.079 0.049 0.057 0.045 0.064 0.051 0.057 0.074 0.110 
Log(Total Assets) 3.291 4.582 4.981 5.112 5.225 5.275 5.329 5.267 5.145 4.900 
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5.4.4 Profitability premiums and internal insiders 
To test the proposed hypotheses, following the methodology introduced by 
Fama and French (2008), all qualified stocks that have met the criteria in section 
5.3.2 are now independently sorted by firm’s profitability. They are measured 
at the end of June into five quintile groups, and by its June-end internal insider 
holding level into five quintile groups. The intersection of group breakpoints 
thus generates 25 portfolios including firms sorted with similar average 
profitability as well as internal insider’s holding level. These portfolios are 
constructed at the beginning of July and held for one year, in line with one-way 
sort portfolio analysis.  
To remain within the scope of this thesis, only value-weighted portfolio Fama-
French 3-factor alpha is reported to account for the fact that a portfolio’s excess 
return is driven by other common risk factors documented in previous literature. 
However, the complete analysis covers both equal-weighted and value-
weighted portfolio average excess return and FF-3 alpha. Returns for double 
sort portfolios selected by firm’s gross profitability (𝐺𝑃𝑇𝐴) and CEO ownership 
( 𝐶𝐸𝑂 ) are presented in the Panel A of Table 18. The gross profitability 
premium, which is measured as the long-short portfolio return and listed in the 
column “GPTA High-Low”, is positive, suggesting the pervasive existence of 
gross profitability among the market. This is in line with Novy-Marx (2013), 
who finds the market-wide phenomenon that high profitability firms outperform 
low profitability firms in general. The profitability premium is statistically 
significant in four out of five CEO ownership quintiles. The monthly value-
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weighted Fama-French 3-factor alpha for gross profitability premium in the 
lowest 𝐶𝐸𝑂 quintile is 0.86%, and it is 1.06% in the middle 𝐶𝐸𝑂 quintile 1.35% 
in the highest 𝐶𝐸𝑂 quintile, giving evidence that the profitability anomaly is 
more pronounced in high CEO ownership firms, though the pattern is not perfect 
in linear. The insider ownership premium, measured as the long-short 𝐶𝐸𝑂 
portfolio in each 𝐺𝑃𝑇𝐴 quintile, is negative in four out of five 𝐺𝑃𝑇𝐴 quintiles, 
and is only significant in low 𝐺𝑃𝑇𝐴 quintile. This indicates that the premium 
from insider ownership sorted by 𝐶𝐸𝑂 , documented by Lilienfeld-Toal and 
Ruenzi (2014), is driven by the correlation between CEO ownership variable 
with firm’s fundamental factors that also have pricing power to future stock 
returns. The equal-weighted portfolio excess return gives consensus in finding 
that the positive CEO ownership exists, but only in high 𝐺𝑃𝑇𝐴 quintiles. 
A broader definition of internal insider ownership does not change the finding 
that the gross profitability premium is higher in high internal insider ownership 
firms. Independent sorting of stocks by gross profitability and top executives’ 
ownership ( 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑅 ) also supports our finding, confirming the positive 
relationship between profitability and insider ownership. The results in Panel B 
of Table 18 depict that the bottom, medium and top 20% firms characterised by 
𝐼𝑁𝑆𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑅 , have an average monthly 𝐺𝑃𝑇𝐴  premium at 0.86%, 0.91% and 
1.26% per month value weighted FF-3 alpha. The gross profitability premium 
has similar pattern as the results from 𝐺𝑃𝑇𝐴-𝐶𝐸𝑂 double sorts, especially the 
premium in top and bottom insider ownership quintile. This is due to the 
similarity of firms’ insider ownership structure. Firms with high CEO 
ownership usually have high top managers’ ownership as the CEO is one of the 
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top managers in a firm. This is confirmed by the high spearman’s ranking 
correlation between the two variables, which is 0.833% in Table 13.  
The positive profitability-insider relationship also emerges in terms of operating 
profitability-CEO ownership and operating profitability-top executive’s 
ownership. In Panel C of Table 18, the average returns from profitability high-
low portfolios from the bottom 20%, mid 20%, and top 20% CEO ownership 
quintile are with value-weighted returns of -0.07%, 1.77%, and 1.47% FF-3 
alpha. The profitability premium is strikingly low for low 𝐶𝐸𝑂  ownership, 
resulting in a gap of return over 1% in monthly returns. The reduction of 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐴 
premium is due to the fluctuation of low 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐴 firms, in which some firms 
outperform the others, despite of their low operating profitability. Panel D of 
Table 18 reports on an independent portfolios sort by operating profitability and 
top executives’ ownership (𝐼𝑁𝑆𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑅 ), where similar findings to the gross 
profitability and top executives’ ownership are exhibited. The portfolios’ 
monthly average value-weighted profitability premiums from low to high 
𝐼𝑁𝑆𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑅  quintiles are 0.86%, 0.92%, and 1.20%. These results indicate a 
positive relationship between the operating profitability anomaly and insider 
ownership. 
 
 
5.4.5 Profitability premium and external insiders 
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Returns from an independent sort of firms by gross profitability and outsider 
internal ownership, measured as institutional ownership ( 𝐼𝑂 ) show no 
supporting evidence for the assumed positive relationship to stock returns. The 
results in the Panel A of Table 19 show that the gross profitability premium 
generally declines with the increase of institutional ownership. The bottom, 
mid, and top 20% of 𝐼𝑂 quintiles record monthly value-weighted profitability 
premiums at 1.15%, 0.73%, and 0.60% respectively. It is seemingly a 
contradiction of the proposed hypothesis that high insider ownership should be 
rewarded with higher returns than low insider ownership firms. Decomposing 
the 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐴  premium in the three 𝐼𝑂  quintiles, the long-side portfolios are 
performed indifferently, yielding at 0.21%-0.28% per month. While the short-
side portfolio is different: the monthly return is -0.87%, -0.52% and -0.39%, 
positively related to its institutional ownership. This shows that in low operating 
profitability firms, investors suffer less in higher insider ownership than low 
insider ownership firms.  
Where the insider proxy is replaced by the concentration of institutional holders 
(𝐼𝑂 − 𝐻𝐻𝐼), the portfolio analysis shows that the gross profitability premium is 
negatively associated with ownership concentration. Given the results in the 
Panel B of Table 19, the bottom, mid, and top 20% 𝐼𝑂 − 𝐻𝐻𝐼 quintiles have 
monthly returns of 0.76%, 0.53%, and 0.51% value-weighted returns. Although 
portfolio returns generally decline as ownership concentration increases, low 
gross profitability firms with high ownership concentrations have substantially 
lower average returns than any other firms, when profitability is controlled for. 
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Thus, the return premium is concentrated on firms with high ownership 
concentration but low gross profitability.   
When operating profitability replaces gross profitability, the average returns 
from profitability- 𝐼𝑂  sorted stocks show a positive profitability-insider 
ownership relationship and those results are disclosed in Panel C of Table 19. 
The High-Low operating profitability portfolio has monthly value-weighted 
returns at 0.26%, 0.76%, and 0.64%. This increase in profitability premium is 
due to the relatively low portfolio returns from high institutional ownership 
firms. Replacing external insiders with institutional ownership concentration 
(𝐼𝑂 − 𝐻𝐻𝐼 ), as presented in the Panel D of Table 18. The increase of the 
operating profitability premium across low to high ownership concentration, is 
not driven by the same mechanism of 𝐺𝑃𝑇𝐴- 𝐼𝑂 − 𝐻𝐻𝐼 group, as the average 
portfolio returns in low 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐴 group seems negatively related to the increase of 
ownership concentration, leading to a positive 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐴-𝐼𝑂 − 𝐻𝐻𝐼 pattern. This 
should be carefully interpreted as the ownership information not only reflects 
the agency behaviour but also signalling for the stock liquidity related to 
arbitrage activities, as discussed in Edelen et al. (2016) investigation. 
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Table 20 Profitability premium and internal insider ownerships 
From July 1980 to December 2015, stocks independently sorted by firm’s profitability (measured as GPTA in Panel A and B; OPTA in Panel C and D) and the proxy of 
internal shareholders (measured as CEO in Panel A and Panel C; Insider in Panel B and Panel D) then held for one year. This generates 25 portfolios, divided at every 20% 
of the profitability spectrum from low to high and every 20% of the insider ownership spectrum in a similar manner. High-Low refers to a portfolio holding the top 20% 
most profitable stocks (High) and shorting the bottom 20% (Low) within the same insider ownership quintile or refers to holding high insider ownership stocks and shorting 
low insider ownership firms within the same profitability quintile.  The performance of the portfolio is measured as value-weighted Fama-French 3-factor alpha at 
percentage, and Newey-West (1987) adjusted standard error. 
Panel A.  GPTA-CEO Ownership Group 
Monthly Value Weighted Returns (%) 
CEO Low GPTA 2 3 4 High GPTA GPTA High-Low 
Low CEO -0.28 0.07 0.17 0.21 0.58 0.86 
 (-1.77) (0.49) (1.01) (0.14) (0.92) (3.12) 
2 -0.35 0.01 0.13 0.12 0.37 0.72 
 (-3.1) (0.33) (0.73) (0.18) (0.14) (2.32) 
3 -0.77 -0.49 0.07 -0.02 0.29 1.06 
 (-2.93) (-0.51) (0.52) (-1.31) (1.08) (2.85) 
4 -0.36 -0.10 -0.08 0.30 -0.04 0.32 
 (-0.87) (-1.96) (0.07) (0.72) (-0.40) (0.66) 
High CEO -0.8 -0.18 -0.09 0.43 0.54 1.35 
 (-3.23) (-1.63) (-1.47) (0.52) (0.62) (3.50) 
CEO High-Low -0.51 -0.24 -0.25 0.22 -0.03  
 (-1.72) (-0.84) (-1.04) (0.68) (-0.10)  
(Continued) 
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(Continued) 
Panel B. GPTA-INSIDER Ownership Group 
Monthly Value Weighted Returns (%) 
INSIDER Low GPTA 2 3 4 High GPTA GPTA High-Low 
Low INSIDER -0.41 -0.01 0.22 0.16 0.45 0.86 
 (-2.29) (-0.08) (1.19) (1.24) (2.89) (3.41) 
2 -0.51 0.54 0.15 0.08 0.43 0.94 
 (-1.75) (0.93) (0.25) (0.15) (2.27) (3.37) 
3 -0.63 0.12 -0.31 0.31 0.28 0.91 
 (-2.50) (0.43) (-1.29) (1.50) (1.55) (3.04) 
4 -0.16 -0.16 0.23 0.25 0.05 0.21 
 (-0.68) (-0.80) (1.02) (0.89) (0.21) (0.70) 
High INSIDER -0.74 0.15 -0.16 0.52 0.52 1.26 
 (-1.70) (0.52) (-0.66) (1.82) (2.01) (2.73) 
INSIDER High-Low -0.32 0.16 -0.38 0.36 0.07  
 (-0.84) (0.60) (-1.47) (1.26) (0.22)  
 
 
(Continued) 
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(Continued) 
Panel C. OPTA-CEO Ownership Group 
Monthly Value Weighted Returns (%) 
CEO Low OPTA 2 3 4 High OPTA OPTA High-Low 
Low CEO 0.36 -0.28 0.26 0.12 0.29 -0.07 
 (0.51) (-1.28) (1.42) (0.83) (2.58) (-0.10) 
2 -2.07 -0.07 -0.25 0.17 0.25 2.33 
 (-2.71) (-0.29) (-1.11) (1.15) (1.21) (3.13) 
3 -1.46 -0.49 -0.29 -0.23 0.31 1.77 
 (-2.21) (-1.57) (-1.25) (-1.07) (1.56) (2.73) 
4 0.18 -0.35 -0.21 0.01 0.01 -0.16 
 (0.27) (-0.81) (-0.63) (0.06) (0.05) (-0.26) 
High CEO -0.89 -0.22 0.05 -0.13 0.58 1.47 
 (-1.36) (-0.74) (0.16) (-0.65) (2.14) (2.33) 
CEO High-Low -1.25 0.06 -0.21 -0.24 0.29  
 (-1.46) (0.18) (-0.68) (-1.22) (0.95)  
 
 
      
(Continued) 
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(Continued) 
Panel D. OPTA- INSIDER Ownership Group 
Monthly Value Weighted Returns (%) 
INSIDER Low OPTA 2 3 4 High OPTA OPTA High-Low 
Low INSIDER -0.53 0.01 0.06 0.24 0.30 0.83 
 (-2.61) (0.07) (0.50) (1.84) (2.18) (3.39) 
2 -0.29 -0.24 0.49 0.40 0.37 0.66 
 (-0.76) (-0.46) (1.26) (1.59) (1.52) (1.49) 
3 -0.49 -0.34 -0.31 0.08 0.44 0.92 
 (-1.64) (-1.22) (-1.51) (0.34) (1.85) (3.44) 
4 -0.36 0.17 0.03 -0.10 0.34 0.56 
 (-1.31) (0.91) (0.15) (-0.46) (1.28) (1.72) 
High INSIDER -0.51 0.05 -0.14 0.05 0.69 1.20 
 (-1.36) (0.20) (-0.46) (0.21) (2.51) (2.72) 
INSIDER High-Low 0.02 0.04 -0.20 -0.19 0.39   
 (0.35) (0.11) (-1.48) (-1.53) (0.21)  
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Table 21 Profitability premium across external insider ownerships 
From July 1980 to December 2015, stocks independently sorted by firm’s profitability (measured as GPTA in Panel A and B; OPTA in Panel C and D) and the proxy of 
internal shareholders (measured as CEO in Panel A and Panel C; Insider in Panel B and Panel D) then held for one year. This generates 25 portfolios, divided at every 20% 
of the profitability spectrum from low to high and every 20% of the insider ownership spectrum in a similar manner. High-Low refers to a portfolio holding the top 20% 
most profitable stocks (High) and shorting the bottom 20% (Low) within the same insider ownership quintile or refers to holding high insider ownership stocks and shorting 
low insider ownership firms within the same profitability quintile.  The performance of the portfolio is measured as value-weighted Fama-French 3-factor alpha at 
percentage, and Newey-West (1987) adjusted standard error. 
Panel A. GPTA-Institutional Ownership Group 
Monthly Value Weighted Returns (%) 
IO Low GPTA 2 3 4 High GPTA GPTA High-Low 
Low IO -0.87 0.91 -0.41 -0.27 0.28 1.15 
 (-2.49) (0.63) (-1.80) (-0.87) (1.07) (3.73) 
2 -1.16 -0.58 -0.36 0.19 0.39 1.55 
 (-3.58) (-2.82) (-1.53) (0.76) (1.95) (4.67) 
3 -0.52 -0.22 -0.09 -0.05 0.22 0.73 
 (-2.14) (-1.23) (-0.52) (-0.35) (1.33) (2.54) 
4 -0.11 -0.19 -0.13 -0.00 0.22 0.33 
 (-0.62) (-1.09) (-0.83) (-0.03) (2.06) (1.53) 
High IO -0.39 -0.19 -0.21 -0.10 0.21 0.60 
 (-2.08) (-1.24) (-1.6) (-0.84) (1.84) (3.16) 
IO High-Low 0.48 -1.10 0.20 0.17 -0.06  
 (1.33) (-0.76) (0.83) (0.54) (-0.23)  
 
(Continued) 
 185 
 
(Continued) 
Panel B. GPTA-Institutional Ownership Concentration Group 
Monthly Value Weighted Returns (%) 
IO-HHI Low GPTA 2 3 4 High GPTA GPTA High-Low 
Low IO-HHI 0.00 0.11 0.34 0.57 0.76 0.76 
 (0.02) (1.31) (1.81) (3.38) (3.25) (3.24) 
2 0.16 -0.07 0.04 0.27 0.54 0.39 
 (1.27) (-0.54) (0.39) (2.41) (2.65) (2.15) 
3 -0.06 -0.54 0.14 0.25 0.46 0.53 
 (-0.55) (-3.55) (1.06) (1.96) (2.67) (2.50) 
4 -0.24 -0.28 -0.16 0.10 0.39 0.63 
 (-1.77) (-1.37) (-1.09) (0.65) (1.95) (3.18) 
High IO-HHI -0.51 -0.62 0.13 -0.07 -0.02 0.51 
 (-2.53) (-3.17) (0.44) (-0.38) (-0.09) (2.46) 
IO-HHI High-Low -0.51 -0.73 -0.21 -0.63 -0.74  
 (-2.54) (-3.74) (-0.70) (-3.18) (-3.26)  
 
 
(Continued) 
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(Continued) 
Panel C. OPTA-Institutional Ownership Group 
Monthly Value Weighted Returns (%) 
IO Low OPTA 2 3 4 High OPTA OPTA High-Low 
Low IO -0.24 -0.02 0.24 -0.05 0.02 0.26 
 (-0.28) (-0.05) (0.75) (-0.16) (0.06) (0.31) 
2 -1.00 -0.76 -0.43 0.32 0.44 1.44 
 (-3.37) (-3.5) (-1.98) (1.60) (2.12) (4.37) 
3 -0.76 -0.38 0.22 0.25 0.01 0.76 
 (-3.10) (-1.73) (1.29) (1.70) (0.03) (2.88) 
4 -0.84 -0.16 -0.10 0.05 0.09 0.93 
 (-3.02) (-0.98) (-0.6) (0.37) (0.68) (3.28) 
High IO -0.45 -0.24 -0.12 -0.07 0.19 0.64 
 (-2.22) (-1.41) (-1.03) (-0.59) (1.74) (3.60) 
IO High-Low -0.21 -0.22 -0.36 -0.02 0.17  
 (-0.24) (-0.72) (-1.19) (-0.09) (0.51)  
 
 
 
 
(Continued) 
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(Continued) 
Monthly Value Weighted Returns (%) 
IO-HHI Low OPTA 2 3 4 High OPTA OPTA High-Low 
Low IO-HHI -0.09 0.10 0.31 0.42 0.59 0.65 
 (-0.39) (0.71) (1.71) (1.75) (2.49) (1.88) 
2 -0.03 0.11 -0.11 0.19 0.43 0.45 
 (-0.13) (0.89) (-1.1) (0.81) (2.41) (1.45) 
3 -0.50 -0.13 -0.20 0.27 0.34 0.84 
 (-1.83) (-1.06) (-1.55) (1.28) (1.58) (2.11) 
4 -0.76 -0.14 -0.09 0.09 0.37 1.13 
 (-1.95) (-0.98) (-0.56) (0.54) (1.34) (3.22) 
High IO-HHI -1.21 -0.08 0.01 -0.18 -0.06 1.26 
 (-3.19) (-0.46) (0.05) (-0.95) (-0.30) (3.19) 
IO-HHI High-Low -1.10 -0.18 -0.30 -0.24 -0.65   
 (-2.04) (-0.15) (-0.61) (-1.07) (-2.47) 
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5.5 Cross-sectional regression on profitability and insider ownership 
5.5.1 Regression analysis 
As there is a variation of insider ownership between low and high profitability 
portfolios, a test of whether such a variation can explain profitability anomalies 
was undertaken by conducting cross-sectional regressions on each stock’s 
excess monthly returns with profitability and insider ownerships.  
 
A regression without control variables (𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐸, 𝑙𝑛𝐵𝑀 and 𝑀𝑂𝑀12) is estimated 
following the cross-sectional regression for function 5.3. A regression with 
control variables is estimated following the same regression for function 5.4. 
For each function, the monthly stock return of firm 𝑖( 𝑅𝑖) in excess of the one-
month Treasury Bill rate ( 𝑅𝑓 ) is regressed by 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 , a variable 
representing the firm’s profitability lagged for one month. Then by 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟, a 
variable representing the firm’s corporate governance proxy, and by the two 
variables together, and by the two variables and their interaction variables, 
lagged for one month. 
 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡 = 𝜆0 + 𝜆1𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝜆2𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 +
𝝀𝟑
,𝑿𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (5.5) 
Where  
𝑿𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 = [𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1     𝑙𝑛𝐵𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1     𝑀𝑂𝑀12𝑖,𝑡−1]  (5.6) 
 
5.5.2 Profitability and insider ownership interaction effects  
If the pricing power of profitability and insider ownership in the cross-sectional 
student return is positively related, there may be an interactive effect that causes 
firms with high (low) profitability and high (low) insider ownership to have 
higher returns than other firms.  
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To verify this, Table 20 to Table 23 test whether insider ownership is associated 
with a gross profitability anomaly. If such an interaction effect exists, the 
interaction variable, represented by the coefficient of 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 × 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 
(noted as 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 below), should be distinct from zero. 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡+1 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡+1 = 𝜆0 + 𝜆1𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝜆2𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 +
𝜆3𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝝀𝟒
,𝑿𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1 (5.7) 
Where  
𝑿𝒊,𝒕 = [𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐸𝑖,𝑡     𝑙𝑛𝐵𝑀𝑖,𝑡     𝑀𝑂𝑀12𝑖,𝑡]  (5.8) 
There is no observable interaction effect between gross profitability and internal 
insiders, though CEO ownership is positively related to stock return. A unit 
change in CEO ownership results in an approximate 0.01% increase in expected 
monthly return. Though the economic change is marginal, it is statistically 
significant at the 10% level. The pricing power of CEO ownership is 
presumably due to its correlation with other fundamental firm characteristics 
that can predict stock returns. When control variables are added, the significance 
of CEO ownership drops. The gross profitability is also significantly positively 
related to expected returns at the 5% level. Adding control variables does not 
change the significance of 𝐺𝑃𝑇𝐴, suggesting that GPTA carries pricing power 
for future stock return in addition to size, value, and momentum effects. 
However, the coefficient of interaction variable is positive but insignificant, 
which does not provide persuasive evidence for the hypothesis being tested or 
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support the intuitive findings in earlier sections. For Insider ownership, the 
coefficient of interaction effect is larger than that of CEO ownership, but it 
remains insignificant. The coefficient of 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑅 remains significant across 
all regressions in Table 21, suggesting that the pricing power of insider 
ownership is not due to missing fundamental risk factors in the model, nor 
spurious correlations with profitability.  
In terms of external insider ownership, the interaction effect on gross 
profitability appears stronger. Table 22 reports the results of a regression of 
gross profitability and 𝐼𝑂 . The coefficient of 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  is significant but 
takes a negative sign: the coefficient is -1.573% with a t-statistic of -2.92. This 
suggests that an increase of the gross profitability anomaly is related to lower 
institutional ownership. Both 𝐺𝑃𝑇𝐴 and 𝐼𝑂 are, as expected, positively priced 
with expected stock returns and are significant at the 10% level. Thus the 
negative interaction may result from other behaviour of institutions, such as the 
preference for low past profitability stocks to exploit, the so-called “lottery” 
stocks, or the preference for high liquidity stocks, which are usually large firms. 
Such preferences for specific, rather than general stocks, may hedge the 
portfolios of high level corporate governance firms. Table 23 reports on the 
interaction of gross profitability with 𝐼𝑂 − 𝐻𝐻𝐼 , the concentration of 
institutions. The interaction of ownership concentration is negative and 
significant, with a coefficient of 0.832% and t-statistic of 1.76. All interaction 
effects are subsumed when 𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐸 , 𝑙𝑛𝐵𝑀  and 𝑀𝑂𝑀12  are added to the 
regression. However, this suggests that the variation of profitability premium 
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among low and high insider ownership is related to those fundamental firm 
specifics.  
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Table 22 Fama-MacBeth regressions with interaction term between gross profitability and CEO ownership 
For each month from January 1980 to December 2015, Fama-MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions of monthly excess returns (CRSP monthly return over the one-
month T-bill rate) are estimated for a set of independent variables: The proxy of firm’s profitability (GPTA), the proxy of firms’ internal insider (CEO), the interaction of 
firm’s profitability to high/low in internal insider ownership (Interaction), and firm’s size (lnME), book-to-market equity (lnBM) and past returns (MOM12). The t-statistics, 
adjusted by Newey-West standard error, are in parentheses. Panel A reports basic regressions and Panel B reports regressions with control variables. *denotes p<0.10, ** 
denotes p<0.05 and *** denotes p<0.01. 
Constant GPTA CEO  Interaction lnBM lnME MOM12 Observations Avg. R2 
Panel A. Without Control Variables 
0.683 0.792**     302948 0.007 
(1.49) (2.42)        
0.977** 0.010*    302948 0.002 
(2.52)  (1.69)       
0.671 0.773** 0.007     302948 0.008 
(1.47) (2.39) (1.25)       
0.715 0.672* -0.004 0.022    302948 0.008 
(1.56) (1.90) (-0.31) (0.97)      
Panel B. With Control Variables 
1.680 0.789**  0.034 -0.095 0.349 302948 0.043 
(1.40) (2.43)   (0.27) (-1.38) (0.76)   
2.112* 0.006  -0.110 -0.068 0.350 302948 0.039 
(1.77)  (1.07)  (-1.57) (-0.59) (0.77)   
1.623 0.780** 0.004  -0.091 0.035 0.348 302948 0.044 
(1.33) (2.40) (0.73)  (-1.31) (0.28) (0.76)   
1.673 0.691** -0.005 0.018 -0.092 0.032 0.350 302948 0.046 
(1.37) (2.01) (-0.45) (0.85) (-1.32) (0.26) (0.76)     
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Table 23 Fama-MacBeth regressions with interaction term between gross profitability and insider ownership 
For each month from January 1980 to December 2015, Fama-MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions of monthly excess returns (CRSP monthly return over the one-
month T-bill rate) are estimated for a set of independent variables: The proxy of firm’s profitability (GPTA), the proxy of firms’ internal insider ownership(INSIDER), the 
interaction of firm’s profitability to high/low in internal insider ownership (Interaction), and firm’s size (lnME), book-to-market equity (lnBM) and past returns (MOM12). 
The t-statistics, adjusted by Newey-West standard error, are in parentheses. Panel A reports basic regressions and Panel B reports regressions with control variables. *denotes 
p<0.10, ** denotes p<0.05 and *** denotes p<0.01. 
Constant GPTA INSIDER Interaction lnBM lnME MOM12 Observations Avg. R2 
Panel A. Without Control Variables 
0.750* 0.622**     275599 0.007 
(1.71) (2.08)        
0.962** 1.179**    275599 0.002 
(2.53)  (2.40)       
0.733* 0.586** 1.022**    275599 0.008 
(1.66) (1.99) (2.30)       
0.732* 0.591* 1.020 -0.183    275599 0.010 
(1.65) (1.85) (1.05) (-0.10)      
Panel B. With Control Variables 
1.904* 0.665**  0.030 -0.107* 0.103 275599 0.046 
(1.86) (2.24)   (0.29) (-1.91) (0.21)   
2.203** 0.842* -0.049 -0.116** 0.107 275599 0.041 
(2.19)  (1.95)  (-0.48) (-2.04) (0.22)   
1.785* 0.654** 0.770* 0.036 -0.100* 0.099 275599 0.047 
(1.72) (2.21) (1.86)  (0.35) (-1.76) (0.20)   
1.798* 0.641** 0.590 0.164 0.035 -0.100* 0.101 275599 0.048 
(1.73) (2.04) (0.65) (0.10) (0.33) (-1.77) (0.21)     
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Table 24 Fama-MacBeth regressions with interaction term between gross profitability and institutional ownership 
For each month from January 1980 to December 2015, Fama-MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions of monthly excess returns (CRSP monthly return over the one-
month T-bill rate) are estimated for a set of independent variables: The proxy of firm’s profitability (GPTA), the proxy of firms’ external insider (IO), the interaction of 
firm’s profitability to high/low in external insider ownership (Interaction), and firm’s size (lnME), book-to-market equity (lnBM) and past returns (MOM12). The t-statistics, 
adjusted by Newey-West standard error, are in parentheses. Panel A reports basic regressions and Panel B reports regressions with control variables. *denotes p<0.10, ** 
denotes p<0.05 and *** denotes p<0.01. 
Constant GPTA IO Interaction lnBM lnME MOM12 Observations Avg. R2 
Panel A. Without Control Variables 
0.705** 0.641***     1301374 0.003 
(2.25) (3.52)        
0.661  0.528     1301374 0.008 
(1.64)  (1.58)       
0.612 0.653*** 0.007     1301374 0.011 
(1.52) (3.59) (0.34)       
0.434 1.146*** 0.727* -1.573***   1301374 0.012 
(1.03) (3.93) (1.80) (-2.92)      
Panel B. With Control Variables 
1.195** 0.702***  0.475*** -0.094* 0.598** 1301374 0.026 
(2.31) (3.83)   (4.18) (-1.70) (2.36)   
1.573*** 1.582*** 0.446*** -0.244*** 0.760*** 1301374 0.027 
(3.15)  (5.98)  (3.90) (-4.23) (2.84)   
1.293** 0.642*** 1.069*** 0.438*** -0.195*** 0.634** 1301374 0.030 
(2.45) (3.36) (4.48)  (3.74) (-3.25) (2.45)   
1.249** 0.763*** 1.184*** -0.298 0.435*** -0.195*** 0.632** 1301374 0.031 
(2.32) (2.69) (4.11) (-0.61) (3.72) (-3.25) (2.44)     
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Table 25 Fama-MacBeth regressions with interaction term between gross profitability and ownership concentration 
For each month from January 1980 to December 2015, Fama-MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions of monthly excess returns (CRSP monthly return over the one-
month T-bill rate) are estimated for a set of independent variables: The proxy of firm’s profitability (GPTA), the proxy of firms’ external insider (IO-HHI), the interaction 
of firm’s profitability to high/low in external insider ownership (Interaction), and firm’s size (lnME), book-to-market equity (lnBM) and past returns (MOM12). The t-
statistics, adjusted by Newey-West standard error, are in parentheses. Panel A reports basic regressions and Panel B reports regressions with control variables. *denotes 
p<0.10, ** denotes p<0.05 and *** denotes p<0.01. 
Constant GPTA IO-HHI Interaction lnBM lnME MOM12 Observations Avg. R2 
Panel A. Without Control Variables 
0.705** 0.664***     1143916 0.003 
(2.25) (3.55)        
0.661  -0.420     1143916 0.007 
(1.64)  (-1.31)       
0.612 0.652*** -0.083     1143916 0.010 
(1.52) (3.52) (-0.25)       
0.434 0.449** -0.388 0.833*   1143916 0.012 
(1.03) (2.52) (-1.01) (1.76)      
Panel B. With Control Variables 
1.195** 0.733***  0.478*** -0.092 0.669** 1143916 0.028 
(2.31) (3.87)   (4.03) (-1.64) (2.56)   
1.573*** -1.508*** 0.475*** -0.225*** 0.775*** 1143916 0.027 
(3.15)  (-5.41)  (4.03) (-3.32) (2.82)   
1.293** 0.708*** -1.116*** 0.463*** -0.179** 0.643** 1143916 0.031 
(2.45) (3.72) (-3.69)  (3.88) (-2.58) (2.43)   
1.249** 0.718*** -1.133*** 0.091 0.463*** -0.179** 0.642** 1143916 0.032 
(2.32) (3.58) (-3.70) (0.19) (3.87) (-2.58) (2.43)     
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Regression on firms’ excess returns to operating profitability and insider 
ownership gives similar results as to gross profitability and insider groups. 
When monthly stock excess return is regressed by 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐴 solely, its significance 
varies across internal and external insider groups, as Cremers and Nair (2005) 
documents (t=1.36 in 𝐶𝐸𝑂 group and t=1.26 in 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 group; t=2.04 in 𝐼𝑂 
group and t=2.20 in 𝐼𝑂 − 𝐻𝐻𝐼 group). This suggests that the pricing power of 
operating profitability is less strong in this sample than the market sample.  
Recall that the source of 𝐶𝐸𝑂 and 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 is from Execucomp that only traces 
US S&P 1500 indexed firms and the variation of operating profitability among 
these firms may less sensitive to the stock returns. When control variables are 
included, as reported in Panel B of Table 24-Table 27, the significance of 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐴 
is increased and the coefficient is quantitatively similar regardless the insider 
ownership group ( 𝜆1̂ =1.786 in 𝐶𝐸𝑂  group, 𝜆1̂ =1.868in 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟  group; 
𝜆1̂=1.919 in 𝐼𝑂 group and 𝜆1̂=1.987 in 𝐼𝑂 − 𝐻𝐻𝐼 group). 
Together with 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐴, the significance of 𝐶𝐸𝑂 (t=1.92) is higher than 𝐺𝑃𝑇𝐴 
with 𝐶𝐸𝑂 (t=1.25). However, the interaction variable is still not significant, as 
the coefficient of 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐴 × 𝐶𝐸𝑂 is 0.071 (t=0.88). Controlling firm’s size, book-
to-market equity and momentum further dilutes the pricing power of 𝐶𝐸𝑂 
ownership, as its t-stat drops to 1.02. This shows the pricing power of internal 
insiders is related to these well-documented factors and does not represent a 
systematic pricing factor. In light of this, the interaction effect of insider 
ownership and operating profitability may also not be systematically significant. 
The regression analysis supports this view by showing a decline of the 
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coefficient of 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐴 × 𝐶𝐸𝑂  where control variables are added (=0.003, t=-
0.01). When internal insider is proxied by 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 , the coefficient of 
𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐴 × 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑅 is -0.424 without control variable and is -0.596 with control 
variable. Although the coefficient is economically large, it failed to pass the t-
static significant threshold due to the relatively small sample size and less time 
period is covered. For the external insider group, the interaction effect is only 
significant when the insider proxy is related to institutions, and only when size, 
book-to-market ratio, and momentum are not included in the regression. The 
sign is also unexpectedly negative. These facts suggest that both 𝐺𝑃𝑇𝐴 and 
𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐴 carry similar factor loadings to insider ownership variables. 
 
5.5.3 Summary 
The positive profitability-insider ownership relationship is not pervasive among 
the empirical evidence presented in this section. Only institutional ownership 
has a positive interaction effect with operating profitability in the cross-
sectional stock return regression.  All other tests either do not provide decisive 
evidence (no significant results, or results that are no longer significant when 
control variables are included) for the existence of an interaction effect or 
demonstrate an interaction effect that is contrary to the hypothesis. The alternate 
hypothesis, that profitability premium are more pronounced where insider 
ownership is high also does not receive sufficient supporting evidence.  
In addition, it seems that the observation of two internal measures, 𝐶𝐸𝑂 and 
𝐼𝑁𝑆𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑅 do not represent an unbiased sample of the U.S. market. Previous 
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research has repeatedly confirmed a strong positive relationship between returns 
and 𝑙𝑛𝐵𝑀  and returns and 𝑀𝑂𝑀12 , and a weakly negative relationship 
between returns and 𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐸. In the current research, the coefficients for 𝑙𝑛𝐵𝑀 
are insignificant when an anti-takeover variable enters the regression, and the 
coefficients of 𝑀𝑜𝑚12  are significant at the 10% level. The coefficient of 
𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐸is significant at the 10% level.  This inconsistent factor loading suggests 
that the sample of internal insiders is not an unbiased fraction of the market. 
Information related to these controversial findings and inconsistencies with the 
hypotheses can be found in Edelen et al. (2016), who find evidence that 
institutions have an inability to trade stocks due to legal regulations on holding 
periods and short-sale constraints. These unobserved restrictions may distort the 
interactions of insider ownership and preference with profitability. In addition, 
Cremers and Nair (2005) argue that two-step cross-sectional regression for 
testing the interaction of governance and other firm characteristics is affected 
by a firm’s idiosyncratic risk and therefore results in “very low power due to 
the noise in estimating the firm-specific alpha” (p.2873). Following their 
suggestions, portfolio analysis is used to reduce the effects of idiosyncratic risk 
and potential bias from skewed variables and outliers. 
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Table 26 Fama-MacBeth regressions with interaction term between operating profitability and CEO ownership 
For each month from January 1980 to December 2015, Fama-MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions of monthly excess returns (CRSP monthly return over the one-
month T-bill rate) are estimated for a set of independent variables: The proxy of firm’s profitability (OPTA), the proxy of firms’ internal insider (CEO), the interaction of 
firm’s profitability to high/low in internal insider ownership (Interaction), and firm’s size (lnME), book-to-market equity (lnBM) and past returns (MOM12). The t-statistics, 
adjusted by Newey-West standard error, are in parentheses. Panel A reports basic regressions and Panel B reports regressions with control variables. *denotes p<0.10, ** 
denotes p<0.05 and *** denotes p<0.01. 
Constant OPTA CEO Interaction lnBM lnME MOM12 Observations Avg. R2 
Panel A. Without Control Variables 
0.764 1.355      302948 0.007 
(1.64) (1.36)        
0.977*** 0.010**    302948 0.002 
(2.85)  (2.02)       
0.735 1.350 0.010*    302948 0.009 
(1.57) (1.35) (1.92)       
0.800* 1.005 -0.004 0.071    302948 0.010 
(1.66) (0.90) (-0.22) (0.88)      
Panel B. With Control Variables 
2.160** 1.786**  0.028 -0.128** 0.325 302948 0.041 
(2.03) (2.17)   (0.21) (-2.03) (0.63)   
2.113* 0.065  -0.068 -0.110 0.350 302948 0.039 
(1.88)  (1.02)  (-0.56) (-1.62) (0.67)   
2.076* 0.782** 0.046  0.029 -0.126* 0.324 302948 0.044 
(1.90) (2.40) (0.72)  (0.22) (-1.89) (0.63)   
2.103* 0.778** 0.038 -0.003 0.024 -0.121* 0.323 302948 0.044 
(1.90) (2.29) (0.26) (-0.01) (0.19) (-1.87) (0.63)     
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Table 27 Fama-MacBeth regressions with interaction term between operating profitability and insider ownership 
For each month from January 1980 to December 2015, Fama-MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions of monthly excess returns (CRSP monthly return over the one-
month T-bill rate) are estimated for a set of independent variables: The proxy of firm’s profitability (OPTA), the proxy of firms’ internal insider (Insider), the interaction of 
firm’s profitability to high/low in internal insider ownership (Interaction), and firm’s size (lnME), book-to-market equity (lnBM) and past returns (MOM12). The t-statistics, 
adjusted by Newey-West standard error, are in parentheses. Panel A reports basic regressions and Panel B reports regressions with control variables. *denotes p<0.10, ** 
denotes p<0.05 and *** denotes p<0.01. 
Constant OPTA Insider Interaction lnBM lnME MOM12 Observations Avg. R2 
Panel A. Without Control Variables 
0.798* 1.098      273660 0.007 
(1.68) (1.26)        
0.962** 1.179**    273660 0.002 
(2.53)  (2.40)       
0.762 1.089 1.145**    273660 0.008 
(1.60) (1.25) (2.34)       
0.750 1.151 1.241 -0.424    273660 0.010 
(1.55) (1.21) (1.18) (-0.09)      
Panel B. With Control Variables 
2.150** 1.868***  0.067 -0.126** 0.088 273660 0.044 
(2.16) (2.86)   (0.68) (-2.27) (0.18)   
2.203** 0.842* -0.049 -0.116** 0.107 273660 0.041 
(2.19)  (1.95)  (-0.48) (-2.04) (0.22)   
2.006** 1.860*** 0.852** 0.06 -0.117** 0.083 273660 0.045 
(1.99) (2.84) (1.98)  (0.77) (-2.10) (0.17)   
1.981* 1.913*** 0.975 -0.596 0.077 -0.116** 0.086 273660 0.046 
(1.96) (2.70) (0.97) (-0.13) (0.78) (-2.08) (0.18)     
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Table 28 Fama-MacBeth regressions with interaction term between operating profitability and institutional ownership 
For each month from January 1980 to December 2015, Fama-MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions of monthly excess returns (CRSP monthly return over the one-
month T-bill rate) are estimated for a set of independent variables: The proxy of firm’s profitability (OPTA), the proxy of firms’ external insider (IO), the interaction of 
firm’s profitability to high/low in external insider ownership (Interaction), and firm’s size (lnME), book-to-market equity (lnBM) and past returns (MOM12). The t-statistics, 
adjusted by Newey-West standard error, are in parentheses. Panel A reports basic regressions and Panel B reports regressions with control variables. *denotes p<0.10, ** 
denotes p<0.05 and *** denotes p<0.01. 
Constant OPTA IO Interaction lnBM lnME MOM12 Observations Avg. R2 
Panel A. Without Control Variables 
0.732* 1.239**     1096691 0.005 
(1.87) (2.04)        
0.816** 0.245     1096691 0.009 
(1.99)  (0.70)       
0.721* 1.231*** 0.051     1096691 0.011 
(1.66) (2.60) (0.17)       
0.646 1.977*** 0.438 -2.388*   1096691 0.013 
(1.43) (2.70) (0.93) (-1.65)      
Panel B. With Control Variables 
1.349*** 1.919***  0.466*** -0.133** 0.779*** 1096691 0.026 
(2.70) (4.51)   (4.40) (-2.58) (3.36)   
1.552*** 1.323*** 0.412*** -0.222*** 0.739*** 1096691 0.026 
(3.17)  (5.63)  (3.97) (-4.33) (3.18)   
1.497*** 1.702*** 1.191*** 0.416*** -0.246*** 0.738*** 1096691 0.029 
(3.03) (4.12) (5.32)  (4.03) (-5.05) (3.22)   
1.542*** 1.449** 0.850** 1.967 0.431*** -0.245*** 0.745*** 1096691 0.030 
(3.03) (2.29) (2.42) (1.51) (4.18) (-5.08) (3.27)     
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 Table 29 Fama-MacBeth regressions with interaction term between operating profitability and ownership concentration
For each month from January 1980 to December 2015, Fama-MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions of monthly excess returns (CRSP monthly return over the one-
month T-bill rate) are estimated for a set of independent variables: The proxy of firm’s profitability (OPTA), the proxy of firms’ external insider (IO-HHI), the interaction 
of firm’s profitability to high/low in external insider ownership (Interaction), and firm’s size (lnME), book-to-market equity (lnBM) and past returns (MOM12). The t-
statistics, adjusted by Newey-West standard error, are in parentheses. Panel A reports basic regressions and Panel B reports regressions with control variables. *denotes 
p<0.10, ** denotes p<0.05 and *** denotes p<0.01. 
Constant OPTA IO-HHI Interaction lnBM lnME MOM12 Observations Avg. R2 
Panel A. Without Control Variables 
0.731** 1.224**     1005886 0.004 
(2.03) (2.20)        
0.901*** -0.117     1005886 0.008 
(3.28)  (-0.36)       
0.662** 1.343*** 0.111     1005886 0.011 
(2.02) (2.78) (0.40)       
0.741** 0.839 -0.033 2.353*   1005886 0.012 
(2.25) (1.49) (-0.41) (1.82)      
Panel B. With Control Variables 
1.300*** 1.987***  0.470*** -0.128** 0.755*** 1005886 0.026 
(2.61) (5.26)   (4.09) (-2.48) (2.84)   
2.066*** -1132*** 0.500*** -0.178*** 0.725*** 1005886 0.027 
(3.60)  (-3.72)  (3.87) (-2.70) (2.67)   
1.923*** 1.879*** -1021*** 0.452*** -0.207*** 0.726*** 1005886 0.029 
(3.29) (4.98) (-3.35)  (3.92) (-3.24) (2.71)   
1.872*** 2.512*** -0.829*** -1.68 0.462*** -0.215*** 0.724*** 1143916 0.031 
(3.25) (5.34) (-2.72) (-1.18) (4.02) (-3.29) (2.71)     
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5.6 Further Tests of Firm’s Profitability and Corporate Governance 
If the interaction of firm’s insider ownership and profitability anomaly is driven by 
the mechanism of corporate governance, other proxies, such as anti-takeover 
provision (see Gompers et al. 2003), manager salaries (see Harford et al. 2008) 
should predict the profitability premium via the same channel. This section pays 
special attention to the two possible channels as previous literature has documented 
a pricing power determining stock return from annually rebalanced portfolios 
sorted by the two variables (Gompers et al. 2003; Bebchuk et al. 2009), and are 
widely discussed in subsequent research (see Bebchuk et al. 2013, Gao, 2015) 
Since the availability of G-Index and E-Index is limited to several years, leaving a 
gap of approximately 2-3 years between the update time. Following Bebchuk et al. 
(2013) this research assumes there is no change of two variables in the gap period. 
Given IRRC information is a summation of existing information from the market, 
this research assumes the information is available at the month of initial publication, 
which is September 1990, July 1993, July 1995, February 1998, November 2000, 
February 2002, January 2004, and January 2006 respectively. After the last IRRC 
publication, both G-Index and E-Index information remain unchanged until 
December 2006. This adjustment allows to examining stock return in a continuous 
time period from September 1990 to December 2006, which is 195 months. 
5.6.1 Governance Proxies 
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𝑮 − 𝑰𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒙: Gompers et al. (2003) compute the G-Index as an indicator of firm 
manager’s power by a series of information from Corporate Takeover Defences by 
Investor Responsibility Research Centre (IRRC). The index range is from 1 to 19, 
while higher index value refers to higher manager’s power, and lower shareholder’s 
rights. Due to the limit of availability, G-Index only covers Standard & Poor’s 500 
listed firms as well as annual firm list covering firms that included in Fortune, 
Forbes and Business Week in the years 1990, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 
and 2006. The data is from Professor Andrew Metrick’s website (visit the web-
link1 in the footnote for details). 
The original source of 𝑮 − 𝑰𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒙  is matched with TICKER, which contains 
14,000 ticker-year observations. The index is merged with CRSP stock header file 
to match all TICKERs to PERMNO and GVKEY in order to merge 𝑮 − 𝑰𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒙 
with accounting information, fiscal and calendar date and stock returns. Since firms 
with dual-class stocks have distinctive stockholder rights than ordinary firms, those 
firms are removed from database as GIM (2003). The identifier of dual-class is by 
G-Index database (dual class: 0 no;1 yes). I do not use CRSP Share Class identifier 
(CRSP code SHRCLS) as most stocks are labelled with blank. The total number of 
observations with PERMNO and no dual-class stock is 13,823, and 270 of which 
its PERMNO is linking with multiple market TICKER. I manually correct all those 
                                                 
1 http://faculty.som.yale.edu/andrewmetrick/data.html 
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cases to ensure all observations are correctly matched thus give a total 13,613 
observations.   
 𝑬 − 𝑰𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒙: Using the same original source from IRRC, 𝐸 − 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 measures a 
similar methodology but has a value range from 0 to 6. Higher 𝐸 − 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 indicates 
higher manager power which is similar to 𝐺 − 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 . Due to the limit of 
availability, E − Index only covers firms in the year of 1990, 1993, 1995, 1998, 
2000, 2002, 2004, and 2006.  
The data is provided by Professor Lucian Bebchuk from Harvard University (visit 
the web-link 2in the footnote for details) and match all TICKER with corresponding 
GVKEY and PERMNO, following the same method addressing 𝐺 − 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥. 
𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒚: The ratio of top manager’s salary is measured by the top five managers’ 
granted stock options using Black-Scholes value (Compustat Execucomp item 
𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑎𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠_𝑏𝑙𝑘_𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒), where ranking information is the same as 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟, 
divided by the total compensation of stock option, salary, and bonus they have 
received. If option’s Black-Scholes value is missing, option’s fair value that 
reported to SEC (Compustat Execucomp item 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑎𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠_𝑓𝑣 ) is applied. 
Since 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦 uses information from annual reports, this research assumes a six-
                                                 
2 http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/data.shtml 
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month lag from the fiscal-year end month to the month that information is available 
to the public. 
5.6.2 Profitability premium and governance proxies 
Return for double sort portfolio by gross profitability (𝐺𝑃𝑇𝐴) and G-Index (𝐺 −
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥) is presented in Table 30. The profitability premium is positive in four out 
of five G-Index quintiles. This is in line with Novy-Marx (2013) that high 
profitability firms outperform low profitability firms in general. Another finding 
from Novy-Marx is profitability premium is marginally significant when return is 
not risk-adjusted. This research confirms this finding as only the third 𝐺 − 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 
quntile records profitability premium with a significant sign (t=2.04). To account 
for considerations that excess return is driven by other common risk factors that 
have been documented by previous literature, value weighted 𝐹𝐹 − 3  alpha is 
reported. The conclusion remains similar with raw excess return. Good governance 
(low 𝐺 − 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 quintile) is associated with positive portfolio risk-adjusted return, 
yielding 0.35% per month, and as hypothesised, weak governance is associated 
with negative portfolio return at -0.10% per month. However, the pattern of G-
Index and GPTA premium is not monotonic.  
Compared with G-Index, E-Index seems more correlated with stock return and 
firm’s profitability premium. Although the relation between profitability and E-
Index is not a monotonic pattern as well, profitability premium is positive in low 
𝐸 − 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 quintile but is negative in high 𝐸 − 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 quintile and cannot subsume 
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by Fama-French 3-Factor model. The governance premium is stronger than 𝐺 −
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥. These findings are roughly supporting the view that good governance (low 
𝐺 − 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 and low 𝐸 − 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥) is associated with higher profitability.  
When profitability is measured by operating profitability (𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐴), the conclusion 
does not change. The pattern of 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐴 premium with three governance proxies 
confirms the good governance (low 𝐺 − 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥, low 𝐸 − 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥, and high 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦) 
is associated with higher profitability. The positive profitability-return pattern is 
observed and is significant in both GPTA and OPTA sorts. The positive corporate 
governance-return pattern is clearer than 𝐺 − 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥  as 3 out of 5 profitability 
quintiles records a negative High − Low premium and are significant in several 
quintiles 
However, the interpretation of findings in Table 30 are strictly restricted due to the 
lack of sample volume and time span. Comparing with Novy-Marx (2013), using 
1963-2010 period U.S. stock observation, the dataset used in Table 30 is restricted  
to the  1990-2006 period, and according to the instruction of IRRS as well as 
Gompers et al. (2003), only S&P 1500 stocks are included for computing anti-
takeover index. Whether there is any bias is still pending further discussion. 
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Table 30 Profitability Premium and Governance Proxies 
From July 1990 to December 2006, stocks within the same profitability are independently sorted by its gross profitability (GPTA) and operating profitability 
(OPTA) respectively and one measure of corporate governance (see section 5.6.1 for detail), then hold for one year. This generates 5 portfolios with every 
20% of the profitability spectrum from low to high. Panel A reports value weighted portfolio FF-3 alpha (in percentage) of GPTA premium, Panel B reports 
OPTA premium and corresponding t-statistics as panel A, both are with Newey-West adjusted standard error.  
 
G-Index  E-Index  Salary  
Panel A. GPTA Group 
Low G-Index 0.351 Low E-Index 0.377 Low Salary 0.983 
 (0.91)  (1.09)  (2.00) 
2 0.450 2 0.728 2 0.400 
 (1.31)  (2.66)  (1.25) 
3 0.487 3 0.736 3 0.479 
 (2.04)  (2.64)  (1.55) 
4 0.430 4 0.828 4 0.555 
 (1.54)  (1.60)  (1.79) 
High G-Index -0.112 High E-Index -0.214 High Salary 1.741 
 (-0.47)  (-0.89)  (6.25) 
      
Panel B. OPTA Group 
 
Low G-Index 0.823 Low E-Index 1.144 Low Salary 0.614 
 (1.94)  (2.97)  (1.23) 
2 1.721 2 1.32 2 0.826 
 (2.97)  (4.01)  (4.71) 
3 1.386 3 1.307 3 1.679 
(Continue) 
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(Continued.) 
 (3.39)  (0.12)  (3.59) 
4 1.433 4 0.835 4 0.500 
 (3.82)  (2.07)  (1.35) 
High G-Index 0.776 High E-Index 0.083 High Salary 1.654 
 (1.55)  (0.12)  (4.71) 
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5.7 Conclusion and Discussion 
 
The relation between firm’s profitability and insider ownership has helped to 
explain the profitability premium which is firstly proposed by Novy-Marx (2013) 
and further explored by Ball et al. (2015) as well as Fama and French (2015). Firms 
with high profitability are associated with high insider ownership as can be 
observed in the portfolio-level analysis. Controlling for the level of firm’s internal 
insider ownership (measured as firm’s 𝐶𝐸𝑂 and 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑅), the monthly average 
𝐺𝑃𝑇𝐴 and 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐴 premium is 0.86% in the lowest 20% insider ownership firms and 
is 12.6-1.47% in high insider ownership firms. This is consistent with the literature 
arguing firm’s agency costs have significant predicting power to profitability, since 
insiders are more heavily influential than any other stakeholders as a key 
mechanism of corporate governance to reduce agency costs. As for the external 
insider ownership, the average 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐴 premium is also increased controlling for the 
institutional ownership (𝐼𝑂).  
However, as summarised in section 5.5.3, the predictive power of firm’s 
profitability does not diverge from low and high insider ownership firms in the 
cross-sectional regression analysis. This is contradictory to the conclusion from 
portfolio analysis, where the profitability premium is positively associated with 
average insider ownership. Therefore, hypothesis H2 has been rejected.  
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Using insider ownership as a proxy of governance has limitations in various 
prospects, as this research has recognised. Though Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
argue that firm is performing better with high institutional ownerships because 
institutions are able to monitor manager behaviour and have an influence in free 
cash-flow distribution, Chen et al. (2007) find this assert is conditional upon several 
conditions.  
First, institutions may not behave as good-duty supervision as hypothesized in 
theories. Chen et al. (2007) find only institutions that are independent and focus on 
long-term investing are more active in their role of supervision. Their further 
analysis finds that mixing long-term independent institutions with other institution 
types together distorts the predicting power of institutional ownership to firm 
performance. The mixed finding of institutional ownership, as this chapter has 
presented, may result from such phenomenon. 
Second, the source of institutional ownership provided by Thomson Reuters has 
potential quality issues. The Thomson Reuters 13-F filling database is the original 
source calculating institution ownership. However, Asquith et al. (2005) observe 
that the ownership could over 100% for some firms in a specific period. Though 
firms that are under heavy short-selling may result in a scenario that institutional 
ownership is over 100% because all common shares are held by institutions and are 
short-sold. But the number of outliers is apparently much more than such an 
extreme case. Recently the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) has 
suspended the subscription of Thomson Reuters 13-F filling database for similar 
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reasons (visit the web-link3 in the footnote for details).  This research recognises 
this notice and is ready to re-estimate the institutional ownership once high-quality 
institutional ownership database is available. 
Third, this explanatory power of institutional ownership may result from other 
channels. Because the presence of institutions has also improved market efficiency 
by creating liquidity and reduces the bid-ask spread, the institutional ownership is 
also being viewed as a proxy of liquidity effect in literatures such as Ali et al. (2003) 
and Conrad et al. (2014). Since the channels of pricing stock returns are various 
and are largely under discovery, a significant relation between institutional 
ownership and profitability. Therefore, further analysis that could identify the co-
founding effect of the two possible explanations is required. 
Why do firm-level analysis and portfolio-level analysis arrive at such different 
conclusions? Lilienfeld-Toal and Ruenzi (2014) argue that high levels of stock 
holding incentivise insiders, leading them to behave as value-creating shareholders. 
Insider ownership, therefore, does not represent a missing risk factor within asset 
pricing theory, but rather may contain information related to a firm’s other 
fundamental characteristics. In cases like this, insider ownership is a proxy of 
existing firm fundamental information, which explains why the interaction effect is 
no longer significant when a firm’s size, book-to-market ratio, and past returns are 
included in the regression. For the portfolio analysis, as stocks are independently 
                                                 
3 https://wrds-www.wharton.upenn.edu/pages/support/research-wrds/research-note-regarding-
thomson-reuters-ownership-data-issues/ 
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sorted by profitability and insider ownership, the portfolio subsumes firms’ 
idiosyncratic risks. In such case, the portfolio analysis creates a clearer picture of 
the relationship between the two factors of interest than cross-sectional analysis.   
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6 PROFITABILITY PREMIUM, FIRM’S DISTRESS RISK AND STOCK 
RETURNS 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Two profitability-related factors, distress risk and profitability, play a significant 
role in understanding the cross-sectional stock return and the universe of asset 
pricing. Distress risk is measured as the probability of whether a firm is expected 
to become financially distressed, suffering from bankruptcy, default, or being 
performance-related delisted from the exchange. It has drawn considerable 
scholarly attention, as distress risk has been raised as an explanation for several 
well-documented anomalies by researchers, including Fama and French (1993), 
Kapadia (2011), and Avramov et al. (2013). Firm profitability, measured as the 
ratio of a firm’s gross profits (or operating profits) over its total assets, are drawn 
directly from a firm’s financial report. It has strong power in terms of determining 
stock returns. Novy-Marx (2013) argues that the variation of firm’s profitability is 
an underlying source of value premiums. These findings contribute to 
understanding market efficiency by their power to predict stock returns, and it is 
possible to explain several other market anomalies by using these factors within 
analyses. 
The pricing power of a firm’s profitability, according to Novy-Marx (2013), is 
because profitability represents a firm’s expected cash flow which determines the 
firm’s rate of return demanded by investors. This judgement originated from the 
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conceptual justification of Fama and French (2008), who argue that variations in 
firms’ cross-sectional profitability, given the same stock prices, cause the different 
rate of stock returns. In this chapter, following the same logic, investors should also 
take distress risk into account, as distress risk means that the expected cumulative 
dividends displays a probability that cannot be fully claimed by equity investors. 
When a firm is in distress, the U.S. bankruptcy acts mean that equity investors have 
only a residual claim to the firm’s value.  Therefore, distress risk alters the expected 
stock return according to the potential loss of expected earnings, and high distress 
risk firms are historically associated with lower profitability and reluctant to pay 
dividends, as studied by Altman (1968). Also, this variation of distress risk may 
help to explain the profitability premium, the return pattern that is associated with 
firm’s profitability ratio. The relation between firm’s profitability and financial 
distress, according to Fama and French (2000), can be concluded as follows: “… 
and the prospect of failure or takeover gives firms with low profitability incentives 
to allocate asset to more productive uses” (p.161). 
Interestingly, there has been no research investigating the relationship between firm 
profitability and distress risk and their interactions in terms of explaining the 
variation of returns across stocks. This is perhaps surprising, as the existing 
literature has documented the relationship between them consistently. Altman 
(1968) finds that firm’ past profitability helps investors distinguish between the 
healthy firm and distressed firms, and further proposes a discriminating model that 
can be used to measure a firm’s distress risk using profitability alongside several 
firm specifications.  This finding is further examined and supported by Campbell 
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et al. (2008), who find that a firm’s past profitability has predictive power for the 
likelihood of financial distress up to 120 months ahead. On the other side, Fama 
and French (2006) document the fact that a firm’s one-year lagged distress risk, 
measured by Ohlson’s O-score, has predictive power for the firm’s expected 
profitability in a cross-sectional analysis. These conclusions suggest that both 
return premiums are in fact driven by common factors embedded in distress risk 
and profitability. 
In line with these justifications, this chapter adopts three financial distress measures 
to test whether the profitability anomaly can be explained via the correlation 
between the two factors. The three distress risk measures are chosen from available 
most-cited literature: Firm’s failure probability (Campbell et al. 2008), firm’s 
Distance-to-Default (Bharath and Shumway, 2008), and Firm’s O-score (Franzen 
et al. 2006). These measures are representative as they are commonly used in asset 
pricing literatures such as Novy-Marx (2013), Hou et al. (2015), Pointiff and 
McLean (2016), and their validity in predicting financial distress risk has been 
scrutinised in Blöchlinger (2012) and Charitou et al. (2013). Before these variables 
are used to conduct analysis, all three distress risk measures are cross-checked with 
literature to ensure the measure is representing a credible replica of the targeting 
literature. Also, the measure of firm’s gross profitability (Novy-Marx ,2013) and 
operating profitability (Ball et al. 2015) are cross-checked as well, in which section 
5.4.2 has presented the replication in detail.  
 217 
 
There is a convincing evidence arising from portfolios sorted on two profitability 
measures where a variation of distress risk exists across all portfolios. Particularly, 
in low profitability portfolios where the average return monotonically declines with 
the increase of distress risk, creating a significant variation of portfolio returns 
between high and low profitability firms. The firm-level analysis confirms the 
existence of an interaction effect between the two factors, and the profitability 
premium is more pronounced in high distress risk firms. These findings contribute 
to work combining the two pricing powers into a single framework. 
This chapter presents novel findings of the profitability anomaly in relation with 
firm’s distress risk. When profitability is present in the ten decile portfolios, all 
three distress risk measures monotonically decline with the increase in average 
gross profitability (measured as 𝐺𝑃𝑇𝐴 ) as well as in operating profitability 
(measured as 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐴 ). Ranking stocks by profitability and distress risk 
independently further emphasises this relationship by showing the profitability 
premium, measured either as the excess return over the one-month T-bill rate or the 
Fama-French three-factor alpha, generally increases as the portfolio’s average 
distress risk increases. The difference of average profitability premium between 
low and high distress risk firms could be as high as 1.30% per month. These 
findings are further supported by firm-level analysis, where Fama-MacBeth 
regressions show a significant interaction effect between a firm’s profitability and 
distress risk in terms of pricing expected stock returns, and the explanatory power 
of firm’s profitability is significantly different among low and high distress risk 
firms. 
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6.2 Hypothesis Development 
In the attempt of understanding characteristics of firm’s profitability, Fama and 
French (2006) find firm’s strength (ability to survive), measured as O-score, a 
bankruptcy predictor, has significant power that negatively determined firm’s 
profitability ratio, measured as firm’s earning to total assets. This is consistent with 
the judgement of Altman (1984) who argues that financial distress occurs with 
indirect costs to firm’s profits. In exploring how financial distress affects firm’s 
performance, Altman (1984) further finds that firm’s expected profits, measured by 
ten-year average profits, are reduced by 6.6% to 10.5% from three years before the 
firm is distressed, representing the cost of financial distress implied in firm’s 
distress risk. This is in line with the legal requirement: Due to legislation 
requirement that distressed firms are not allowed to pay dividends, investors will 
receive less payoff as expected in such circumstance. 
Though one might argue that since firm’s distress risk and profitability is 
interactive, the finding of Fama and French (2006) does not represent a true 
economic relationship that firm’s profitability is affected by the historical 
information. Opler and Titman (1994) address this issue by using distress industry 
as a dummy variable controlling its effect on firm’s profitability, and they find 
financial distress still affects firm’s performance, including sale growth and 
profitability, as distressed industry is suffering severe asset sale declining, 
employment loss and negative investment growth, which is in line with the 
argument of Altman (1986). Thus, this chapter investigates the return premium 
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caused by firm’s profitability by considering whether firm’s distress risk can better 
characterise them. The lead-lag effect of firm’s distress risk and profitability in the 
literature suggests the following hypothesis that this chapter is going to test. 
If the profitability premium is solely driven by firm’s profitability, then the lead-
lag effect in profitability and distress risk shall be observed as a positive relation 
between firm’s distress risk and profitability premium.  Empirically, in the 
portfolio-level analysis, one should expect the profitability premium varies in 
accordance with portfolio’s average distress risk.  
Hypothesis 1: The profitability premium is positively associated with firm’s 
distress risk. 
The relationship of profitablility premium and firm’s distress risk can only be true 
if the profitability premium is driven by the profitability itself, instead of other 
factors behind the profitability. Thus this research has designed a cross-sectional 
test, to discover whether the pricing power of profitability exists in the firm level 
analysis, and to what extent this pricing power is divergent by firms with high/low 
distress risk. In this test, it is expected that the pricing power of a firm’s profitability 
positively and significantly determines the cross-sectional stock returns, and the 
pricing power is higher in firms with higher distress risk against low distress risk 
firms. 
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Hypothesis 2: The predicting power of firm’s profitability to the cross-sectional 
stock return is significantly different in firms with low/high distress risk. 
 
6.3 Data and Summary Statistics 
This chapter is using a sample of 1980-2015 non-financial U.S. firms’ common 
shares traded on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ. The dataset does not contain firm 
data prior to 1980 due to the lack credibility data in estimating firm’s distress risk, 
as mentioned by Campbell et al. (2008).  Data is obtained from Compustat Annual 
file, Compustat Quarterly file, CRSP monthly stock file, and the combined dataset 
is used to calculate variables listed below. Delisting returns are taken from CRSP 
where available. If a delisting return is missing, but it is recognised as performance-
related delisting event in CRSP (CRSP Delisting code 400, 550-585), a return of -
30% is used the same way as Shumway and Warther (1999) and Bharath and 
Shumway (2008) did. Based on the convention in asset pricing studies, firms with 
SIC codes 6000-6999 are removed, along with stocks that are not common shares 
traded on the NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ. Firm’s market value of equity (𝑀𝐸), book-
to-market equity ratio (𝐵𝐸𝑀𝐸) and 12-month momentum (MOM12) are estimated 
following the methodology in section 4.3, and any observation missing value of 
such variables in given month does not remain in the database. 
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The final dataset contains 1,393,517 firm-month observations across June 1980-
December 2015 that meet all the above criteria and have at least one valid distress 
risk measure. 
6.3.1 Distress risk measures 
Failure Probability (𝑭𝑷): Campbell et al. (2008, 2011) find that their hazard 
model presents better predicting power than most existing distress risk models. It 
is measured by time-weighted firm net income to market value of total assets, time-
weighted stock excess returns, market-to-book ratio, debt-to-total assets, price, 
return volatility and relative size to the S&P 500 market. The measure has been 
widely adopted in recent research (Conrad et al. 2014; Stambaugh et al. 2016). The 
detailed estimation is presented in section 4.3.1. 
Distance-to-Default (𝑫𝑫): Vassalou and Xing (2004) first introduced this measure 
as a way to understand size and value premiums in cross-sectional stock returns. 
Campbell et al. (2008, 2011) and Bharath & Shumway (2008) also contributed to 
the model by setting some parameters as fixed values.  
The importance of estimating of 𝐷𝐷 in the context of Bharath and Shumway (2008) 
methodology lies in the market value of firm’s assets as well as its volatility in the 
matching period of its debt structure, which are assumed in a framework of 
European call option and the implied value is derived by the option pricing model. 
The probability of financial distress, 𝑃, is equal to 
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𝑃 = N (−
ln(
𝑉
𝐹
)+(𝜇−0.5𝜎𝑉
2)𝑇
𝜎𝑉√𝑇
) (6.1) 
𝜎𝑉 =
𝜎𝐸𝐸
(𝐸+𝐹)
 (6.2) 
σ𝐸 = (
𝑉
𝐸
)
𝜕𝐸
𝜕𝑉
𝜎𝑉 (6.3) 
where  
𝜎𝐸 = 𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 
𝜎𝑉 = 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 
 
𝐸 =  𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚′𝑠 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 
𝐹 = The face value of the firm′s debt 
𝑉 = 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 
r = The ongoing risk − free rate 
𝜇 = 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚′𝑠 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 
𝑇 = 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦, 𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑎𝑠 1 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 
The estimation of 𝜎𝐸  theoretically follows the third equation. However, for the 
convenience of calculation, Bharath and Shumway (2008) use the equation (6.2) 
equation to gain an approximate value of 𝜎𝑉. The value of firm’s debt is the sum of 
firm’s debt in current liabilities (Compustat annual file item 𝑑𝑙𝑐𝑡) and long-term 
debt (Compustat annual file item: 𝑑𝑙𝑡 ) with a weight of 50%. Moreover, the 
parameter 𝜇  is equal to firm’s cumulative return over the previous year before 
estimating.  
𝑶 − 𝒔𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆: A factor model measuring a firm’s distress risk, invented by Ohlson 
(1980). Dichev (1998) as well as Griffin and Lemmon (2002) find it to be related 
to market risk and has pricing power to determine expected stock returns. This 
measure is further polished by Franzen et al. (2007) by considering how a firm’s 
R&D expenditure affects a firm’s capital structure and future earnings and, 
ultimately, the firm’s distress risk.  Ultimately, the firm’s distress risk is measured 
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as O-score. This research follows the methodology of Dichev (1998), Franzen et al. 
(2007) and Blöchlinger (2012) by taking the O-score to predict firm’s distress risk. 
High O-score firm means the firm is riskier in terms of being financially distressed 
than low O-score firms. 
The O-Score model is calculated as follows: 
𝑂 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = −1.32 − .407 × 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 6.03 ×
𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
− 1.43 ×
𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
+ 0.0757 ×
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
− 2.37 ×
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
−
1.83 ×
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
+ 0.285 × 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 − 1.72 ×
𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 − 0.521 × 𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 (6.4) 
where 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒  is the log of total assets (Compustat Annual File item 𝑎𝑡 );  
𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙  is firm’s current assets (Compustat Annual File item 𝑐𝑎 ); 
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 is firm’s current liabilities (Compustat Annual File item 𝑐𝑙); 
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠 is firm’s pre-tax income (Compustat Annual File item 𝑝𝑖) plus 
depreciation (Compustat Annual File item 𝑑𝑝) Dummy𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 equals 1 
when the firm has negative net income (Compustat Annual File item 𝑛𝑖) in the 2 
prior years, 0 else; and Dummy𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠  is 1 if firm’s total assets minus total 
liabilities (Compustat Annual File item 𝑙𝑡) is less than zero, 0 else.  
𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜in equation (6.4) captures the effects of adjustments to the estimation, 
which is represented by   
𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
 𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡−𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡−1
𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡+ 𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡−1
 (6.5) 
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6.3.2 Summary statistics 
To deliver a comparable result with earlier chapters, this chapter also estimates 
firm’s gross profitability (𝐺𝑃𝑇𝐴), operating profitability (𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐴), size, book-to-
market ratio and momentum variables as the method introduced in section 5.3. The 
final dataset drops any firm-month observation that 1) has missing values of 𝐺𝑃𝑇𝐴 
at June-end; 2) has missing values of 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐴 at June-end; 3) has missing values of 
𝑀𝐸 at December-end in the last year; 4) has missing value of 𝐵𝐸 at June-end; 5) 
has missing values of stock price at June-end.; 6) has no valid distress risk measure 
at June-end. This leaves 1,175,825 firm-month observations that meet all criteria. 
Compared with the dataset used in Chapter 5, there is a reduction of dataset volume 
by about 20%, due to the dataset used in this chapter requires at least one valid 
measure of firm’s distress risk at the end of June, which requires substantial 
accounting information from firm’s financial reports, where missing values on 
specific factors sometimes take place. 
Table 29 reports the time-averaged cross-sectional summary statistics and 
Spearman’s rank correlation between all variables.  In line with Altman (1968), 
Ohlson (1980), Shumway (2001), as well as Campbell et al. (2008), all distress risk 
measures are negatively correlated with firm’s profitability. Three distress risk 
measures are positively correlated with each other with a correlation coefficient of 
43.0%-46.3%, a quantitatively comparable value implying these variables value 
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distress risk with similar magnitude, though the estimation of each distress risk 
measure is distinctive. 
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Table 31 Summary statistics of firm’s profitability, distress risk and firm characteristics 
 
The matrix below gives the time series-averaged summary statistics and Spearman’s rank correlation between the main variables. GPTA is the gross profitability 
of total assets following Novy-Marx (2013). OPTA is the operating profitability of total assets following Ball et al. (2015). ME is the market capitalisation in 
million US dollars. BE/ME is the book-to-market ratio following Davis and the Fama and French (2000) estimation. Three distress risk measures are: 1) DD is 
the Distance-to-Default following Bharath and Shumway (2008); 2) O-score measured as Franzen et al. (2007); 3) Failure Probability (FP) as Campbell et al. 
(2008). Other considered variables are capital expenditure to total assets, cash flow to total assets, debt to assets and R&D to total assets. The dataset is composed 
based on all firm-month observations from June 1980 to December 2015, a total month of 426. 
Variable GPTA OPTA ME  BEME DD O-Score FP 
Capital 
Exp./at 
Cash/at 
Cash 
flow/at 
Debt/at R&D 
Mean 0.411 0.118 1604.880 0.519 0.086 -1.883 0.084 0.068 0.170 0.011 0.228 0.077 
P1 -8.056 -80.500 0.128 -74.134 0.000 -267.993 0.000 -0.152 -0.018 -17.092 0.000 -0.382 
Median 0.369 0.139 92.929 0.546 0.002 -2.661 0.030 0.044 0.088 0.064 0.188 0.036 
P99 4.853 5.847 715599 1263.100 1.000 921.460 5.001 2.354 1.000 3.321 6.789 10.755 
SD 0.278 0.299 10740 30.785 0.206 8.416 0.209 0.081 0.200 0.275 0.233 0.146 
SKEW 0.992 -135.744 21.405 -214.432 2.616 42.391 7.995 3.867 1.640 -13.667 3.420 16.451 
  GPTA OPTA ME BEME DD O-Score FP 
Capital 
Exp./at 
Cash/at 
Cash 
flow/at 
Debt/at R&D 
GPTA             
OPTA 0.535            
ME -0.044 0.352           
BEME -0.080 -0.132 -0.283          
DD -0.082 -0.343 -0.546 0.218         
O-Score -0.179 -0.436 -0.447 0.021 0.463        
FP -0.190 -0.386 -0.124 -0.007 0.461 0.430       
(Continued) 
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(Continued) 
Capital 
expenditure/at 
0.131 0.268 0.100 -0.046 -0.093 -0.059 -0.188      
Cash/at -0.024 0.016 0.067 -0.204 -0.192 -0.143 -0.253 -0.078     
Cash flow/at 0.379 0.740 0.387 -0.082 -0.390 -0.478 -0.362 0.271 -0.075    
Debt/at -0.173 -0.163 -0.068 0.004 0.321 0.374 0.365 0.002 -0.450 -0.150   
R&D/at 0.076 0.183 -0.053 -0.233 0.022 -0.014 -0.065 -0.058 0.375 -0.129 -0.284   
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6.4 Profitability Premium and Distress Risk 
6.4.1 Gross profitability premium and distress risk 
Stocks in the beginning of July of every year during sample period (1980-2015), 
are independently sorted by firm’s profitability and by distress risk, and split into 
quintiles. Twenty five portfolios are constructed based on the intersection of the 
two factor’s quintile breakpoints, and these portfolios are held for one year. Firm 
profitability is measured by gross profitability (𝐺𝑃𝑇𝐴) and operating profitability 
(𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐴) respectively, and both are calculated based on the previous fiscal year’s 
annual report. Distress risk is measured by firm’s failure probability ( 𝐹𝑃 ), 
Distance-to-Default (𝐷𝐷 ), and O-score (𝑂 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒) respectively. To maintain 
consistency with the literature, the 𝐷𝐷  and 𝑂 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒  are calculated based on 
information known at the end of June, while 𝐹𝑃 is taken from the value at the 
beginning of January. This means that all distress risk variables used in the portfolio 
analysis have at least a one-month lag to the date of portfolio formation. All firms 
without valid profitability and distress risk proxy or that contains missing data 
required to compute firm’s size, book-to-market ratio, or past year’s returns are 
dropped before forming portfolios.  
The profitability premium from buying high profitability stocks and shorting low 
profitability stocks (𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ − 𝐿𝑜𝑤 portfolio) remains strong even after controlling 
for a firm’s distress risk. For the stock group ranked by 𝐺𝑃𝑇𝐴 and 𝐹𝑃,  the value-
weighted monthly 𝐹𝐹 − 3 alpha is 0.432%, 0.295%, 0.543%, 1.365%, and 1.702% 
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per month from low to high distress risk quintile. The premium is statistically 
significant at the 5% level for four out of five distress risk quintiles, which suggests 
that the profitability anomaly is not explainable by common risk factors that are 
embedded in the 𝐹𝐹 − 3 model. 
The profitability anomaly tends to be less significant in the low distress risk 
quintiles, especially when using the value-weighted Fama-French 3-factor alpha, 
which in the second quintile is insignificant (t=1.46). This suggests that, although 
controlling for distress risk, the profitability premium is still significant in most 
quintiles and abnormal returns seemingly cluster in the high distress risk quintiles. 
The cluster emerges with the increase of average distress risk suggesting that 
further supporting evidence should be sought.  The distress risk premium seems 
concentrated within the lower 𝐺𝑃𝑇𝐴  quintiles, where value-weighted portfolio 
monthly returns are significant (t=-4.62). Since low profitability firms are less able 
to survive in financial distress (Altman, 1968), this result is consistent with earlier 
literature. 
When distress risk is proxied by 𝑂 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 , the profitability premiums across 
remain significant in most 𝑂 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒  quintiles. From the lowest distress risk 
quintile to the highest, the average profitability premiums are 0.702%, 0.815%, 
1.035%, 0.903%, and 1.847% per month. All results are statistically significant 
except for the lowest 𝑂 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 quintile (t=1.69), which suggests that the positive 
profitability premium is robust and tends to increase with distress risk. The upward 
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trend of profitability premiums related to distress risk remains observable, and 
features strong t-statistics. 
When distress risk is measured by Distance-to-Default (𝐷𝐷), the 𝐺𝑃𝑇𝐴-𝐷𝐷 sorted 
portfolios record average monthly equal-weighted gross profitability premiums of 
0.777%, 1.308%, 1.322%, 1.534%, and 1.329% for low distress risk quintile and 
each subsequent, all significant at the 1% level. The value-weighted monthly 
returns generally reduce this premium, particularly in the lowest and highest 
quintiles of 𝐷𝐷, to 0.493%, 1.056%, 1.094%, 0.915%, and 0.550%. Again, the 
differences between equal-weight and value-weight results provide some evidence 
that the profitability premium is partially driven by firm size. Only the mid-range 
𝐷𝐷 quintiles have a significant premium, which implies that the distribution of 
profitability premiums is hump-shaped when controlling for 𝐷𝐷.  
Portfolios based on long-short 𝐷𝐷 firms generate negative distress risk premiums 
as measured by 𝐹𝑃  and 𝑂 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒.  Equal-weighted portfolio returns 
monotonically increase with a firm’s average profitability, with averages at -
0.748%, -0.367%, -0.253%, -0.220% and -0.196% per month from low to high 
𝐺𝑃𝑇𝐴 quintiles. However, only the distress risk premium from the lowest 𝐺𝑃𝑇𝐴 
quintile is significant (t=2.19). When these premiums are value-weighted, all 
returns are statistically significant at the 10% level and they are -0.763%, -1.064%, 
-0.605%, -0.575%, and -0.706% per month. The value-weighted distress premium 
no longer has a positive relationship with firm profitability; this conclusion holds 
even where those premiums are measured as Fama-French 3-factor alphas.  
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Table 32 Portfolio returns from gross profitability and distress risk double sort 
From July 1980 to December 2015, stocks within the same profitability are independently sorted by gross profitability (GPTA) and distress risk proxy and then 
held for one year. Five portfolios are generated by dividing at every 20% of the profitability spectrum from low to high and at every 20% of the distress risk 
spectrum. High-Low refers to a portfolio holding the top 20% profitable stocks (High) and shorting the bottom 20% (Low) within the same distress risk quintile 
or refers to holding good Distress Risk stocks and shorting bad Distress Risk firms within the same profitability quintile. Panel A reports GPTA and failure 
probability sorted portfolio value weighted average monthly risk-adjusted returns (in percentage terms) by Fama-French 3-factor model and corresponding t-
statistics, with Newey-West adjusted standard error, Panel B reports the value-weighted Fama-French 3-factor alphas and corresponding t-statistics of GPTA-
Distance-to-Default sorted portfolios, and Panel C reports the same information of GPTA-O-score sorted portfolios. 
Panel A. Failure Probability as distress risk measure 
Monthly Value Weighted Returns (%) 
Failure Prob. (FP) Low GPTA 2 3 4 High GPTA GPTA High-Low 
Low FP 0.12 0.24 0.17 0.17 0.55 0.43 
 (0.44) (2.09) (0.81) (0.73) (2.46) (2.88) 
2 -0.12 0.05 -0.02 0.34 0.17 0.30 
 (-0.43) (0.41) (-0.07) (1.89) (0.83) (1.46) 
3 -0.16 0.06 -0.05 0.37 0.39 0.54 
 (-0.54) (0.37) (-0.33) (2.41) (2.32) (2.09) 
4 -0.82 0.23 0.30 0.30 0.55 1.37 
 (-4.06) (1.28) (2.50) (2.42) (5.22) (3.31) 
High FP -1.07 -0.49 0.18 0.36 0.63 1.70 
 (-5.40) (-2.15) (1.92) (3.68) (6.72) (2.49) 
FP High-Low -1.19 -0.73 0.01 0.19 0.08   
 (-4.62) (-2.42) (0.79) (1.54) (1.40)  
 
 
(Continued) 
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(Continued) 
Panel B. Distance-to-Default as distress risk measure 
Monthly Value Weighted Returns (%) 
Distance-to-Default (DD) Low GPTA 2 3 4 High GPTA GPTA High-Low 
Low DD -0.49 -0.09 0.06 0.32 0.42 0.91 
 (-1.58) (-0.71) (0.53) (2.90) (4.40) (3.83) 
2 -1.13 -0.26 0.18 -0.22 0.11 1.24 
 (-4.56) (-1.80) (1.43) (-1.52) (0.66) (4.32) 
3 -1.44 -0.58 -0.43 -0.10 -0.24 1.21 
 (-4.68) (-3.33) (-2.39) (-0.53) (-1.47) (3.89) 
4 -1.36 -0.71 -0.63 -0.37 -0.34 1.02 
 (-3.85) (-3.58) (-3.02) (-1.82) (-1.62) (3.17) 
High DD -1.86 -1.60 -1.29 -0.99 -1.06 0.80 
 (-3.15) (-5.11) (-3.83) (-3.08) (-2.82) (2.50) 
DD High-Low -1.37 -1.51 -1.35 -1.31 -1.49   
 (-2.22) (-4.79) (-5.03) (-3.78) (-4.66)  
       
Panel C. O-score as distress risk measure 
(Continued) 
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(Continued) 
Monthly Value Weighted Returns (%) 
O-Score Low GPTA 2 3 4 High GPTA GPTA High-Low 
Low O-Score -0.38 0.18 0.23 0.15 0.33 0.70 
 (-2.08) (1.19) (2.03) (1.47) (2.94) (3.12) 
2 -0.34 -0.03 0.19 0.18 0.47 0.82 
 (-2.2) (-0.3) (1.87) (1.71) (3.47) (3.30) 
3 -0.63 -0.06 -0.28 0.23 0.40 1.04 
 (-3.68) (-0.51) (-1.62) (1.63) (3.03) (4.08) 
4 -0.71 -0.70 -0.38 -0.00 0.20 0.90 
 (-3.13) (-3.83) (-2.15) (-0.03) (1.11) (4.01) 
High O-Score -1.96 -1.68 -1.13 -0.67 -0.11 1.85 
 (-8.14) (-5.04) (-4.34) (-2.72) (-0.46) (4.35) 
O-Score High-Low -1.58 -1.85 -1.36 -0.82 -0.43   
 (-4.79) (-3.48) (-4.06) (-3.88) (-2.13)  
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6.4.2 Operating profitability premium and distress risk 
 
Using the same portfolio analysis method as used in the 𝐺𝑃𝑇𝐴-Distress risk double 
sorts, stocks are independently sorted by their operating profitability (𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐴) and a 
proxy of distress risk into five quintiles to investigate premiums from the resulting 
25 portfolios. 
The monthly average operating profitability premium monotonically increases with 
a firm’s distress risk. When distress risk is proxied by 𝐹𝑃, value-weighted portfolio 
FF-3 alphas are 0.975%, 1.198%, 1.007%, 0.855%, and 1.353% per month from 
low to high distress risk quintiles. The increasing premium across distress risk 
quintiles suggests that the profitability premium is positively related to distress risk, 
as per the 𝐺𝑃𝑇𝐴 − 𝐹𝑃 sorted portfolios. The relatively low 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐴 premium in the 
4th 𝐹𝑃 quintile is because its premium has been accounted for in Fama-French 3-
factors, where the 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐴 premium measured as portfolio’s excess return increases 
monotonically with 𝐹𝑃. This is in line with Ball et al. (2015) finding that operating 
profitability carries more pricing power related to firm’s size and book-to-market 
ratio than gross profitability in determining stock returns. 
The spread of 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐴 long-short portfolio premiums is even wider when distress 
risk is proxied by the 𝑂 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒. In the lowest 𝑂 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 quintile, the profitability 
premium is 0.284% per month with a t-statistic of 1.27, and the monthly premium 
increases to 0.815% in the 2nd 𝑂 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 quintile, 0.831% in the 3rd 𝑂 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 
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quintile and finally reaching 1.702% in the highest 𝑂 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒  quintile. The 
profitability premium is extremely large and significant in the highest distress risk 
quintile, where it yields over 1.40% per month higher than low distress risk firms. 
In summation, the tabulated results show the operating profitability premium is 
only significant at the 5th 𝑂 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 quintle. This gives further evidence that the 
profitability premium is strongly affected by distress risk.  
Finally, 𝐷𝐷  is used as a proxy of distress risk and then the stocks are sorted 
independently by 𝐷𝐷  and 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐴 . An interesting pattern is revealed, as the 
profitability premium no longer remains significant at the highest distress risk 
quintile. The 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ − 𝐿𝑜𝑤 profitability portfolio at the 5th distress risk quintile has 
an average return of 0.376% (t=0.95) value-weighted. Comparing this with the 
increasing profitability premium from low to high distress risk quintiles in previous 
results, operating profitability premiums show no such pattern. The portfolio’s FF-
3 alpha further supports the previous findings by showing no clear pattern of 
profitability premiums related to distress risk in equal-weighted results. 
Additionally, no significant profitability premiums in the highest distress risk 
quintile. Both of these findings are contradictory to previous results. 
By looking at portfolio returns in each distress risk quintile, the relation between 
distress risk and profitability premium is further dissected. The positive relation 
between operating profitability premium to the average portfolio’s distress risk 
measured by 𝐹𝑃 and 𝑂 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 is heavily influenced by low profitability firms. 
Those firms are grouped as the short-side of long-short portfolio and those firms 
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perform exceptionally low when portfolio’s average distress risk is high. The 
variation of low and high distress risk portfolio returns in the low operating 
profitability group (the first column of the five-by-five groups) is 0.532% when 𝐹𝑃 
proxies distress risk and is 1.908% when 𝑂 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 is proxying distress risk. While 
in the high operating profitability group (the fifth column of the five-by-five 
groups), the variation of portfolio return is relatively small. These findings imply 
that the pricing power of firm’s profitability may be sensitive to firm’s distress risk 
level. 
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Table 33 Portfolio returns from operating profitability and distress risk double sort 
 
From July 1980 to December 2015, stocks within the same profitability are independently sorted by operating profitability (OPTA) and distress risk proxy and 
then held for one year. Five portfolios are generated by dividing at every 20% of the profitability spectrum from low to high and at every 20% of the distress 
risk spectrum. High-Low refers to a portfolio holding the top 20% profitable stocks (High) and shorting the bottom 20% (Low) within the same distress risk 
quintile or refers to holding good Distress Risk stocks and shorting bad Distress Risk firms within the same profitability quintile. Panel A reports OPTA and 
failure probability sorted portfolio value weighted average monthly risk-adjusted returns (in percentage terms) by Fama-French 3-factor model and 
corresponding t-statistics, with Newey-West adjusted standard error, Panel B reports the value-weighted Fama-French 3-factor alphas and corresponding t-
statistics of OPTA-Distance-to-Default sorted portfolios, and Panel C reports the same information of OPTA-O-score sorted portfolios. 
Panel A. Failure Probability as distress risk measure 
Monthly Value Weighted Returns (%) 
Failure Prob. (FP) Low OPTA 2 3 4 High OPTA OPTA High-Low 
Low FP -0.52 -0.03 0.22 -0.03 0.45 0.98 
 (-2.38) (-0.12) (1.43) (-0.21) (2.99) (3.98) 
2 -0.89 -0.15 0.08 0.16 0.31 1.20 
 (-3.44) (-0.81) (0.63) (1.55) (3.71) (3.68) 
3 -0.82 -0.37 -0.07 0.08 0.19 1.01 
 (-3.45) (-2.47) (-0.50) (0.84) (1.45) (2.87) 
4 -0.88 -0.32 -0.27 -0.13 -0.02 0.86 
 (-3.14) (-2.47) (-1.74) (-0.80) (-0.10) (2.73) 
High FP -1.05 -0.82 -0.11 -0.12 0.30 1.35 
 (-3.63) (-3.70) (-0.55) (-0.47) (0.91) (3.02) 
FP High-Low -0.53 -0.79 -0.33 -0.09 -0.15   
 (-1.60) (-2.19) (-1.32) (-0.26) (-0.38)  
(Continued) 
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(Continued) 
Panel B. Distance-to-Default as distress risk measure 
Monthly Value Weighted Returns (%) 
Distance-to-Default (DD) Low OPTA 2 3 4 High OPTA OPTA High-Low 
Low DD -0.20 -0.18 0.10 0.20 0.31 0.51 
 (-0.65) (-1.19) (0.75) (2.21) (4.14) (1.84) 
2 -0.84 -0.52 -0.18 0.05 -0.06 0.78 
 (-2.63) (-2.88) (-1.14) (0.47) (-0.39) (1.96) 
3 -1.31 -0.78 -0.49 -0.34 -0.16 1.15 
 (-4.50) (-3.33) (-3.22) (-2.10) (-0.99) (3.23) 
4 -1.74 -0.66 -0.57 -0.59 -0.23 1.51 
 (-5.22) (-3.13) (-2.79) (-3.13) (-1.07) (3.14) 
High DD -1.65 -1.23 -1.21 -1.55 -1.28 0.38 
 (-3.53) (-3.98) (-4.32) (-4.15) (-3.06) (0.95) 
DD High-Low -1.45 -1.05 -1.31 -1.75 -1.58   
 (-3.37) (-3.09) (-5.23) (-5.43) (-4.49)  
 
Panel C. O-score as distress risk measure 
Monthly Value Weighted Returns (%) 
O-Score Low GPTA 2 3 4 High GPTA GPTA High-Low 
(Continued) 
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(Continued) 
Low O-Score -0.05 -0.23 0.30 0.11 0.23 0.28 
 (-0.24) (-1.33) (2.11) (-4.68) (2.93) (1.27) 
2 -0.56 -0.18 0.01 0.16 0.26 0.82 
 (-2.23) (-1.34) (0.05) (0.91) (2.68) (2.77) 
3 -0.65 -0.34 -0.14 0.07 0.18 0.83 
 (-2.33) (-2.35) (-1.14) (1.90) (1.25) (2.44) 
4 -0.86 -0.38 -0.39 -0.47 -0.25 0.62 
 (-3.31) (-2.14) (-2.24) (0.52) (-1.27) (1.69) 
High O-Score -1.96 -1.53 -1.32 -1.21 -0.26 1.70 
 (-7.10) (-5.72) (-4.68) (-2.34) (-1.02) (5.11) 
O-Score High-Low -1.91 -1.29 -1.61 -1.32 -0.49   
 (-7.00) (-4.67) (-5.00) (-4.03) (-1.92)  
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6.5 Cross-sectional Regression Analysis 
6.5.1 Fama-MacBeth regression design 
Cross-sectional regression is used to examine further two findings arising from the 
portfolio analysis: the interaction effect between the profitability anomaly and 
distress risk; and the fact that the profitability premium is higher where a firm’s 
distress risk is high. A set of cross-sectional regressions is designed such that for 
each month 𝑡 + 1, stock excess return over U.S. one-month T-bill rate, denote 𝑟𝑖 −
𝑟𝑓, is regressed by firm’s profitability and distress risk at month 𝑡, along with the 
product of the two variables, representing their interaction: 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡 = 𝜆0 + 𝜆1𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜆2𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 + +𝝀𝟑
,𝑿𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 +
𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (6.6) 
Where  
𝑿𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 = [𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1     𝑙𝑛𝐵𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1     𝑀𝑂𝑀12𝑖,𝑡−1]  (6.7) 
Following the logic used in the portfolio analysis, a test is also performed to check 
whether the interaction effect is caused by omitted risk variables. To control the 
omitted risk variable issue, following Fama and French (2008), 𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐸, ln𝐵𝑀, and 
𝑀𝑂𝑀12 are used as control variables. The proxy of distress risk, failure probability 
(𝐹𝑃), Distance-to-Default (𝐷𝐷), and O-score (𝑂 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒), respectively are used in 
the regression analysis. 
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To ensure all cross-sectional analyses are comparable, before performing the 
regression, all observations that have missing values of 𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐸, 𝑙𝑛𝐵𝑀, or 𝑀𝑂𝑀12 
are dropped. That means that the same dataset is used for regressions with and 
without the control variables. Thus, the total number of observations is consistent 
between the two groups where the same profitability and distress risk proxy is used. 
To address outlier observations with extreme value, all variables are winsorised at 
1 percentile level. If an interaction effect exists, a statistically significant 
coefficient ?̂?3 , should appear within the regression. Furthermore, if such an 
interaction effect is not due to correlation with existing risk factors, ?̂?3  should 
remain significant after control variables are included. 
6.5.2 Does distress risk explain the profitability anomaly? 
 
To set a benchmark that could compare results with various profitability measures 
and distress risk measures, firm’s monthly excess return is regressed solely by the 
firm’s profitability variable, and solely by the firm’s distress risk variable. One 
would expect that the coefficient sign of 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡  should keep being 
positive and significant, and the coefficient sign of 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡 should keep being 
negatively significant. Those results are disclosed in the first and second regression 
in Table 32-Table 37. The coefficient of 𝐺𝑃𝑇𝐴 is 1.062 in Table 32, and is 1.182 
in Table 33, 1.156 in Table 34, and all coefficients are statistically significant with 
a t-statistic over 5.0. The coefficient of 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐴, is 2.478 in Table 35, and is 2.793 in 
Table 36 and 2.390 in Table 37. All of which have a t-statistics over 4.5. These 
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consistent results verify that the analyses does not suffer from a biased sample due 
to missing values of distress risk measures, and the significance of two profitability 
variables are in line with the finding of Ball et al. (2015). Meanwhile, three distress 
risk measures are all negatively priced in the cross-sectional expected returns with 
t-statistics over 2.0. This is also in line with earlier findings of the distress risk 
puzzle such as Campbell et al. (2008) and Bharath and Shumway (2008). The value 
of coefficient and significance of both firm’s profitability and distress risk measures 
is even more pronounced when 𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐸, 𝑙𝑛𝐵𝑀, and 𝑀𝑂𝑀12 enters into regression, 
suggesting the pricing power of firm’s profitability and distress risk is beyond these 
well-documented firm characteristics. 
If the profitability anomaly is simply a tautology of the distress puzzle, then the 
coefficient may lose its significance when firm’s profitability and distress risk enter 
into regression simultaneously. The third regression in Table 32-Table 37 tests such 
hypothesis by regressing firm’s excess return with firm’s profitability and distress 
risk. In the 𝐺𝑃𝑇𝐴 − 𝐹𝑃 group, the coefficient of 𝐺𝑃𝑇𝐴 is increased about 8 basis 
points while the coefficient of 𝐹𝑃 decreases significantly by 97 basis points, and its 
significance drops proportionally. The 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐴 − 𝐹𝑃 group has a similar pattern as 
𝐺𝑃𝑇𝐴 − 𝐹𝑃, where the coefficient of 𝐹𝑃 declines 129 basis points after the 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐴 
variable enters regression. A more severe drop of significance emerges where 
distress risk is measured by 𝑂 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 . The coefficient of  𝑂 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒  is 
marginally significant with 𝐺𝑃𝑇𝐴, with a t-statistics of 1.79, and the coefficient is 
no longer significant with 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐴 . However, the significance of 𝐷𝐷  variable 
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remains stable co-existing with firm’s profitability, where 𝐺𝑃𝑇𝐴 and 𝐷𝐷 are all 
statistically significant at 1% level and so does in 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐴 and 𝐷𝐷. In short, the 
significance of profitability is not absorbed by distress risk variable.  
To test whether the profitability premium is mostly clustered among high distress 
risk firms, the distress risk variable is replaced with a dummy variable, which 
represents when a firm’s distress risk is above the average value of the entire 
market. Thus, the interaction effect proxy is either zero or equal to the value of 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1. Cross-sectional regressions are run as previously. If distress 
risk contributes to the power of a firm’s profitability, then the average coefficient 
of the interaction variable will represent the fraction that high distress risk accounts 
for.  
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡 = 𝜆0 + 𝜆1𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜆2𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝜆3𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝝀𝟒
,𝑿𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (6.8) 
Where  
𝑿𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 = [𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1     𝑙𝑛𝐵𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1     𝑀𝑂𝑀12𝑖,𝑡−1]  (6.9) 
Due to the form of 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 has changed, the value of average coefficient of 
distress risk dummy does not directly comparable with regressions conducted using 
actual value. However, the significance of distress risk variable should be 
quantitatively similar, and it is in the analyses. The average adjusted R2 is 
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quantitatively similar also, ranging from 0.7% to 1.2% for regressions without 
control variables and 2.7% to 3.1% for regressions with control variables.  
The interaction of 𝐺𝑃𝑇𝐴 and 𝐹𝑃  shows that high distress risk accounts for a 
fraction of gross profitability predicting power. The value of ?̂?3  is 0.408 with 
control variables, and is 0.540 without control variables. Both results are 
statistically significant at the 1% level. This implies that the average return from 
high profitability and high distress risk firms is higher than the average return from 
low distress risk but high profitability firms. For the 𝐺𝑃𝑇𝐴 − 𝑂 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 sample, 
the interaction effects shows the predicting power of 𝐺𝑃𝑇𝐴 is more pronounced in 
high 𝑂 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 firms, but the variation is correlated with other firm characteristics, 
as the significance of interaction is positive but less significant When 𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐸, 𝑙𝑛𝐵𝑀 
and 𝑀𝑂𝑀12 are added in the regression as control variables. The interaction of 
𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐴 − 𝐹𝑃  has coefficients of 2.025% and 1.081% per month and both are 
statistically significant. However, there is no significant return cluster at high 
distress risk for 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐴 − 𝑂 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 groups; the coefficient of interaction variable 
here is not significant. The interaction effect has no significant explanatory power 
for either the 𝐺𝑃𝑇𝐴 − 𝐷𝐷 group or the 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐴 − 𝐷𝐷  group, which is consistent 
with the interaction effect analysis using actual values. Given that all distress risk 
measures are highly positive-skewed, using monthly mean values as the threshold 
for constructing dummy variables, it further supports the findings that the 
profitability anomaly is concentrated in a small fraction of firms and does not 
represent a systematic risk that is linearly related to expected stock returns.  
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Table 34 Regression analysis for gross profitability and failure probability 
This table lists Fama-MacBeth regression analysis for gross profitability (GPTA) and distress risk. In every month, each firm's monthly stock return (CRSP 
code ret) over the one-month Treasury bill rate is regressed by firm profitability, distress risk, and the control variables. All variables, excluding return, are 
winsorized at the1 percent level. This table presents time-series averages of regression coefficients and Newey-West adjusted t-statistics with 12 lags. The 
sample period contains observations from July 1980 to December 2015, a total 426 months. 
Intercept GPTA FP Interaction lnME lnBM MOM12 Observations Avg.R2 
0.203 1.062***     1175825 0.003 
(0.61) (6.07)        
0.862*** -3.896***    1175825 0.006 
(3.35)  (-2.66)       
0.354 1.140*** -2.923*    1175825 0.009 
(1.26) (6.00) (-1.96)       
0.375 0.989*** -0.483*** 0.540***   1175825 0.008 
(1.27) (5.35) (-2.95) (2.91)      
0.167 1.374***  0.028 0.509*** 0.510** 1175825 0.025 
(0.35) (6.94)   (0.67) (5.12) (2.45)   
1.079*** -4567*** -0.013 0.426*** 0.445** 1175825 0.025 
(2.73)  (-3.46)  (-0.32) (4.27) (2.18)   
0.462 1.280*** -3655*** 0.005 0.497*** 0.407** 1175825 0.029 
(1.12) (6.84) (-2.93)  (0.14) (4.94) (2.06)   
0.441 1.165*** -0.501*** 0.408** 0.012 0.507*** 0.434** 1175825 0.028 
(1.03) (6.30) (-3.33) (2.41) (0.30) (5.01) (2.15)     
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Table 35 Regression analysis for gross profitability and Distance-to-Default 
This table lists Fama-MacBeth regression analysis for gross profitability (GPTA) and distress risk. In every month, each firm's monthly stock return (CRSP 
code ret) over the one-month Treasury bill rate is regressed by firm profitability, distress risk, and the control variables. All variables, excluding return, are 
winsorized at the1 percent level. This table presents time-series averages of regression coefficients and Newey-West adjusted t-statistics with 12 lags. The 
sample period contains observations from July 1980 to December 2015, a total 426 months. 
Intercept GPTA DD Interaction lnME lnBM MOM12 Observations Avg.R2 
0.225 1.182***     889997 0.003 
(0.70) (5.85)        
0.762*** -0.012***    889997 0.005 
(2.73)  (-2.92)       
0.268 1.158*** -0.011***    889997 0.008 
(0.87) (5.84) (-2.61)       
0.375 1.144*** -0.607*** 0.210   889997 0.009 
(1.27) (5.62) (-3.03) (0.65)      
0.149 1.360***  0.023 0.507*** 0.559** 889997 0.027 
(0.30) (6.59)   (0.52) (5.17) (2.53)   
0.952** -0.014*** -0.018 0.443*** 0.551** 889997 0.026 
(2.17)  (-4.38)  (-0.45) (4.55) (2.47)   
0.331 1.328*** -0.012*** 0. 002 0.518*** 0.504** 889997 0.029 
(0.71) (6.52) (-4.02)  (0.04) (5.21) (2.31)   
0.388 1.336*** -0.618*** 0.056 -0.005 0.520*** 0.510** 889997 0.030 
(0.85) (6.38) (-3.87) (0.18) (-0.12) (5.26) (2.32)     
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Table 36 Regression analysis for gross profitability and O-score 
This table lists Fama-MacBeth regression analysis for gross profitability (GPTA) and distress risk. In every month, each firm's monthly stock return (CRSP 
code ret) over the one-month Treasury bill rate is regressed by firm profitability, distress risk, and the control variables. All variables, excluding return, are 
winsorized at the1 percent level. This table presents time-series averages of regression coefficients and Newey-West adjusted t-statistics with 12 lags. The 
sample period contains observations from July 1980 to December 2015, for 426 total months. 
Intercept GPTA O-score Interaction lnME lnBM MOM12 Observations Avg.R2 
0.297 1.156***     1122397 0.004 
(0.93) (5.87)        
0.697** -0.073***    1122397 0.005 
(2.18)  (-2.62)       
0.288 1.026*** -0.049*    1122397 0.008 
(0.87) (5.28) (-1.75)       
0.523** 0.772*** -0.368*** 0.6352***   1122397 0.007 
(1.97) (4.22) (-2.62) (4.05)      
0.321 1.286***  0.004 0.440*** 0.510** 1122397 0.025 
(0.68) (6.72)   (0.09) (4.60) (2.55)   
0.978** -0.088*** -0.060 0.315*** 0.568*** 1122397 0.024 
(2.24)  (-3.77)  (-1.63) (3.27) (2.76)   
0.434 1.125*** -0.053** -0.028 0.399*** 0.509** 1122397 0.027 
(0.97) (6.16) (-2.35)  (-0.75) (4.09) (2.52)   
0.545 1.078*** -0.251** 0.2686* -0.014 0.423*** 0.506** 1122397 0.027 
(1.28) (5.53) (-2.05) (1.76) (-0.34) (4.31) (2.51)     
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Table 37 Regression analysis for operating profitability and failure probability  
This table lists Fama-MacBeth regression analysis for operating profitability (OPTA) and distress risk. In every month, each firm's monthly stock return (CRSP 
code ret) over the one-month Treasury bill rate is regressed by firm profitability, distress risk, and the control variables. All variables, excluding return, are 
winsorized at the1 percent level. This table presents time-series averages of regression coefficients and Newey-West adjusted t-statistics with 12 lags. The 
sample period contains observations from July 1980 to December 2015, a total 426 months.  
Intercept OPTA FP Interaction lnME lnBM MOM12 Observations Avg.R2 
0.379 2.478***     1175825 0.005 
(1.09) (4.65)        
0.862*** -3.896***    1175825 0.006 
(3.35)  (-2.66)       
0.502* 2.200*** -2.637**    1175825 0.009 
(1.66) (4.91) (-2.04)       
0.537* 1.738*** -0.368*** 2.025***   1175825 0.009 
(1.73) (4.18) (-2.62) (3.88)      
0.692 3.046***  -0.055 0.450*** 0.569*** 1175825 0.025 
(1.51) (6.92)   (-1.43) (4.62) (2.67)   
1.079*** -4.567*** -0.013 00426*** 0.445** 1175825 0.025 
(2.73)  (-3.46)  (-0.32) (4.27) (2.18)   
0.894** 2.816*** -2.997** -0.066* 0.444*** 0.480** 1175825 0.028 
(2.23) (7.35) (-2.54)  (-1.81) (4.48) (2.38)   
0.878** 2.517*** -0.362*** 1.081** -0.062* 0.439*** 0.507** 1175825 0.028 
(2.12) (6.46) (-2.76) (2.40) (-1.68) (4.48) (2.45)     
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Table 38 Regression analysis for operating profitability and Distance-to-Default 
This table lists Fama-MacBeth regression analysis for operating profitability (OPTA) and distress risk. In every month, each firm's monthly stock return (CRSP 
code ret) over the one-month Treasury bill rate is regressed by firm profitability, distress risk, and the control variables. All variables, excluding return, are 
winsorized at the1 percent level. This table presents time-series averages of regression coefficients and Newey-West adjusted t-statistics with 12 lags. The 
sample period contains observations from July 1980 to December 2015, 426 total months. 
Intercept OPTA DD Interaction lnME lnBM MOM12 Observations Avg.R2 
0.347 2.793***     889997 0.006 
(1.00) (4.80)        
0.762*** -0.012***    889997 0.005 
(2.73)  (-2.92)       
0.382 2.678*** -0.008**    889997 0.009 
(1.16) (4.97) (-2.12)       
0.420 2.530*** -0.469*** 0.635   889997 0.010 
(1.30) (4.86) (-2.97) (0.84)      
0.645 3.481***  -0.064 0.460*** 0.620*** 889997 0.027 
(1.39) (7.55)   (-1.61) (4.88) (2.76)   
0.952** -0.014*** -0.018 0.443*** 0.551** 889997 0.026 
(2.17)  (-4.38)  (-0.45) (4.55) (2.47)   
0.796* 3.378*** -0.011*** -0.080** 0.470*** 0.570** 889997 0.029 
(1.81) (7.57) (-3.71)  (-2.11) (4.92) (2.58)   
0.855** 3.340*** -0.567*** 0.136 -0.085** 0.474*** 0.573** 889997 0.030 
(1.97) (7.74) (-4.35) (0.19) (-2.27) (4.99) (2.57)     
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Table 39 Regression analysis for operating profitability and O-score 
This table lists Fama-MacBeth regression analysis for operating profitability (OPTA) and distress risk. In every month, each firm's monthly stock return (CRSP 
code ret) over the one-month Treasury bill rate is regressed by firm profitability, distress risk, and the control variables. All variables, excluding return, are 
winsorized at the 1 percent level. This table presents time-series averages of regression coefficients and Newey-West adjusted t-statistics with 12 lags. The 
sample period contains observations from July 1980 to December 2015, 426 total months. 
Intercept OPTA O-score Interaction lnME lnBM MOM12 Observations Avg.R2 
0.458 2.390***     1122397 0.005 
(1.35) (4.77)        
0.697** -0.073***    1122397 0.005 
(2.18)  (-2.62)       
0.464 2.462*** 0.007     1122397 0.007 
(1.39) (6.01) (0.27)       
0.677** 1.044** -0.278* 2.413***   1122397 0.009 
(2.52) (2.06) (-1.66) (2.93)      
0.810* 3.060***  -0.077** 0.396*** 0.564*** 1122397 0.025 
(1.81) (7.47)   (-2.07) (4.15) (2.77)   
0.978** -0.087*** -0.060 0.315*** 0.568*** 1122397 0.024 
(2.24)  (-3.77)  (-1.63) (3.27) (2.76)   
0.796* 3.221*** 0.012  -0.075** 0.403*** 0.546*** 1122397 0.026 
(1.83) (8.78) (0.56)  (-2.07) (4.16) (2.67)   
0.874** 2.665*** -0.081 0.653 -0.079** 0.386*** 0.547*** 1122397 0.027 
(2.29) (6.21) (-0.58) (1.03) (-2.20) (4.11) (2.69)     
 
 
 
  
6.6 Conclusions 
This chapter, together with Chapter 5, outlines the profitability premium and its 
relations to several firm characteristics, and provides empirical evidence 
showing how profitability premium relates to another risk factor, firm’s distress 
risk. A significant interaction between firm profitability and distress risk in 
determining expected stock returns during the 1980 to 2015 period is observed. 
To verify these findings with reference to the existing literature, several distress 
risk measures that are used in Franzen et al. (2007) and Bharath and Shumway 
(2008) research are used. Combining these techniques with Campbell et al.’s 
(2008) failure probability, this research covers several measurements of distress 
risk, including accounting-based predictors, market-based predictors, and 
hybrid predictors. The average distress risks across one-way sorted profitability 
portfolios are similar, where distress risk is negatively associated with firm’s 
profitability. Thus, the findings of this research are unlikely to be the result of 
spurious correlations or model misspecification. 
The findings support the view that firm profitability and distress risk influence 
each other, as documented by scholars like Altman (1968) and Olson (1980).  
Investors interpret high distress risk as a negative impact factor in terms of a 
firm’s future profitability. Thus, the distress risk-expected return relationship is 
more pronounced in low profitability firms. When a firm’s profitability is high, 
the impact of distress risk is less important, as the positive strong profitability 
gives sufficient expectation for high dividend payouts, leading to a positive 
expected return for those stocks. In fact, the 𝐺𝑃𝑇𝐴 − 𝐹𝑃  and 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐴 − 𝐹𝑃 
portfolio sorts show that, when a portfolio’s average profitability is high, 
  
investors are willing to take on additional distress risk, although they do demand 
higher expected returns for such portfolios. The value-weighted returns for 
portfolios formed by high 𝐺𝑃𝑇𝐴  and high 𝐹𝑃 are 1.97% per month, or 1.296% 
per month for high 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐴 and high 𝐹𝑃 portfolios. Compared to the baseline 
return of 0.358% per month (see Ball et al. (2015)) for 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ − 𝐿𝑜𝑤 𝐺𝑃𝑇𝐴 
hedge portfolio returns, controlling for distress risk significantly increases the 
performance of profitability long-short portfolios. 
Additionally, cross-sectional regressions produce findings consistent with 
portfolio analysis. The interaction effect between profitability and distress risk 
is positively priced to expected stock returns and is statistically significant in 
most samples.  The pricing power of firm profitability is also partially clustered 
in high distress risk firms: the difference of the pricing power of profitability 
variable is at 25% to 43% in high distress risk firms versus low distress risk 
firms, a statistically significant variation. 
The findings suggest several areas for potential future research. Firstly, there is 
some evidence that distress risk explains a firm’s profitability pricing power, 
but the current results do not allow the details of the mechanism by which the 
interaction of a firm’s profitability and distress risk works to be ascertained in 
detail. Previous research has suggested economic endogeneity between firm 
profitability and distress risk, and this has been exploited as a proposed 
explanation for the empirical results. It is therefore natural to demand a more 
precise econometric analysis to discover if there is a causality effect between 
the two factors. This would also allow investigation of whether the term-
  
structure of distress risk, as shown in Table 4 of Campbell et al. (2008), further 
contributes to the pricing power of profitability. 
The second outstanding issue relates to the results found when using Distance-
to-Default as distress risk proxy. Here, the measure does not explain the two 
profitability anomalies: the profitability premium does not concentrate in firms 
with high 𝐷𝐷, and the interaction of profitability and 𝐷𝐷 is not statistically 
significant in the cross-sectional regression analyses. One potential explanation 
is that high 𝐷𝐷 firms have some characteristics that differ from high 𝐹𝑃 or high 
𝑂 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 firms. This would reconcile the finding that the average 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ −
𝐿𝑜𝑤 portfolio returns in the highest distress risk quintile are not significant in 
the 5-by-5 independent portfolio sorts. Another possible explanation is the bid-
ask bonus on penny stocks. Those stocks have high distress risk alongside 
extreme illiquidity conditions (see Chapter 4). Thus, most research drops stocks 
that have closing prices below one dollar before conducting analysis.   This may 
contribute to providing a solution to this issue as penny stocks were retained in 
the models examined in this chapter to maintain the consistency of the sampling 
method used by Novy-Marx (2013) and Ball et al. (2015). 
  
  
7 CONCLUSION 
 
7.1 Findings  
 
This thesis has scrutinised two return anomalies: firm’s distress risk and firm’s 
profitability in determining stock returns cross-sectionally. The research seeks 
to explain stock return premiums that are driven by these factors. The first 
chapter, Limit of Arbitrage and the Distress Puzzle finds the distress risk 
premium is clustered in stocks of high transaction cost and holding cost. When 
double-sorting firms are based on these factors and distress risk, the average 
value-weighted distress premium increases from 0.62% per month to 1.35%- 
2.17% per month in the top 20% high limit-of-arbitrage effect firms. 
Furthermore, it is observed that the interaction of distress risk with stock’s 
illiquidity ratio, short-selling constraints and idiosyncratic volatility further 
characterises the predicting power of distress risk.   
 
The second chapter, Profitability, Insider Ownership and Cross-sectional Stock 
Returns, examines how profitability anomalies are related to firm’s insider 
ownership in terms of determining cross-sectional stock returns in the U.S. 
market. Portfolio-level analyses discover that firms with lower agency costs, as 
proxied by various forms of insider ownership, are associated with high 
expected stock returns, in line with Gompers et al. (2003). Additionaly, firm’s 
insider ownership is positively related to profitability premium in the 1980-2015 
U.S. stock market sample. The interactive relationship between firm’s 
profitability and insider ownership can explain stock returns and the 
profitability premium at stock-level analyses. However, this empirical evidence 
  
is sensitive to additional risk factors and sample volume. 
 
The third chapter, Profitability Premium, Firm’s Distress Risk and Stock 
Returns, links the two empirical findings by documenting a robust relation 
between the two pricing factors. This research finds significant interaction 
effects of firm’s profitability as well as distress risk in co-determining stock 
returns cross-sectional. In line with the findings of Altman (1968) and Fama and 
French (2006) that firm’s past information of profitability predicts future 
distress and vice versa. It is also found that the predicting power of firm’s 
profitability is partially clustered with firms having high distress risk, in which 
the difference of the power can be as large as 2.4 standard errors from zero. 
These findings, combined with earlier chapters, shed a light on exploring the 
two fundamental pricing factors under a unified framework. 
 
 
 
7.2 Limitations  
 
Given the growing literature that questions the research paradigm of empirical 
asset pricing research, this thesis has some limitations, whilst the best effort has 
been made to cover potential research bias, and robustness check has been 
conducted to ensure the coherent of findings. One might argue that the method 
of Fama-MacBeth (1973) regression overstates the significance of the average 
slope of tested pricing factors, which is raised by Peterson (2009) who also 
suggests several empirical techniques to minimize the potential bias in 
estimating variable’s covariance. Besides, all portfolio analyses are constructed 
using two variables’ independent sort method and have not considered the 
  
dependent sort methods, which present more meaningful results if researchers 
are interested in. For example, whether controlling for distress risk can further 
amplify/weaken the pricing power of profitability ratio.  
 
The empirical findings are also restricted due to the limited availability of data. 
This particularly affects the results of research in Chapter 5. As noted by 
Bebchuk et al. (2013), finding a good proxy of agency cost is difficult in terms 
of two aspects: First, the mechanism how agency cost affects cross-sectional 
stock returns is still an ongoing debate, where no asset pricing models have been 
derived to prove the agency cost is covariate with stochastic discount factor. 
Second, even in the U.S. stock market where academia has investigated for 
decades, firms with full disclosure of corporate governance status are limited to 
those listed firms that are indexed by S&P or covered by IRRC. These firms 
only cover a small fraction of the market. Since the thesis’s research object is 
two market-wide phenomena, the availability of data may restrict the 
interpretation of empirical findings. 
 
In addition, in Chapter 6 one of the distress risk measures, Distance-to-Default 
( 𝐷𝐷 ) has no explanatory power to the profitability anomaly, which is 
contradictory to the proposed hypothesis. It could be arguable that, according to 
Campbell et al. (2008), 𝐷𝐷 is a distress risk measurement that is less accurate 
than logit estimation model. But this argument could stand only if a systematic 
comparison of those measures is proposed. Another possible explanation is that 
𝐷𝐷 is heavily influenced by short-term stock information, which contains noisy 
information that distorts the true distress risk information that 𝐷𝐷 is delivering. 
  
Therefore, the averaged value of 𝐷𝐷  in a long estimation window is more 
suitable for tests in annually rebalanced portfolios, or the portfolio could be 
rebalanced monthly to fit the market condition timely. 
 
Moreover, this thesis has not yet contributed to understanding asset pricing by 
presenting new asset pricing models. Given the extensive research on 
investigating the distress puzzle and profitability premium, one might present a 
multi-factor asset pricing model and compare the explanatory power with other 
more prestigious models. These discussed limitations could be the topic for 
future research. 
 
 
7.3 Future Works 
 
The extension of Chapter 4 Limit of Arbitrage and the Distress Puzzle can start 
with using other distress risk measures such as O-score and Z-score which has 
been mentioned in the research methodology chapter (See Avramov et al. 
(2013) and George and Hwang for the discussion of using O-score and Z-score 
in the asset pricing research). The extension of using other distress risk measures 
can further depict the whole picture of distress risk and limit of arbitrage and 
further reduce any potential bias of selecting distress risk proxy. 
Future research related to Chapter 5 can test whether alternative interpretation 
is more suitable to explain the imperfect explanation of the profitability 
premium and insider ownership. For instance, Edelen et al. (2016) find the 
  
relation between institutional ownership to market anomalies is also subject to 
costly arbitrage and faulty earnings expectations, which are also popular 
explanations to anomalies in the literature. The change of institutional 
ownership is better in capturing the behaviour of institutional ownership than 
the static percentage of shares held by institutions. Besides, one may collect and 
re-estimate the analysis using additional corporate governance data and 
blockholder information from other sources. As documented in Chapter 5, the 
limited availability of this information from EXECUCOMP and Thomson 
Reuters has restricted the analysis to present robust findings. Moreover, there 
are other mechanisms that show how governance mechanism affects stock 
returns. For instance, Hou and Robinson (2006) argue that industry competition 
may also result in a variation of firm’s profitability. Given research like Giroud 
and Mueller (2011), Abdioglu et al. (2015) have controlled the industry effect 
to examine the variation of firm’s corporate governance. The difference of 
industry may be an alternative explanation on why insider ownership is related 
to the profitability premium phenomenon. 
Future research related to Chapter 6 can start from modelling the economic 
relation between distress risk and profitability and incorporating them under a 
unified asset pricing framework, similar to the way Novy-Marx (2013) adopted 
a dividend-discount model or the way Garlappi and Yan (2011) or George and 
Hwang (2010) used a stochastic discount factor model. For the empirical 
research area, one should address the insignificance of 𝐷𝐷 in explaining the 
profitability premium by considering alternative estimating methods to the 
option-implied model, or using a longer time-averaged 𝐷𝐷 to avoid random 
variation in the short-term. Given the finding from Chapter 4 that high distress 
  
risk firms are also difficult to arbitrage, the effect of arbitrage limit and size 
effect should be considered in conducting empirical research in order to present 
the full picture of the two anomalies. 
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